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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

DIALECTIC OF LENINISM, DISCIPLINE, ONE-MAN COMMAND

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 85 (signed to press 2 Apr 85) pp 18-24

[Article by Col V. Manilov: "The Leninist Principles of Socialist Discipline"]

/Excerpts/The study of questions pertaining to the development, the universal establishment and undeviating strengthening of the new discipline have an important place in the Leninist theory of socialist revolution. V.I. Lenin saw it as a powerful weapon of the party and the people in the building of socialism and the defense of socialism's gains, as an absolute and mandatory condition for achieving ever higher levels of maturity for the socialist society.

Today, at a time when our nation is accomplishing the tasks involved in improving developed socialism, when the party is focusing the attention and efforts of the Soviet people on systematically bringing all aspects of our society's life into complete conformity with the highest, scientific concepts of socialism, Leninist concepts and principles of socialist discipline are particularly important. Their realization permits us to make full use of the enormous possibilities and the decisive advantages of developed socialism, to intensify the economy, to steadily improve the people's welfare and culture and to strengthen the nation's defense capability.

Soviet military discipline is one of the types of socialist discipline and is in the mold of our society's discipline. Strictly because of this, it has the same basic principles as those of socialist discipline as a whole. The principle of awareness occupies the pivotal, core place within the system of these principles.

Strictly speaking, awareness is the main distinguishing feature and the most important qualitative characteristic of socialist discipline. Naturally, this also includes our military discipline. In antagonistic socioeconomic formations, discipline has in fact always been and to this day continues to be the loyal servant of the exploitative classes. Their well-being rests on the forced labor, the sorrow and need, the oppression and lack of rights of the bulk of the population. And these relations--relations of domination and subordination, of glaring social injustice--are sanctified by religion, established in moral and legal standards and reflected in the demands of discipline and in its principles. The law that man preys upon man holds sway.

And the more meager the spiritual life of the working masses, the more base and primitive their interests, the more passive and inert they are on the social level, and the more disunited, the more profitable it is for the powers that be, because this is precisely what they need--compliant human material, blindly obedient and reconciled to their lot as slaves (whether it be in a slave-owning society or the contemporary capitalist society).

It is therefore far from accidental that the term "aware" is used as a synonym for the term "socialist" in the Leninist tenets on the new discipline, Soviet discipline. V.I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that it is precisely awareness which is the main and crucial sources of the strength and viability of the new social relations among the people of the new social system. Awareness is precisely what makes the socialist state strong. And it is precisely awareness which must be the keystone for all the work of establishing universal organization and discipline.

With respect to military organizational development, V.I. Lenin himself linked the historic fact of the birth of the Red Army, a new type of army, directly and immediately with the establishment of aware socialist discipline. Neither a military organization for the socialist state nor defense of the revolutionary gains is possible unless such discipline exists, unless the masses are aware of the objectives and causes of wars, unless they understand that they are fighting for a cause of vital importance to them.

In the contemporary situation the Leninist principle of awareness with respect to socialist discipline is becoming increasingly more important. The fact is that the more extensive and complex the tasks being performed by the nation, the greater is the role of the human factor and consequently, the role of organization and discipline. This dependence is in the nature of an objective law of social development. And if the level of discipline does not conform to the demands of modern production, let us say, this invariably retards its development and has a negative effect on its end results. It was with good reason that Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, mentioned the strengthening of discipline and the implementation of decisive steps to further establish order among the basic tasks of the party's domestic policy and its ideological work.

This fully applies also to the Armed Forces of the USSR. The end result of the servicemen's work today is the combat readiness of the subunit, the unit and the ship. The forms and methods of accomplishing the missions defined by the requirements for combat readiness are reflected most concretely in military discipline. Consequently, conscientious fulfillment of the demands of military discipline is an essential condition for the successful functioning of the Armed Forces and is at the same time one of the most important indicators of the fightingman's awareness.

Such is the dialectical linkage between the objective and the subjective in socialist discipline. The actual unity of the knowledge, the convictions and the practical work of the servicemen is the most graphic vital manifestation of that linkage. The achievement of such unity--and not just a profound understanding and awareness of the need, but the actual observance of regulation

order by all, not just in words, but in practice--is the super-task, one might say, of all the work performed to strengthen military discipline.

As this task is accomplished, it is important to see in each fightingman the personality with its unique individuality and inner world, its own experience in life, even though this may not yet be extensive, with its joys and concerns, its plans and needs. It is impossible to realize the principle of awareness and discipline without this, just as it is impossible, incidentally, if the teacher does not set an example of irreproachable organization and discipline and does not possess a high level of professional and general development or pedagogical tact. The maintaining of a high level of organization and order can be turned into an aware need, into a demand not just of the mind, but of the heart of every fightingman only by combining and merging these two features in the work of the military cadres.

The Leninist principle of responsibility, independence and initiative is implemented in close linkage with the principle of awareness, supplementing it and filling in its social fabric. The direct dependence of responsibility upon the degree to which the individual is aware of the demands of discipline is perfectly apparent. Along with the direct connection, however, there is a no less important reverse linkage, which is manifested in the individual's ability not just to recognize the demands of discipline, but also to fulfill them.

V.I. Lenin believed that responsibility is inseparable from a sense of participating in the accomplishment of general state tasks, from the desire to contribute one's bit to their accomplishment, to take on a part of the common affairs and concerns.

An extremely important aspect of the Leninist understanding of responsibility as a principle of socialist discipline is the fact that it is not featureless and amorphous, but always has a specific objective. And the implementation of this principle requires actually assuring that every individual is responsible for a specific, strictly and precisely defined job or part of a job. If V.I. Lenin regarded irresponsibility in general as the most dangerous evil, it is especially intolerable in military affairs, since "it very frequently results invariably in catastrophe, chaos, panic, multiple authority and defeat" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 39, p. 46).

The principle of responsibility in the army and navy has become even more important in the contemporary situation. There are many reasons for this. The level of development of weaponry, the enormous scale and dynamism of combat operations as they are conceived in military art for the present and the foreseeable future demand unprecedented precision, promptness, coordination and agreement of the efforts of many, many people. And a breakdown in any single section, on a single team as a result of irresponsibility on the part of even a single serviceman can bring the threat of failure in the execution of the combat order by a subunit, unit or ship.

There is yet another circumstance which makes responsibility as a principle of discipline particularly important today. A modern war, should imperialism

unleash one, will involve the use of weapons which will inevitably confront the troops with the need for independent, autonomous combat operations, with missions which have to be performed in a situation of uncertainty, extensive radioelectronic counteraction, lack of contact with superior commanders and staffs, and isolation from the main and adjacent forces. Large formations, small subunits or individual servicemen may find themselves in such a situation. Is it necessary to point out how great the role of responsibility, independence and initiative will be in such a situation!

Aggressive circles of imperialism, primarily American, are building up a nuclear missile capability for a so-called first strike and are frantically developing and adopting new conventional weapons systems, including high-precision systems the combat effectiveness of which is comparable to that of nuclear weapons. Ruling circles of the USA and NATO are advancing new, particularly aggressive concepts involving surprise "preventive" attacks "in depth" and are creating groupings of forces intended for unleashing a war. This is precisely why every subunit, unit and ship today, regardless of where they are deployed, must constantly be in a state of readiness to conduct combat operations in an extremely complex situation and with a severe shortage of time. This is why it is vitally important to have constant military discipline developed to the maximum possible degree in all elements of our Armed Forces. This accounts for the extremely great measure of accountability for the absolute observance of its requirements.

The Armed Forces as a whole and each subunit, unit and ship individually perform perfectly specific missions within the framework of this responsibility, success being achieved through harmonious, coordinated efforts, through the common work of all members of the military collectives. And this work, as Lenin expressed it, cannot be performed without order, without everyone being subordinate to that order. It demands absolute and extremely strict unity of will. Such unity can be achieved through the unquestioning subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one individual, the leader. V.I. Lenin demonstrated the erroneousness of the opinion that individual administrative power is incompatible with democratism, with the Soviet type of state. Specifically, he believed that one-man command is the only correct way to organize the work in the army. V.I. Lenin regarded one-man command not just as the right, but as the duty of the leader, one which demands special qualities of him: competence, firmness, principle, the ability to gain the trust of people, to organize and lead them. He sharply criticized and unmercifully ridiculed a lack of will or inability to direct matters into the proper channel on the part of those in charge. V.I. Lenin considered persuasion to be the main method of achieving unity. He stressed the fact that the campaign against lack of discipline cannot be conducted in the form of propaganda and agitation alone, however, that it must also be conducted with force, that power must be intelligently dispensed and measures established by law skillfully applied.

The facts should be stressed that unity of will as a principle of discipline can actually only be realized in a socialist collective, in a socialist army, which does not have the antagonisms between commanders and the rank and file which are inherent in the military organization of exploitative states. It

stems from this that only in a socialist army does the demand for absolute subordination, which is the keystone of all military discipline, go beyond mere obedience to a specific official, have great sociopolitical meaning and coincide with the convictions and the moral ideals of laboring people who have joined the ranks of the socialist homeland's defenders.

The compound will of hundreds, of tens of thousands of people expressed in a single individual, the leader, is developed in the Soviet way in our nation--that is, on the extremely broad base of socialist democracy and under the leadership of the society's political vanguard, the Communist Party. V.I. Lenin pointed out this latter circumstance particularly, stressing the fact that individuals vested with the authority of one-man command are carrying out not their own will, but the will of the society, which is reflected on a scientific basis in party policy in the Soviet socialist state. As the sole commander implements the principle of unity of will, he is therefore expected to firmly carry out that policy, to always take a party approach to matters, to exhibit a high level of principle and demandingness toward subordinates, to constantly rely upon the party and Komsomol organizations and to make full use of their mobilizing force and prestige for enhancing combat readiness and strengthening discipline.

This essentially comprises the party basis for Soviet one-man command. The party has always considered and still considers the need to strengthen one-man command in the Armed Forces in inseparable linkage with the task of intensifying party-political work. With the forms and methods inherent in them, one-man command and party-political work assure the achievement of unity of will and action in the personnel and consequently, both firm discipline and a high level of combat readiness as well. Soviet one-man command actually provides a broad front for party-political work, which in turn strengthens the sociopolitical and ideological basis of one-man command.

The term "comradely" is frequently encountered among the Leninist characteristics of socialist discipline. And there is a reason for this. The term "comrade," borne and tested in the flames of the revolutionary proletariat's class battles on the basis of the common interests, objectives and ideals for the socialist reform of reality, is a symbol of cohesion, solidarity and unity. And comradely discipline is proletarian discipline, which personifies solidarity and cooperation in the struggle. Consequently, the historical uniqueness of socialist discipline lies precisely in this cohesive comradely bond, in proletarian collectivism.

With the victory of the October Revolution, the working class assumed a leading position within the system of social relations, proletarian collectivism became the active motivating force behind the building of the new society and its defense, and its requirements and standards became one of the main principles of socialist discipline, the principle of collective functioning.

Military service is collective functioning from beginning to end, but it is also strictly regulated functioning. It is functioning in which an order has the force of a law, and loyalty to soldierly friendship and military comradeship is the regulation duty of every fightingman. It is in the military collective and under its active influence that the diverse forms of

social communication among the servicemen--obedience, efficiency of performance, subordination, one-man command and friendship--are rounded out with the specific substance of life. Socialist competition, a powerful means of enhancing the social activeness and responsibility of the fightingmen and of uniting them, is organized and conducted in the collective. Finally, skills are strengthened and habits of collectivist behavior, without which really firm discipline is simply impossible, are formed in and through the collective.

In short, the indoctrinational possibilities of the military collective are enormous. And the effective realization of these possibilities depends primarily upon the sole commander. He is the central figure in the military collective by virtue of his service position. It is important for him to be the central figure also on the strength of his professional and moral prestige. The merging of service and actual status combined with the ability to rely upon the collective and to properly organize its functioning is an extremely important indicator of the officer's ideological-political and professional maturity and is an absolute requisite for successful realization of the principle of collective functioning.

The Leninist principles of socialist discipline serve as the methodological basis for the extensive work performed by the party to strengthen order and organization in our society. A profound and clear understanding of these principles and their systematic, creative application guarantee success in the work performed by commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy to establish aware and responsible collectivist discipline imbued with a single will in the subunits and units and on the ships. Only this kind of discipline insures a mastery of the modern weapons and the art of using them. Only this kind of discipline makes it possible to fully realize the great moral-political potential of our Armed Forces. Only this kind of discipline can reliably maintain the troops and naval forces at a proper level of readiness to guarantee the routing of any aggressor and to safeguard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the homeland's security.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LENINISM: BASIS OF PARTY'S SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, DEFENSE POLICY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 85 (signed to press 2 Apr 85) pp 3-8

[Leading article: "The Life-Giving Force of Leninism"]

[Excerpts] In all the stages of its history, the Soviet Nation has undeviatingly followed the path indicated by Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The nation's industrialization, the socialist reorganization of agriculture and the cultural revolution have been carried out within an extremely brief historical period, and the national question has been equitably resolved under the tested leadership of the Communist Party founded by him. We have developed our own skilled cadres, and great scope has been provided for the development of science and technology. The nation's economic makeup has been fundamentally transformed. Our homeland has become a mighty industrial power with a modern agriculture and advanced culture. Prior to the war, the Soviet Union had already achieved second place in the world and first place in Europe with respect to industrial output volume.

Enormous credit goes to V.I. Lenin also for the fact that he scientifically substantiated the need to defend the new social system borne of the socialist revolution and developed a well-ordered doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland. It provided the foundation on which the party has continued to persistently strengthen the Soviet Nation's security during the years of socialist development. This has made it possible to significantly enhance the USSR's defense capability, which was demonstrated with enormous force during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet people and their Armed Forces performed an unprecedented feat under the leadership of Lenin's party. They not only defended the freedom and independence of their socialist homeland, but also made a crucial contribution to the salvation of European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians. Our Victory was a triumph of the most advanced social and state structure, borne of October, of its economic system, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the superiority of our military organization. The commemoration of the 115th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth has been illuminated by the light of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory.

The Marxist-Leninist concept of developed socialism as a special, objectively essential first phase of the communist socioeconomic formation forms the core

of the CPSU's strategy and tactics in the contemporary situation. It is the result of an in-depth analysis of the experience of our party and other fraternal parties and of world realities, and is an outstanding contribution to the theory of scientific communism.

The strategic line worked out at the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee is one of accelerated socioeconomic development of the nation and improvement of all aspects of the society's life. This process includes transforming the materials and equipment base, intensifying production on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress, perfecting the system of social relations, particularly economic relations, developing the individual himself and improving the material conditions of his life and labor.

The CPSU always organically links current tasks with strategic ones. Lenin believed that only a large-scale mechanized industry, capable also of reorganizing crop production, could provide the material foundation for socialism. The development of heavy industry has been and continues to be an absolute prerequisite for accomplishing all of the economic and social tasks. The 26th party congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee considered the matter in precisely this, the Leninist way. Accelerating the development and raising the level of machine building as the basis for the technical reequipment of public production, the application of modern technology and the improvement of product quality are moving to the fore. Implementation of the long-range Energy Program of the USSR and the provision of the national economy with fuel and energy, raw materials, metal and other materials are also of fundamental importance.

Questions pertaining to agrarian theory and agrarian policy occupied an importance place in Lenin's work. As a component of the general plan for building socialism in the USSR, Lenin's cooperative plan showed the peasants the only certain path to socialism and was successfully implemented. The Leninist tenets with respect to the agrarian question are still of permanent importance today. They provide the scientific foundation for the party's work to improve agriculture's productive forces and socioeconomic relations in the rural area. The Food Program of the USSR, which was ratified 3 years ago and is now being implemented, embodies Lenin's ideas about a reliable food supply for the nation and all-round progress for agriculture under mature socialism.

Stressing the undeviating nature of the course worked out by the party for accelerating the nation's socioeconomic development and improving all aspects of the society's life, the special March 1985 Plenum of the party Central Committee pointed out that we must achieve a decisive advance in converting the national economy to intensive development. We must, we are obligated, to reach the most advanced scientific-technical positions and the highest world level in public labor productivity.

Every Soviet individual, in whatever area he works in the building of communism, must thoroughly understand that the more conscientiously and effectively he works, the stronger will be the socialist homeland and the better

and more beautiful will be our life. "In order to live better, we must work better." This is what the Lenin party teaches us. By "living better" it means not only receiving a greater income and having a higher consumption level, but--and this is very important--also possessing values of a spiritual, moral and psychological order, values which the Soviet individual treasures no less, and perhaps more, than material benefits. Everything for the sake of people, for the good of people--this program tenet is increasingly being given more profound and specific substance in our society.

As the CPSU directs the building of communism, it persistently and purposefully strives to achieve external conditions conducive to the accomplishment of the creative tasks and to secure a just, universal peace and security of peoples. From the first state act of the Soviet regime--the Lenin Peace Decree--to the Peace Program worked out at the 24th CPSU Congress and developed at the 25th and 26th congresses, this has been the consistently class, internationalist line of our party and our state. This line is based on Leninist foreign policy principles--the principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems. Our party's Leninist foreign policy is one of the sources of the Soviet homeland's strength and its great international prestige.

Struggling persistently and tirelessly for peace, our party assesses the nature, the trends and specific features of contemporary world development from a profoundly class position, in the Leninist manner. It exercises great vigilance with respect to the intrigues of the imperialist aggressors, because never before has there been such a terrible threat as the one hanging over mankind today. The party regards the achievement of agreement among the opposing forces on the immediate halting of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and prevention of the militarization of space as the only intelligent way out of the situation which has developed. The Soviet delegation to the Geneva talks has precisely defined the position of the USSR: the halting, and not the continuation, of the arms race, the halting of missile deployment and the actual and large-scale reduction of weapons stockpiles. Positive results can only be achieved in the talks, however, with complete understanding by our partners of the humane objectives of the Soviet Union's proposals and their recognition as the only ones acceptable in the existing international situation.

Loyal to Lenin's precepts on maintaining great vigilance with respect to the intrigues of aggressive imperialist forces, our party and the Soviet State are effectively concerning themselves with the nation's defense and with the strengthening of the combat capability and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The party is resolving all questions pertaining to military organizational development and to the development and improvement of the Armed Forces in a spirit of general state development.

"In the complex international situation," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said in his speech at the special March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "it is important as never before to maintain our homeland's defense capability at a level letting potential aggressors know very well that an encroachment upon

the security of the Soviet Nation or its allies, upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a devastating responsive strike. Our glorious Armed Forces will continue to have at their disposal everything necessary for this."

The task assigned the Soviet Army and Navy by the party is a great and responsible one. The homeland's defenders are performing their job all the more vigilantly because of this. They firmly adhere to V.I. Lenin's precepts in their daily training, studying military affairs in a real way, persistently mastering the use of the weapons and combat equipment and methods of conducting modern warfare, strengthening discipline and organization and increasing their vigilance and combat readiness. Socialist competition has been launched on an extensive basis in the units and on the ships with the slogan: "For the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress--our selfless military labor!". Fightingmen of the '80s are honorably continuing the sacred combat traditions of the front-line fighters.

It is the task of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations to channel this patriotic enthusiasm of army and navy personnel into the further enhancement of their field, air and naval training and the strengthening of military discipline. In the contemporary situation, in which the army and navy are outfitted with complex combat equipment and the tasks facing them and the conditions for combat operations have become considerably more complex, Lenin's instruction on the need for military discipline "developed to the highest limits" has assumed exceptional importance.

Like all the Soviet people, fightingmen of the army and navy demonstrate monolithic unity round the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, and unanimously approve and support the Soviet State's foreign and domestic policy. Patriots and internationalists, they are prepared to honorably defend their socialist homeland and the interests of socialism and peace, together with fightingmen of the fraternal Warsaw Pact nations.

The light of Leninism and of Lenin's wisdom shines on our whole life. Lenin's concepts are our banner, our strength in the struggle to build the new society. Preserving unshakeable faith in these concepts, the Soviet people led by the Lenin party are proceeding confidently along the path of October and looking to the future with revolutionary optimism.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL CHIEFS OF RAILROAD TROOPS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Vovk: "To Raise the Fighting Spirit of Political Organs"]

[Text] A conference was held of the chiefs of political organs of the railroad troops. Lt Gen A. Stolyarov, a member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Administration of Railroad Troops, spoke on the tasks of political organs and party organizations in light of the decisions of the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and conferences of the CPSU Central Committee on questions of accelerating scientific and technical progress.

The necessity of strengthening party influence on all aspects of troop life and activity, the universal intensification of production, its technical rearmament, raising the effectiveness and quality of work, and the battle for economy and thrift were emphasized in the report and speeches by officers A. Kortusov, V. Sosnin, V. Shcherbinin, N. Yachkovskiy and others.

Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Lt Gen D. Volkogonov, Chief of Railroad Troops Col Gen M. Makartsev, and Chief of the Directorate of Party Organizational Work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Lt Gen V. Lukinykh spoke at the conference.

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ARMED FORCES

RESPONDING TO PARTY CALL FOR INTENSIFICATION IN ECONOMY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 85 p 2

[Article: "The Main Reserve for Intensifying the Economy: How to Conduct Classes on Materials from the CPSU CC Conference on Questions of Accelerating Scientific and Technical Progress"]

[Text] Fightingmen of the army and navy, like all of the Soviet people, greeted with enormous enthusiasm the results of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and its decision to convene the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 25 February 1986. The CPSU CC Plenum is significant in that it formulated the concept for accelerating the nation's social and economic development on the basis of scientific and technical progress.

A conference held in the CPSU Central Committee on 11 and 12 June 1985 on questions of accelerating scientific and technical progress was an important sociopolitical event in the nation's life. M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, presented a report at the conference on "the basic question of the party's economic policy." The report described achievements of the Soviet economy, demonstrated the need for and the possibility of accelerating the nation's social and economic development on the basis of scientific and technical progress, revealed shortcomings and difficulties, outlined ways and means of overcoming them and set the tasks for today and for the long-range.

The work of explaining Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's report and other conference materials is universally being developed and becoming more and more active today in the army and navy, in the units and on the ships. In order for the personnel to thoroughly study them, it will be necessary to prepare and conduct one political class for soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers, one class in the political training groups for shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, career servicemen and female military personnel, as well as within the system of party and economic education. Conference materials must be extensively used for studying the regular subjects in the Marxist-Leninist training groups for officers, giving special attention to the matter of increasing the responsibility of military cadres, improving their work style and having them take an active part in the ideological and propaganda work. Conference materials should be used at military educational institutions for studying the corresponding subjects in the training programs.

It is recommended that the following topics be covered in the classes:

1. Accelerating Scientific and Technical Progress--a Requirement of Life
2. The Tasks of the Fightingmen with Respect to Improving Their Military Skill and Greeting the 27th CPSU Congress in a Worthy Manner

It is best to conduct the political classes for soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers in the form of narration and discussion.

In the introduction the fact should be stressed that our party is preparing for the 27th Congress by implementing specific steps to seek and activate all reserves for enhancing production effectiveness and improving product quality. Our successes in economic development are indisputable. They are generally acknowledged, but we are now dealing with a new stage in our development, rapid progress in strategically important areas, the structural reorganization of production, a shift to intensification and the profound restructuring of the economic machinery and the entire system of management. It is an urgent matter, a matter for the entire party and the entire nation, to accelerate the nation's social and economic development on the basis of scientific and technical progress.

The discussion of the first topic must thoroughly cover the premises and conclusions presented in Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's report. These have to do with the restructuring of the investment and structural policy, the technical reequipping of enterprises, the conservation of resources and drastic improvement of product quality. It is important to explain to the fightingmen that it is essential in the contemporary situation to develop machine building at accelerated rates (it has the predominate role with respect to accelerating scientific and technical progress), to overcome shortcomings in capital construction, to establish proper order in the organization of production and to resolutely orient science toward the needs of production and production toward science. The party Central Committee's instructions on improving planning and management, restructuring the entire national economic system and converting from the large-scale economic experiment to the establishment of an integral system of management and control are highly important.

Special stress should be laid on the CPSU Central Committee's main directive for the work of party organizations today. It involves effecting a psychological restructuring of public awareness to conform to the new demands of life and a drastic change in the minds and attitudes of the cadres from top to bottom, focusing their attention on what is most important, scientific and technical progress. The ideological and propaganda cadres, the press, radio and television have been assigned the task of bringing out progressive experience in restructuring the national economy and convincing the people that the acceleration of scientific and technical progress is a vitally important matter conforming to the interests of all and permitting every individual to manifest his abilities and talents.

When beginning the explanation of the second topic, one needs to demonstrate the importance of the tenets and conclusions set forth by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev at the conference in the CPSU Central Committee for the fightingmen's successful accomplishment of the tasks involved in mastering the combat equipment and weapons and enhancing vigilance, organization, discipline, regulation order and the combat readiness of the units and ships. During the class it is important to reveal the place and role of Soviet fightingmen--reliable guards of the building of communism--in the accomplishment of the national tasks and to demonstrate the social significance of the military work. One should analyze how the tasks involved in the summer training period are accomplished in the unit, on the ship and in the subunit, and cite specific examples of exemplary fulfillment of military duty.

It is useful to stress the fact that it is the patriotic duty of the soldier and seamen, of every fightingman, to take an active part in socialist competition, thereby making the maximum personal contribution to maintaining the combat readiness of the Armed Forces at a level assuring a crushing defeat for any aggressor. Socialist competition must continue to focus on the struggle for excellent fulfillment of the combat training tasks and norms, the achievement of good results in the combat and political training, the mastery of the weapons and combat equipment, the raising of ratings, the observance of communist moral standards and military ethics, and irreproachable conduct.

In order to achieve a high ideological and organizational level for the classes and to link them closely with the life of the military collectives, it is essential to thoroughly instruct and prepare the group leaders and to involve leading officer personnel of the units, ships and formations in the conducting of the classes.

The purpose of the forthcoming classes is to actively contribute to the mobilization of the personnel to successfully accomplish the tasks involved in the summer training period and to greet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner.

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ARMED FORCES

MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS IN ARMORED VEHICLES

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 6, 1985 pp 6-11

[Article by Col L. Man'shin, department chief in the Main Armored Administration of the Ministry of Defense and Lt Cols Ye. Burkun and V. Chernikov, ZNAMENOSSETS correspondents: "'ZNAMENOSSETS' Investigates a Problem: The Role of Discipline in the Accident-Free Operation of Equipment"]

[Text] The staff room was filled with the hum of voices. The officers leaving the class were animatedly discussing a critique of the tactical exercises that were just concluded. Many of them were still mentally on the training ground and in the combat formations of the tankers and motorized riflemen.

"What's the matter, Nikolay Leont'yevich?" one of the commanders asked the commander of the armored service. "The subunits fulfilled their assigned tasks. On the whole, the equipment didn't let us down."

"Exactly, on the whole. But in particular?" responded his colleague, pausing at the threshold of the room.

The preoccupation of Officer N. Petrushenko was understandable: a number of combat vehicles had fallen into the hands of the repairmen during the exercise. Because of these delays, some crews had not caught up to their subunits.

The basic reasons for the appearance of defects were clearly traced behind the terse lines of the dispatches reports received by the armored service: the breach of rules of vehicle operation and maintenance, the poor preparedness of individual drivers and driver-mechanics and imperfections in the planning and organization of the soldiers' combat training. If you analyze the reasons for the failures of assemblies and components of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs), you are led to the conclusion that the lion's share of the malfunctions are connected with the fact that some subunit specialists and officers did not entirely fulfill their servicing and regulation duties; in other words, they committed a breach of military discipline.

Discipline and equipment.... As emphasized at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the question of universally strengthening

discipline and procedure has become an urgent requirement of the present day. Much attention is devoted to this theme in the pages of the military press. What are the components of this problem? Where are its so-called sore spots?

In order to try and answer these questions, the editorial office and specialists of the Main Armor Directorate of the Ministry of Defense investigated this problem in several motorized rifle subunits of the Carpathian Red Banner Military District. Material from the published investigation, and above all an analysis of the specific reasons for combat vehicle breakdown, it is thought, will assist warrant officers and sergeants and all the personnel of the subunits to look more strictly after the state of affairs in combat equipment operation, maintenance, upkeep and repair and to take appropriate measures to strengthen discipline and the clear fulfillment of the requirements of regulations and manuals.

Concern About Combat Readiness

A little puddle was darkened by a dirty spot on the gray concrete of the motor pool. Drops of fuel fell slowly into it from the rear door of an IFV. The oily lower part of the fuel tank gleamed. "Are the welded seams leaking?" flashed the thought at the first instant. No, it all turned out to be much simpler: Private A. Milyayev had just filled a bucket with fuel and part of it had spilled. Just try not to spill when you're disconnecting and hooking back up the high-pressure hose connecting the rear tank with the main.

But the driver-mechanic had spotted such a method in the training subunit which he had recently finished. He decided to use somebody's experience so as to wash his tar-soiled hands more quickly. It never occurred to the soldier that when the armored door is slammed shut, diesel fuel would fall onto the sealing gasket and would begin to corrode the rubber or seep into the bottom of the vehicle.

Unfortunately, other driver-mechanics also resorted to similar methods of "hygiene." The rubber gaskets on many combat vehicles are chewed up in places and stick out in tatters because of fuel repeatedly falling on them. This also breaches the hermetic seal of the IFV. When such a vehicle is afloat, water will inevitably begin to seep through the gaps formed into the assault compartment. It turns out to be a pretty big obstacle--on the other bank, separate subunits that have not yet entered into battle are short an IFV full of water.

This all began with a seemingly inoffensive hand washing, but really with the lack of discipline of "resourceful" soldiers.

One can also judge the poor technical preparation, even heightened to indifference and negligence, of some young specialists toward the equipment by other examples. Thus, Pvt Sh. Kuliyeu, having replaced the fuel pump, didn't put the cotter pins into the fastening elements. Where, he says, is the pump going to disappear to? The soldier didn't take into account that when in motion, mechanical vibrations arise from which the nuts loosen. That's exactly what happened on the march. Fuel began to get out. The driver-mechanic suddenly discovered that the engine "didn't go." A forced stop. While they were investigating and repairing, the company went on far ahead. Warrant officer V. Goncharenko, the company senior technician, also fouled up by having relied on the conscientiousness of his subordinate: he didn't approve the work.

The armored service officers with whom we managed to speak noticed a pattern: at the beginning of a new training year or summer training period, when the equipment falls into the hands of young specialists newly arrived into the subunit, the number of breakdowns increases. "While there are so many because of poor knowledge, there are just as many now and then due to lack of discipline," verifies, for example, Capt V. Khmel'nitskiy.

You wouldn't call this tendency noted some kind of discovery, it seems. It is not for nothing that particular attention is devoted in many army and navy subunits to the formative period of young specialists. In our view, something else is important: How do the warrant officers take into account the deficiencies in the experience of their subordinates in their activity and what practical steps do they undertake to neutralize negative events? After all, the regulations require the company senior technician to know the working, political and moral qualities of the driver-mechanics and conduct work to raise their qualifications.

"Many of yesterday's trainees arrive at the subunit with a poor technical grounding. Hence there are frequently violations," imparts Warrant officer Yu. Papp, the company senior technician. "Therefore I try to uncover shortcomings in their training from their very first steps. Let's say new driver-mechanics arrived last fall. Winter is near at hand; however, they didn't know how to start the heater, as I established at the very first exercise in the motor pool. And if we had to go tomorrow to exercises or into battle? Not putting it off, I began to fill in the blanks in their training."

Yes, Warrant officer Papp didn't wait passively for instructions on what to do and how to do it. His exacting attitude, combined with initiative, produced good results. The motorized riflemen operated confidently at the latest exercises. Driver-mechanic Pvt K. Osmonov was spurred by a short-term leave. Pvt M. Mamednurov, who arrived in October of last year,

was not conspicuous for his knowledge; however, in a few months, he rose to the ranks of the leaders of competition and he was entrusted with a combat-training vehicle. He serves beyond reproach. All of these are the fruits of an individual approach to the training of subordinates.

During work in the motor pool on putting IFVs into short-term storage, Warrant officer Yu. Papp broadly utilized such progressive organization of labor as the team method of equipment maintenance. Teams were headed by the most highly trained driver-mechanics. With their help, recently-arrived soldiers both fulfilled their assignments and simultaneously acquired experience more quickly. When necessary, the company senior technician himself rolled up his sleeves, serving as an example for the motorized riflemen.

The specialists were helped to get on their feet more quickly by a technical corner that Papp set up in one of the bays. For example, how to tell apart the various lubricants and motor oils? Yuliy Stepanovich assembled a stand where samples of all fuel and lubricating materials used on the IFV were contained in transparent test tubes. Come and make sure, if doubt has begun to sneak in, if you intend to pour oil, let's say, into the transmission. It would seem to be a trifle, but it introduces driver-mechanics to equipment culture and cultivates a degree of discipline.

"Soldiers are drawn to learning. If you constantly concern yourself with it, then there are fewer breaches of discipline," confirms Yuliy Stepanovich.

It is evidently worth listening to the words of the company senior technician. He isn't really saying anything new. Every commander knows that where the rhythm of combat training is clearly arranged, discipline is greater. After all, indoctrination and education is a unified process. It is not just military proficiency, physical tempering and technical skills that are acquired on the training fields, in classes and on the parade ground. Along with them grows the soldiers' consciousness--one of the most important factors in strengthening military discipline. A well-arranged training and educational process is especially valuable with young replacements. It is really the base on which all of the soldiers' following service is supported.

But motorized rifle subunits are encountered where the senior technicians carry out their regulation duties, so to speak, without spirit. The result of such an attitude is not long in being told.

Warrant officer V. Petěvka, the company senior technician, was occupied with preparing the IFV technical equipment the night before exercises. The driver-mechanics that he commanded had arrived in the unit two months ago. They had never before participated in exercises. Here Petěvka should have demonstrated activeness, shared his experiences and informed his subordinates that it was necessary to execute with particular zeal and should have checked on them more strictly. The warrant officer did not demonstrate the necessary interest and exacting attitude.

As a result of poor monitoring on the part of the senior technician, Pvt A. Kholokov, servicing the engine compartment, did not check whether the attached equipment was securely fastened. In the field, the starter failed--its fastening had weakened.

As we see, the approach to the formative period of driver-mechanics is different in the two motorized rifle subunits. It is explained, above all, by the working qualities of the company senior technicians.

And just what is the unit armored service? It plans and organizes training in technical preparation with the personnel, even including the warrant officers, and directs and monitors the work of technical study groups. The peculiarity of the first weeks of the new training year or training period, when young replacements arrive, is easy to take into account in combat training plans. What, let's say, is simpler in officer training periods of the company senior technicians than to direct the attention of the warrant officers to the specific character of the first independent steps of a newly-arrived soldier, to give practical advice and methodological recommendations and to take the corresponding subunits under strict control.

In practice the officers of the armored service threw themselves into routine business and concerns of material repair and maintenance. Thus it turned out that they didn't see the forest for the trees. How else to explain the poorly-thought-out character of the very work plan of the technical study group issued to the subunit? For example, according to it, starting the IFV engine in sub-zero temperatures should be studied in March, when spring is at the door and summer is ahead. Here it has to be verified, that an important stage in the training of the young specialists of the armored service was let to slide. And when the demand is slight, somebody from the company's senior technicians begins to have a negligent attitude toward his regulation duties.

Certain subunits, operating IFVs, encountered other difficulties. The motorized rifle company in which Warrant officer L. Boderatskiy serves as senior technician, for example, took part in three exercises over two months. All the driver-mechanics did over this time was to take the combat vehicles out of short-term storage and, upon returning from the training ground, put them into storage.

It would seem, in the resultant situation, that work on the vehicle servicing and maintenance days should have gone without a hitch. After all, the company commander was obligated to enlist the services of all the personnel of the subunit for them. But on these days, we met only the IFV driver-mechanics by the combat vehicles in the motor pool. By order of the officer in charge, a Senior Warrant officer Boderatskiy explained, the other crew members were occupied with work not connected with equipment and weapons maintenance. Thus, it is not difficult to understand, affects both the professional preparedness and the morale of the soldiers.

Technical culture and discipline are twin sisters. In training subunits, future specialists frequently acquire just the theoretical bases of this or that. Their first independent steps quickly reveal gaps in both the professional preparedness of the soldiers and their military education, which has an immediate effect on their attitude toward the equipment. That is why, it seems, the formative period of APC drivers and IFV driver-mechanics should be approached with a special standard. Much depends on the quality of their training at this stage as to how competently and responsibly the soldiers will in the future operate combat vehicles and will carry out technical maintenance, keeping them at constant readiness. It's not for nothing that people say: "You reap what you sow."

The Commander is Responsible for Everything

Wheels throwing up a spray of red-brown water mixed with mud, the combat vehicles rushed into the attack. The guns began to boom and the machineguns to chatter sharply. The steel avalanche rolled irresistibly at the "enemy," shattering all in its path.

And right here, when the training battle had reached its utmost intensity, a white cloud rose over one of the armored personnel carriers. Advancing a few more meters, the APC halted.

Leaping from the hatch, the driver, Pvt A. Alimbayev, looked over the engine.

"Out of antifreeze," he reported to Sgt A. Antonyan, the vehicle commander. After a silence, he added, "It's entirely my fault--I didn't keep an eye on the instruments...."

Maybe it wouldn't be worth mentioning this incident in such detail, if it were an isolated occurrence. Unfortunately, you quite often encounter instances, when the equipment breaks down for one and the same reason: the drivers do not keep an eye on the readings of the control and measuring instruments. In other words, they do not fulfill their elementary duties. It is calculated that such incidents account for more than twenty percent of the total number of breakdowns.

Why do they occur and what are their origins? Let's look into it.

What qualities are the most necessary for a driver in battle and on the march? Probably every soldier knows the answer. Of course they are attentiveness and self-discipline, a precise reckoning knowledge of the technical capabilities of the combat vehicle and a knowledge of how to operate it competently.

As an experienced physician judges the health of a person based on the results of analyses and diagrams, so the driver knows much about the engine's operation from the readings of his control and measuring instruments. And

if he notices some alarming symptom, then he is obligated to apply all his skill to avert the onset of malfunctions. There are many methods and means for this. Some of them are set forth in textbooks and manuals. How to "drive off" high coolant or oil temperatures, for example, and what to do when the pressure falls in the lubrication system. Drivers should not only know these and other "truisms," but rigorously execute them.

But let's return to the incident with Pvt Alimbayev. The engine overheated because, as the soldier explained his blunder, he got carried away by the attack and didn't keep his eye on the control and measuring instruments.

Probably that is how it was. The captivation of battle, the responsibility of the decisive instant, the harsh conditions of driving on the bad roads of spring.... It is understandable. But not justifiable.

Before they arrive at the unit, future specialists not only study the structure and operating rules of the equipment, but also work through driving methods in practice in trainers and combat training vehicles. Here is where the professional "style" is formed. But let's suppose that it was not instilled in the trainees in DOSAAF or in training subunits to keep an eye on the instruments. That means that the deficiency must be corrected in the subunit and a strict system of monitoring must be instituted over the actions of drivers on the part of combat vehicle commanders. After all, non-commissioned officers are obligated to periodically take an interest in the instrument readings when the vehicle is in motion. But just a few sergeants do so. The majority of them rely entirely on the drivers, trying to get out of monitoring. They regard this as an unnecessary matter, distracting them from their duties.

"We have enough to worry about without that," Sgt A. Antonyan tried to justify himself, forgetting that the commander is responsible for everything.

A thorough analysis of armored equipment breakdown incidents reveals at first glance a strange regularity. When drivers did not possess adequate skills, they tried to execute all assigned operations punctually and diligently. In any case, this was characteristic of the majority. Even commanders and company senior technicians at this stage of training keep a most attentive eye on the actions subordinates and monitor them closely.

But a certain time passes. Specialists acquire experience. A well-known habituality appears in their actions, and with it confidence in their resources. This is normal. But simultaneously some soldiers, considering themselves virtually aces, begin to lose their enthusiasm and become less self-disciplined. Commanders do not take into account these psychological changes, seeing only the increased skill of the drivers. Here is a typical example.

Until recently, Pvt A. Krekaten' was considered a competent specialist. But at the regular subunit field exercises the news spread that by his fault the engine had broken down. How could such a thing have happened? It turned

out that there was one cause: the specialist's self-confidence, overestimation of his own knowledge, and, in the end, a soldier's failure to perform.

It was not a complicated operation: to cover the filling neck of the radiator. In a year and a half of service Krekaten' had done it dozens of times. Habitual movements, and the cap was in place. But, in preparing the vehicle for the march, the driver didn't manage to tighten the cap as it should be and just "baited" it. "Nothing terrible will happen" flashed the thought, "I'll finish it later." And the company senior technician, Warrant officer A. Semenov, wrongly didn't check up on the soldier.

Later, everything went as it should have. While in motion the cap flew off the neck, water was expelled from the radiator and the pistons jammed in the cylinders of the engine. The accident could have been averted if the driver had kept an eye on the instrument readings. His lack of discipline led to the breakdown of expensive equipment and failure at the assigned tasks of the platoon.

Constant checking of drivers' actions by the non-commissioned officers is necessary to eliminate such incidents. The vehicle commanders are obligated to manage their subordinates on the march and in an attack. However, as we have established, sergeants have not mastered such skills to the fullest. The opinion has taken hold that here the matter is their personal lack of discipline. Yes, that is one of the causes. But there is another, no less important--the lack of an exacting attitude by officers and warrant officers toward their assistants. After all, when there are defects in the vehicle, virtually no demand is made of the detachment commander, as if he were an outsider. At most, his name is mentioned in the investigation report.

What is the way out? First and foremost, it is necessary to raise the performance of the sergeants themselves, to require their observance of manual regulations on the role of non-commissioned officers, and persistently to draw the sergeants' attention to the equipment in the course of instructional and methodological training. For example, it is possible to work through with them in practice the most effective methods of vehicle control, to study the indicators of characteristic malfunctions, etc. The main thing is not to wait for someone else to do it. It is impossible to maintain a high level of subunit combat readiness today without an affection for the equipment and a heightened sense of responsibility for its operation and care.

Attention to Vehicle Maintenance Day

There is no denying that having eliminated incidents of improper armored equipment operation, it is possible to achieve a lower number of combat vehicle accidents and breakdowns. But is it very much? Practice shows that

the basic pre-conditions of various types of malfunctions lie in the poor quality of equipment maintenance. In approximately seven out of ten incidents the necessity for its repair arises exactly for this reason.

Pvt I. Shcherbatyy, having replaced the head gasket of the cylinder block on the combat training group's APC, didn't tighten the corresponding nuts all the way and Warrant officer N. Dvorachek didn't check up on his subordinate. As a result, the departure for the training center turned out to be a vehicle breakdown. The planned exercises were disrupted as well.

There are enough examples of low-quality equipment maintenance. This happens first and foremost because of the carelessness and negligence of the specialists themselves. But is it only negligence that is to blame? Is it only because of it that the quality of maintenance suffers?

It is well known that equipment battleworthiness depends greatly on how effectively vehicle maintenance and servicing days are conducted and on the timely and high-quality maintenance of combat vehicles after drills and exercises.

We became acquainted with the execution of these important measures in several subunits. And? Many shortcomings were revealed. For example, when putting combat vehicles into short-term storage, the work in the motor pool began late every day. The commanders and officers gave instructions to the personnel for over an hour. And it would be no great loss if the conversation were to be about the matter at hand, instead of a little about everything....

Actually, at the beginning of the training year, the time set aside for combat vehicle maintenance was used productively. But a month passed, and another, and procedure was gradually disrupted. Ever more often, part of the personnel was torn away from the pool work during vehicle maintenance and servicing days. No doubt, such a practice does not have the best effect on both the soldiers' discipline and on equipment upkeep.

Company senior technician Warrant officer V. Slyusarev spoke of this with a heavy heart.

"The company returned from the exercise. First, as stipulated, the equipment had to be put into short-term storage. The unit came up with a plan: The vehicles had to be already serviced and parked in the bays in so many days. The deadline was completely realistic. And what happened with us then? For two or three days everything went strictly according to plan. And then it started.... You just begin to figure out what to do tomorrow when the command arrives: early in the morning the drivers will be at the training

ground. The next day we wait to be dispatched. An hour passes, another--a new situation: the departure is cancelled, work in the motor pool. But, really, the day is lost. If you're able to get some little bit done, that's great. Now judge for yourself, whether we can get the equipment in order in the designated time...."

The regimental level doesn't love this planning leapfrog either. Much--even though necessary, certainly--is done in haste. And haste is the enemy of quality. But we'll say it straight out: often it is precisely from here that directions emanate that give rise to fuss and muddle and the disruption of planned priority tasks.

Commanders of all grades are unanimous in the opinion that poor planning discipline makes their work more difficult. In a word, everybody dislikes such dissonance. But there is a fine point here--they dislike it in different ways. The criticism was sharpest of all in the subunits. The higher you go, the more sound and peaceful it is. The question is posed: why would this be? Evidently, here they've become accustomed to such a situation and consider it impossible to be otherwise. But can it be that concern for the equipment is not equally important for all?

There are other factors directly affecting the quality of vehicle maintenance. Let's begin with excessive attention to form.

For example, we ran across the following instance. The subordinates of Warrant officer M. Ladomeryak were working in the motor pool, having their planned assignments for the day. The external environment, as they say, was consistent. But they looked at the plans more closely--crudely written documents, you can't call it anything else. They were drawn up on the same mold--each had four items. For seven hours the drivers were required to open up the vehicles, prepare the instruments, check the wheel fastenings and to establish good order.

Practice shows that all these operations are done in one-and-a-half to two hours. What to do with the remaining five hours?

"Always find something, we won't sit around with our arms folded," explained Pvt A. Ganezhuk, the senior company driver. "The assignment plans.... They're for the inspectors."

Such an approach to the work at hand in the motor pool not only does not mobilize people, it disorganizes them, inflicts a great weakening of morale and lets them engage in whatever comes up however they please. How can one talk of quality here?

We especially want to speak of the monitoring of drivers, in the first place on the part of subunit commanders and company senior technicians. The appropriate instructions require that they personally supervise the

technical maintenance of the vehicles and verify the execution of operations by subordinates. Far from all of them, however, deal with their duties as they should. Many allude to a shortage of time: "Really keep an eye on all the drivers?"

But the essence is, it seems, not in a shortage of time, but in an unsuitable style of leadership over subordinates. The trouble is that several warrant officers sometimes become like metalworkers: they try to get rid of all the defects themselves. They don't trust their subordinates--this way, they say, is more reliable. Of course, with such a "system" even twenty-four hours in a day aren't enough. And hence there are costs in the condition of the vehicle and the training of the specialists.

And there is still another question. It happens that even if a person maintained a vehicle well, at times there are no spare parts. Unfortunately, this is also a frequent occurrence. As we ascertained, spare parts are supplied erratically and not in the necessary quantities. Here it turns out that the matter suffers due to someone's inefficiency.

So, company senior technician Warrant officer N. Tyshchuk found an oil leak in one of the vehicles. It turned out that the hydraulic booster pump hose had broken. But here's bad luck--it's an inexpensive part, but there are none in store. What to do? Tyshchuk patched up the unfortunate hose as best he could and put it back in place. But after all, if one speaks honestly, this is a precursor to an accident....

In this manner, the resultant equipment maintenance in the subunits where we were gives grounds for serious reflection. The motorized riflemen themselves probably know specific steps to eliminate negative events. But, in our view, the most important thing cannot be forgotten: equipment reliability and freedom from accidents can only be achieved when every specialist and every commander strictly fulfills his regulation duties; that is, displays the maximum personal discipline.

An Exacting Attitude is a Pledge of Success

The motor pool gates opened and, belching a blue-gray cloud of exhaust, Infantry Fighting Vehicle No 193 confidently rolled along the familiar road. Near the bays it stopped, and it was surrounded there and then by driver-mechanics.

"You're back, prodigal! Better late than never!" were heard the animated voices of the soldiers.

"It was in field repair for over a year, and now the men are rejoicing," explained Warrant officer P. Shafranyuk. "We had to wait a long time for another combat-training vehicle, too. The repairmen let us down!"

The company senior technician's distress is easy to understand. The prolonged absence of a vehicle, and at one time two at once, could not help but affect the quality of exercise execution. It is true that they were able to compensate for the shortage of equipment at the expense of a more intensive use of the IFVs remaining in operation. But when the material is worked until it is nearly worn out, you cannot expect anything good to happen in the near future.

We'll digress to the recent past. On one December day in 1983, two-year Lt V. Shishov, the commander of a motorized rifle platoon, had to hand over IFV No 193 to the repair company.

The appropriate regulations state exceedingly clearly: "Vehicles sent for repair should be fully equipped." But the receipt and issue voucher on the IFV, signed by Officer Shishov, contained 43 notations. Among them: there were missing five observation instruments, three headlights, compressor belts, air system pipes, the water overflow tank, an oil tank cap, etc.

With such faults it was impossible to tow the vehicle. However, the platoon commander acted against regulations. What prompted him to do this, you can't ask today: having served the prescribed two years, Lt Shishov was discharged into the reserves.

But frankly speaking, we note that the platoon commander did not personally need lights, belts, etc. Before sending it to repair, the vehicle was deliberately "cannibalized" (such a term is current among the driver-mechanics). And inquiry here should be first of all to the former company senior technician (who today also, incidentally, is not counted among the members of the subunit). They would hardly have migrated spare parts and property in short supply from one combat-training vehicle to another without his blessing. It is stressed in the regulations that "it is forbidden to remove from vehicles sent to repair any apparatus, assemblies, instruments or parts or to replace them with defective ones."

Thus, an elementary lack of discipline of the motorized rifleman became the first barrier that the repairmen were unable to overcome straight off. The vehicle arrived with serious defects, and even de-equipped as well, and an extremely difficult route to its restoration began. The elimination of the notations required 34 types of spare parts, as shown on the claim handed in. They were able to find only a total of 11 items in store. The receipt of the remaining parts dragged on for many long months.

The repair itself also went only so-so.

"Often a total of two or three men worked on the rehabilitation of the equipment received," explains Lt V. Khalitov, the deputy commander of the repair company. "We had to constantly detach people for details around the company, in the kitchen, on watch.... It was like a holiday when we were able to assemble even a third of the company in the workplace."

The report presented of time utilized in the repair subunit was quite good. It was at once apparent who was occupied when with what. Analysis shows, that in another month the specialist teams basically worked fruitfully only on Tuesdays and Thursdays. On the remaining days there was barely a glimmer of work: for every vehicle there was less than one soldier.

The style that had taken root undoubtedly disturbed the commanders. Thanks to measures taken, positive changes were noted. For instance, last January the subunit was freed from kitchen and watch duty. Matters improved appreciably: the repairmen returned six combat vehicles into service. Among them was the IFV that arrived for repair under the command of Warrant officer N. Mel'nichuk. The vehicle had arrived fully equipped. At inspection a total of only three notations turned up.

"The crew consisting of Sergeants Yu. Vashchishin and V. Yukhimchuk and Pvt V. Firsov repaired the IFV with enthusiasm," says Lt Khalitov. "It wasn't even necessary to 'get' a scarce item. Besides, we were actively assisted by Company Senior Technician Mel'nichuk and the vehicle's driver-mechanic. In 18 days, that is, much sooner than the assigned deadline, the IFV returned to the subunit."

This is that obvious example, it seems, that allows us to draw a clear conclusion: the observance of regulation procedures and the interest of people is a guarantee of final success. Naturally there are many such people in the subunits, such as Warrant officer N. Mel'nichuk, who worry about the matter entrusted to them, but there are also others, those who have a negligent attitude toward their service duties and disrupt the accepted procedure. It is impossible to be reconciled with such a situation any longer.

The shortening of equipment idle time could be helped by a more exacting attitude by certain commanding officers. If, for example, it is not permitted to hand in a vehicle for repair with instruments and parts removed, then, obviously it cannot be accepted in such condition. The commander of the repair company, however, did not always demonstrate the requisite adherence to principle now and then and took the blame for the motorized riflemen himself. There is, of course, an explanation for that: there is a schedule for receiving vehicles for repair, and just try and break it!

But in the motorized rifle subunits, evidently, somebody is in on a good thing. Why? Because certain company and platoon commanders have been ducking the troubles associated with combat-training vehicles. Driving instruction is provided--what more do you want?!

At this point, it would seem, would be the place to intervene with the battalion commanders and armored service specialists to demonstrate

persistence in introducing regulation procedure. But the poor exacting attitude of officers and warrant officers at each separate level has led to a distinctive vicious circle. They have become accustomed to the instances of "cannibalization" as a necessary evil. But both the motorized riflemen and the repairmen come off losers.

The Fusion of Discipline and Technical Skills

Little distinguishes the combat-training vehicle parking area of the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Capt S. Gorbachev from others in the motor pool. But from the dashing interior appearance of the IFVs, if such a comparison is permissible, and from their seemingly regulated straight-line formation you get the feeling that here the equipment is treated with affection. The first impression was not deceiving. There were no differing opinions about this subunit in the unit armored service.

We found Capt S. Skotnikov, the commander of the battalion's best company, near one of the IFVs on vehicle maintenance day. The subunit had just returned from exercises, and there was plenty to do. Sergey Nikolayevich scrupulously inspected the running gear. There are more than enough rocks and stumps in the Carpathians. Just try and find them under the snow. The officer attentively looked for fresh "scratches" on the rollers and for hints of cracks. He was assisted by Lt S. Golubev. Honestly speaking, the platoon commander was not so much assisting as acquiring experience: he had just finished training school last year, and was taking part in exercises for the first time.

We got into conversation.

"In my view, prevention is the most important thing in the care of equipment," said Capt Skotniko with conviction. "It is important not to tolerate breakdowns. Then even spare parts are unnecessary. The IFV is an extremely reliable vehicle, undemanding to operate. Carry out inspections and maintenance in the prescribed time period and you'll have no trouble."

In Sergey Nikolayevich's attitude toward the materiel is visible the zealous owner. He checks the condition of the IFV himself every month. Warrant officer N. Mitin, the company senior technician, does this no less often. The platoon commanders inspect the vehicles twice a month. The commanders work constantly on the equipment along with the crews on vehicle maintenance and servicing days. This is not, after all, an enterprising undertaking. It is simply the commanding officers of the company conscientiously fulfilling their service obligations. One can boldly say that here the company officers' execution is up to the mark.

But everything in life doesn't go by the book. When the battalion commanders found out that an exercise was coming up soon, they thought at once "How can we better prepare the driver-mechanics?" They decided to first of all organize supplementary exercises on driving. After all, some soldiers had arrived in the subunit not long ago, and they had little experience. That is how the soldiers joined in their first responsible march.

Supplementary exercises were also envisaged for raising technical knowledge. The first hour of the vehicle maintenance and servicing day was devoted to a review of the program of the training subunits. The bays were equipped with visual aid stands, necessary diagrams and posters were placed along the walls and a small technical library was set up.

The maintenance and repair of the combat training vehicles also became a school for the acquisition of practical skills. Teams of young soldiers were organized that assisted the experienced driver-mechanics. In short, in the subunit they tried to make it that yesterday's trainees felt themselves to be no worse than the experienced soldiers.

The purposeful preparation for the field exercises was repaid a hundred-fold. Not a single incident of equipment breakdown was recorded. This confirms once more that when the commanding officers of a subunit conscientiously carry out their regulation duties, displaying interest, initiative and an exacting attitude of command and concern for the training and education of subordinates as well as set a personal example, then discipline in the company is up to the mark and the equipment is reliable.

The tasks of IFV technical maintenance were carried out in a workmanlike fashion on the vehicle maintenance and servicing days.

The company commander, while not substituting for the senior technician in this, constantly monitored questions of work organization and logistical support. After all, the duties of each are clearly delimited. When there is no forced idle time, matters go well with the personnel and equipment maintenance discipline is higher. It is the same with repair. Vehicles go to the repair subunit fully equipped and under their own power.

All of these components--the maintenance of equipment in constant good condition, the cultivation of a feeling of responsibility for it among the soldiers and the strengthening of military discipline--laid down, as if brick by brick, a strong foundation for the success of the company. It seems that such experience needs the most immediate and universal introduction.

"Equipment unconditionally prescribes the strictest discipline and the greatest accuracy in the observance by each of the share of work assigned to him, under threat of the halting of the entire operation or the deterioration of the machinery..." wrote V. I. Lenin. For military personnel, it is exactly the powerful fusion of discipline and technical skills, to a great degree, that forms that qualitative aspect of military skill that is called high combat readiness.

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ARMED FORCES

TWO VOLUME MILITARY-TOPOGRAPHIC ATLAS PUBLISHED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Perestenko: "The Officer's New Atlas"]

[Text] A new 2-volume Comprehensive Officer's Atlas, dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, was published by the Military-Topographical Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. It consists of three parts: geography, military history and textual supplements. For the first time, many new military terms, concepts and definitions have been included in this monumental work. The present edition differs advantageously from previous officer's atlases because of its more precise structure, wealth of information, depth of scientific-technical development and high quality of print.

The section on geography in the Atlas contains political, physical, geographic-survey, economic and other topical maps of the continents, their parts and individual countries. Maps of the USSR and the socialist countries have been presented in great detail. Street maps of individual countries' capital cities, the largest cities of the world and the hero-cities of the Soviet Union have been included in this section. These maps show the general lay-out of the cities, emphasizing the main thoroughfares and prominent sites; they also show the density of city building and the best approach to a particular city.

All of the materials in the military-historic section of the Atlas present the basic events of military history from ancient times to the present from a Marxist-Leninist point of view. Military events, showing the development of Russian and, especially, Soviet Military Art, and wars, during which new weapons and methods of armed conflict were first applied, are highlighted.

A special place here is occupied by maps of the Great Patriotic War which allow the reader to trace the course of the titanic struggle of the Soviet people against the German-Fascist invaders and Japanese militarists. Of particular interest are the maps narrating the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, the Kursk salient, the Dniepr, in Belorussia and in the Yasko-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder and Berlin sectors.

It should also be noted that the latest national and foreign cartographic and literary-informational materials in existence on 1 Jan 85 were used in the compilation of the geographic and military-historic maps of the Atlas.

Textual supplements include 36 information tables and a alphabetical index of geographic names.

This work by military cartographers and collective of specialist-geographers and historians will occupy an honorable place both as a necessary textbook at academies and other advanced military institutions of learning, and as an important scientific-informational publication for commanders and political workers of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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ARMED FORCES

REVIEW: LT GEN KHARAZIYA--MEMOIRS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 85 p 2

[Review by Col (Ret) S. Ural'skiy of book "Dorogami Muzhestva" [By the Roads of Courage] by Lt Gen (Ret) Kh. Kharaziya, Military Memoirs Series of VOYENIZDAT Publishing House, 1984: "Book Reviews: On the Path to Victory"]

[Text] Lt Gen (Ret) Kh. Kharaziya, the author of the book "By the Roads of Courage" issued by the Military Publishing House in the "Military Memoirs" series, served in cavalry, mechanized, airborne-assault and infantry units and formations. He was a regiment, brigade and division commander in the years of the Great Patriotic War, fought the Hitlerite invaders outside Moscow and Stalingrad and in South Karelia and took part in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia from facism. He tells warmly and in detail about what he saw and experienced, about valor and courage and about the lofty patriotism of Soviet soldiers in battle with the fascist invaders.

Capt Kh. Kharaziya began the Great Patriotic War in the post of chief of staff of the 112th Mountain Cavalry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division deployed in Central Asia. Soon the regiment was entrained and sent to the Bryansk front. The author cites a multitude of specific and instructive examples of the active operations of the cavalry, which inflicted appreciable losses on the enemy in spite of his numerical superiority in manpower, equipment and arms. Red Army soldier G. Dzhaparidze performed an unforgettable heroic deed. In a difficult moment he threw himself into saving the sacred object of the formation. Having detached the standard from the pole, Dzhaparidze wrapped the silk sheet around himself and carried it more than 200 kilometers through the enemy rear areas until he got back to his unit.

In November of 1942, having completed short-term courses at the Supreme Military Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, the author was assigned to command the 4th Guards Mechanized Brigade.

The reader will learn much from the book that is instructive about the battles in Karelia and the forcing of the Svir River. The creative plan of the commanders was brilliantly demonstrated in the organization of a false crossing. Bringing this plan to life, 16 soldiers began a demonstrative false crossing with dummies on rafts and in boats, drawing upon themselves in the fire of the unsuppressed artillery of the enemy's firing positions.

The ruse worked. All of the enemy firing positions that came to life were thrashed and annihilated there and then. The sixteen Guards meanwhile reached the opposite bank and joined battle there. All of them were later awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The 100th Svir Red Banner Guards Infantry Division, in which the author served, ended the Great Patriotic War in Czechoslovakia.

Many soldiers would benefit from reading the reminiscences of Lt Gen (Ret) Kh. Kharaziya.

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ARMED FORCES

COLONEL GENERAL JUSTICE GORNYI ON 'INDIFFERENCE' TO LETTERS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 85 p 2

/Article by Col Gen Justice A. Gornyy, chief military procurator:
"Improve Work With Letters"/

/Text/ Once again I am rereading V. I. Lenin's note to the director of SOVNARKOM affairs. Vladimir Ilich is requiring that all complaints addressed to him be reported to him. So that none of the complaints accidentally get lost in the shuffle, they must make a special log entry for the complaints. An administration official is entrusted with the responsibility to closely monitor the implementation of solutions made in response to the complaints.

The thoroughness with which the instructions were formulated, the concern for the fact that the consideration of problems from disturbed people did not turn into some kind of pretense, and the very tone of Lenin's note convincingly testified to the leader of the revolution's greatest interest in the life, thoughts and peoples' moods and the type of great state importance he attached to laborers' letters, to this most important structure of the vital tie between the party and the masses. The traditions of an interested, attentive attitude to the opinions, advice and observations of citizens in our country are steadily being strengthened and developed. "To solve the complicated and wide-ranging tasks of our contemporary era, touching upon all aspects of our lives," it was emphasized at the April 1985 CPSU CC Plenum, "one can only rely on the active creativity of the people, their intelligence, talents and labor." Further, it directly mentioned the need to pay unremitting attention to public opinion, critical observations, statements and letters from citizens. The right of Soviet citizens to submit their proposals and observations to any state organ, public organization is ensured by the USSR Constitution. The procedure for handling letters and statements is precisely set forth by legislation, including military regulations and manuals.

In carrying out the party's instructions and standardization reports commanders, political worker organs and staffs in the main are correctly organizing and conducting this work. Moreover, in many units and military institutions it has become the rule to anticipate appeals from people in various instances. The days of open letters, evenings of questions and

answers, consultations with service representatives and military lawyers has been put into practice. A lively exchange with people helps supervisors to organize their service, daily routines and personnel recreation better and to detect and remove deficiencies promptly; this favorably affects the morale of the collectives.

At the same time there are still many entirely impermissible violations of established procedure in handling the letters and statements of citizens. Cases of procrastination, formalism or perhaps even outright reluctance by specific officials to get seriously involved with the problems disturbing people are being uncovered by procuracy investigators.

After implementing proposals made by Pvt N. Malychenko, for example, marked improvements in storing equipment and other supplies were achieved. But his soldier had to go directly to the military district troop commander. This is because other officials, primarily battalion commander Maj A Maslov, did not believe it necessary to handle letters and statements sent to him by a subordinate in a manner befitting good judgement for official correspondence.

Pvts N. Voronov and S. Rezhimov many times informed their immediate superiors, including Lt Col V. Tarasentko, about the violations of authorized procedure in the subunit /podrazdelenie/, misconduct of certain servicemen and instances of drunkenness. It can be frankly stated, that their statements were filed away in the unit /chast/. When he found out about this, Maj Gen A. Denyanchuk, Chief of Chemical Troops for the Odessa Military District, did not investigate the substance of the matter. As a result, the situation in the subunit deteriorated still further; feeling that everything was allowed, Jr Sgt D. Gabchenko committed a crime.

Such are the costs of disrespectful and indifferent attitude to a letter or a statement; this goes for the law which also which has specified the legal status of these documents. And the main cause of such a situation is the irresponsibility of those who work with letters and statements, who are called upon to observe strictly and precisely the appropriate statutes. Here and there, it looks like they do not consider the letter and statement as a document. It is difficult, for instance, to imagine how, in a headquarters in another institution, a service document would disappear without a trace. But that is what happens to letters sent here.

In checking why certain comrades in X-unit in the GSFG never received answers, members of the military procuracy revealed that a Sr Sgt R. Abgulin, in charge of this area, simply was not logging in the mail that was sent and was infrequently reporting this to the commander. Let us say that inadvertently an undisciplined, irresponsible person was in the headquarters. But, staff officer Maj A. Kazakov, if one may call him that, know about it; he knew and did not stop this gross violation of procedure because he believed working with letters and statements was third-rate work.

However, at the time when a letter or statement are logged and reported, sometimes this far from means that a reply will be made in the established time allowed. It took two and a half months for Capt A. Karnovich to find time to inform the parents of his subordinates how their sons were serving. It took five months for Lt Col N. Brylev from Chimkentskiy Oblovoyenkomat to make a decision concerning the guidance of a veteran of the Great Patriotic War for review at the raivoyenkomat.

Irresponsibility is well known; it is more often the consequences of a lack of supervision. Both Maj Gen Demyanchuk and Maj Kazakov, about whom we spoke earlier, did not believe it necessary to monitor strictly the work of subordinates with letters and statements of citizens. And similar neglect is characteristic not only of them. At times work in the unit and institution with letters and statements does not attract attention, and is not work a specific post in the plans of the all-powerful commissions and inspections which arrive here. Even the quarterly inspection of this work--stipulated by law--is not performed everywhere. Also, people's controllers are not always checking work with letters and statements. Senior chiefs, political organs and staffs must be more strictly concerned with the status of affairs in their areas and plan a check of work with letters and statements from citizens.

The example which immediate superiors set for their subordinates has major significance. Can officers in Air Force staffs of the Central Asian Military District inquire about neglect in this area in subordinate units and subunits if they themselves are guilty of putting off the review of letters and statements and even lost letters. This very same picture was found during a procuracy inspection in personnel administration department in the above-mentioned military district. The military procurator warned officers V. Knyazkin and V. Pingalskiy concerning the impermissible violations of the law. There are, I believe, sufficiently serious grounds to consider that the appropriate chiefs, staff political departments, and district administration slackened their attention in this important area of work.

I will probably not be mistaken in calling the level of work with letters and statements from citizens a most serious indicator of the professional efficiency and competency of a supervisor of any rank. A wide range of problems which disturb people must each be reviewed and resolved in terms of both the law and conscience. In reading the response to one letter or statement or another, you see clearly not only the attitude an official displays in this matter in general, but also his understanding of the specific essence of the problem, his capability to manage the available forces, means and correctly use his own authority. Unfortunately, authors of responses are far from always noted for their correct, initiative-displaying, lawful solutions. Much official correspondence above impressive signatures are embellished with generalized phrases and incomprehensible explanations.

In a certain military garrison, in connection with the construction of a new building, a problem was resolved concerning the wear on a quarters unit. But labor Veterans Sharlovs, who had been living in this house, refused to move to another residence since, in their opinion, the new residence did not meet technical and sanitary requirements. In cases such as this, disputes are submitted to a court for review. What did officers V. Charnik and V. Kainer, who are responsible for the move decide? They did not turn the matter over to the court, but they themselves decided the house's inhabitants are simply being fastidious and...turned off all their utilities. Naturally, the people complained of the arbitrariness. In the reply signed by Lt Col Loginoz, there was not a word about the substance of the matter: the apartment, he said, met established norms and their refusal of the house was groundless. Having made such a reply, the officer did not stop the arbitrariness of his subordinates, did not see to the connecting of utilities to the home and, did not even pose the question of relocating the people using established procedure. Here is your knowledge of personal rights and responsibilities by officials for you; here is the ability to make a correct decision, based on the law, for you.

Once again, I shall say: such cases are impossible to find where strict monitoring of work with letters and statements from citizens is implemented, where officials and policy makers teach work methods, and inculcate a feeling of high responsibility for work results. The headquarters of the Kiev Military District is just such an established area. Headquarters officers themselves not only set an example of a responsible attitude to each letter and statement, but actively influence the status of this work in subordinate units, military training establishments, institutions, and organizations. It is no surprise that in a number of district garrisons there was more order in the work with letters (this means the solving of problems disturbing people!).

We are rightly proud of our high political and public activeness on the part of Soviet citizenry. Their letters and statements are one of the fundamental manifestations of this activeness. It is necessary everywhere to provide the most attentive review of these actual state papers, to act so that each counsel, each proposal and observation were heard and studied, for the further strengthening of a sense of organization and discipline, and an increase in the combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces.

Col Gen Justice A. Gornyy
Chief Military Procurator

12869
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DEATH OF MSU K.S. MOSKALENKO

Obituary

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy and twice Hero of the Soviet Union, died on 17 June 1985 following a lengthy, serious illness.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces have suffered a heavy loss. A participant in the civil war and a renowned hero of the Great Patriotic War, and loyal son of the Lenin party, of which he had been a member since 1926, has departed this life.

K.S. Moskalenko was born on 11 May 1902 in the village of Grishino in Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon, Donetsk Oblast, into a peasant family. He began working at an early age. He joined the Red Army as a volunteer in 1920 and fought against the White Guard and counterrevolutionary bands. After completing a Red officers' school, he served in various command and staff positions. He completed the artillery academy in 1939.

K.S. Moskalenko was at the front from the first days to the end of the Great Patriotic War. He commanded a motorized antitank artillery brigade, rifle and cavalry corps, a mechanized group and then an army. Forces under his command took an active part in the Battle of Stalingrad, on the Kursk Salient, in the forcing of the Dnepr and the liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In the most difficult combat situation K.S. Moskalenko always demonstrated calmness, determination, firmness in achieving the assigned objective, personal bravery and courage.

Following the Great Patriotic War K.S. Moskalenko commanded the Moscow Air Defense District and the Moscow Military District. In 1960 he became commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces and deputy USSR Minister of Defense. He devoted a great deal of effort and energy to the development of this new branch of the Armed Forces. In 1962 he became chief inspector and deputy minister of defense of the USSR. In 1983 he became inspector-general of the ministry of defense's group of inspectors-general.

K. S. Moskalenko took an active part in social and political life, was a delegate to a number of party congresses and was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, beginning with the second convocation. He was distinguished by great demandingness of himself and his subordinates, by principle, sensitivity and consideration for people. He earned the profound respect of the workers and of fightingmen in the Armed Forces with his wholehearted and selfless service to our homeland and the work of the Communist Party.

Marshal Moskalenko's outstanding service was greatly appreciated by the homeland. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred upon him twice, and he was awarded seven Lenin Orders, the Order of the October Revolution, five Red Banner Orders, two Orders of Suvorov, first degree, two Orders of Kutuzov, first degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, first degree, the Order of the Patriotic War, first degree, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," third degree, and many medals. K.S. Moskalenko's services earned him the title Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and many orders and medals of socialist and other states.

Fightingmen in the army and navy and all of the Soviet people will always preserve a bright memory of Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people and fervent patriot of the Soviet homeland, in their hearts.

M.S. Gorbachev, G.A. Aliyev, V.I. Vorotnikov, V.V. Grishin, A.A. Gromyko, D.A. Kunayev, Ye.K. Ligachev, G.V. Romanov, N.I. Ryzhkov, M.S. Solomentsev, N.A. Tikhonov, V.M. Chebrikov, V.V. Shcherbitskiy, P.N. Demichev, V.I. Dolgikh, V.V. Kuznetsov, B.N. Ponomarev, S.L. Sokolov, E.A. Shevardnadze, M.V. Zimyanin, I.V. Kapitonov, V.P. Nikonov, K.V. Rusakov, L.V. Smirnov, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, V.I. Petrov, A.A. Yepishev, N.I. Savinkin, V.F. Tolubko, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, A.I. Koldunov, A.N. Yefimov, S.G. Gors'hov, V.L. Govorov, S.K. Kurkotkin, V.M. Shabanov, N.F. Shestopalov, A.T. Altunin, I.N. Shkadov, A.I. Sorokin, A.M. Mayorov, A.I. Gribkov, S.I. Rudenko, I.G. Pavlovskiy, A.S. Zheltov, S.B. Vasyagin, A.P. Silantsev, S.P. Ivanov, N.P. Dagayev, P.N. Lashchenko, A.A. Luchinskiy, N.G. Lyashchenko, A.P. Beloborodov, I.I. Gusakovskiy, A.L. Getman, D.D. Lelyushenko and V.N. Dutov

Memorial Article

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Arm Gen S.P. Ivanov: "To The Memory of a Combat Comrade"]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko has a fitting place among the prominent Soviet military chiefs who brought glory to the homeland and its Armed Forces in battles with the enemy during the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union and

Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, he traveled a long and glorious combat path from Red Army man to marshal.

Kirill Semenovitch's biography is filled with events. His life was always inseparably linked with the development and strengthening of our socialist homeland and our Armed Forces. Joining the Red Army as an 18-year-old Komsomol member, he heroically fought the White Guard forces and the interventionists in the legendary First Cavalry [Army]. In 1922, after completing the joint school for Red Commanders in Kharkov, he continued to serve in his own 6th Cavalry Division. He commanded a platoon, a battery and a battalion. Kirill Semenovitch later served as chief of staff and as commander of an artillery regiment in the Far East and in the Kiev Military District. He studied at the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy. He linked his fate with the Lenin party in 1926.

K.S. Moskalenko went into the Great Patriotic War as a general with a solid theoretical background and extensive practical experience. Kirill Semenovitch was at the front from the first days of the war to its victorious conclusion. He demonstrated exceptional skill in directing combat operations, firm character and great courage. In a border engagement, personnel of the 1st Motorized Antitank Artillery Brigade of the Reserve, High Command, which he commanded, destroyed more than 200 enemy tanks. As chief of the 13th Army's staff operations section at that time, I read reports on the brigade's battles and met with the brigade commander. During the third month of the war K.S. Moskalenko became commander of a rifle corps and then a cavalry corps, and commanded a mechanized cavalry group. He was appointed deputy commander of the 6th Army at the end of 1941, and beginning in March of 1942 he successively commanded the 38th Army, the 1st Tank Army, the 1st Guards Army and the 40th Army. K.S. Moskalenko's name is especially closely linked with the 38th Army, of which he assumed command again in October of 1943. He commanded it up to the Victory.

I happened to serve together with Kirill Semenovitch during the difficult periods of the war, when our forces were fighting at Kharkov and Stalingrad and on the Kursk Salient. No matter how the situation developed, K.S. Moskalenko acted purposefully and vigorously, with unshakeable faith in success, and proved himself to be a skillful organizer of both defensive and offensive operations. During the initial period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 1st Tank Army under his command continuously counterattacked the enemy for 12 days and contained it in the area of Kalach-na-Donu for almost a month. K.S. Moskalenko subsequently commanded the 1st Guards Army, the operations of which were highly rated by Army General G.K. Zhukov, representative of Headquarters, Supreme High Command.

The Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Operation, the battle on the Kursk Salient and the battle at a bridgehead beyond the Dnepr near Bukrin are brilliant pages in Kirill Semenovitch's combat biography. K.S. Moskalenko was made a Hero of the Soviet Union at that time. He was one of the first of the commanders to be awarded the rank of Colonel General.

The 38th Army commanded by Colonel General K.S. Moskalenko had an important role in the liberation of Kiev. It was followed by Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Lvov, the Carpathian passes.... Together with fightingmen of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, 38th Army formations were the first to enter Czechoslovak territory, bringing freedom to the fraternal people. Troops of the 38th Army traveled around 2,000 kilometers during the war, took part in the liberation of more than 10,000 cities and other populated areas and continued their victorious operations in Prague.

Army commander K.S. Moskalenko's combat work was marked by determination, a struggle to keep from giving the enemy a respite and a creative quest for new methods and procedures of warfare. Kirill Semenovich's subordinates knew him as a strict and demanding chief, as a sensitive and concerned individual.

After the Great Patriotic War ended K.S. Moskalenko commanded an army, the Moscow Air Defense District and the Moscow Military District. As commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops and deputy USSR Minister of Defense, Kirill Semenovich devoted a great deal of effort and energy to developing the new branch of the Armed Forces. From 1962 to 1983 he worked productively as chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense and deputy minister of defense of the USSR.

Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. Moskalenko was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy. Until the last days of his life he combined extensive party, state and public work with scientific research. His articles, which summarize the experience of the last war, and his two-volume work "Na Yugo-Zapadnom napravlenii" [On The Southwest Axis] had an extensive readership.

K. Moskalenko, son of a poor peasant who found his calling in selfless service to the ideals of the revolution, communism and his great homeland, is remembered by everyone as a devoted fighter for the party, a person of enormous will and courage, and a prominent military chief. A bright memory of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko will always live in the hearts of fightingmen of the army and navy.

11499

CSO: 1801/258

ARMED FORCES

OBITUARY: V.S. ARKHIPOV

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General (Retired) Vasilii Sergeyevich Arkhipov has died in his 79th year, following a prolonged illness. He has devoted all of his conscious life to serving the people, the socialist homeland and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he has been a member since 1931.

V.S. Arkhipov was born in the village of Tyutnyary in Argayashskiy Rayon, Chelyabinsk Oblast, into a poor peasant family. He joined the Soviet Army in 1928, and there he went from cadet at a regimental school to colonel general.

During the Great Patriotic War, he was in the field army, where he commanded a tank battalion, regiment and brigade. He proved himself to be a skillful, courageous and strong-willed commander. After the war he completed the General Staff Military Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR imeni I.Ye. Voroshilov and served as commander of armored and mechanized troops of a military district, an army commander and first deputy commander of a military district. In all the positions assigned to V.S. Arkhipov, he devoted all of his strength, energy and knowledge to strengthening the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces. He was active in the nation's social and political life and was elected a delegate to the 21st CPSU Congress.

V.S. Arkhipov's service to the homeland was greatly appreciated by the Communist Party and the Soviet State. He was twice awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union and was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, five Red Banner Orders, the Order of Kutuzov, second degree, the Red Star Order and many medals, as well as orders and medals of the other socialist nations.

There will always be a bright memory of Vasilii Sergeyevich Arkhipov, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, and fervent patriot of the homeland, in our hearts.

S.L. Sokolov, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, V.I. Petrov,
A.A. Yepishev, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, S.K. Kurkotkin, I.N.
Shkadov, M.D. Popkov, A.M. Mayorov, D.A. Grinkevich,

S.Kh. Aganov, P.I. Bazhenov, V.A. Merimskiy, Yu.M. Potapov,
V.M. Mikhalkin, Yu.M. Andrianov, V.K. Pikalov, Yu.A.
Naumenko, O.A. Losik, D.A. Dragunskiy and V.N. Dutov

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CSO: 1801/258

ARMED FORCES

OBITUARY: A.I. KAZARTSEV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 85 p 4

[Text] Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General (Retired) Aleksandr Ignatyevich Kazartsev, veteran of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, has died after a serious and prolonged illness.

He devoted his entire conscious life to loyally serving the homeland, the Soviet people and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he had been a member since 1928.

A.I. Kazartsev was born on 25 August 1901 in the village of Talmenka in Talmenskiy Rayon, Altay Kray, into a peasant family. He joined the Red Army as a volunteer in 1920 and went from Red Army man to Colonel General in its ranks.

After completing the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he served in various command and staff positions. During the Great Patriotic War A.I. Kazartsev demonstrated good organizational abilities, military skill and personal courage while commanding a division and a corps. After the war he also served in command positions and ended his service as chief of rear services of the Air Defense Forces.

A.I. Kazartsev had a sense of great responsibility and organizational talent, and he devoted all of his strength, knowledge and extensive experience to further strengthening the combat readiness of the Air Defense Forces.

A.I. Kazartsev was always distinguished by party principle, demandingness of himself and of his subordinates, sensitivity and consideration for people.

Colonel General A.I. Kazartsev's services to the homeland were greatly appreciated by the Communist Party and the Soviet State. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred upon him, and he was awarded three Lenin Orders, three Red Banner Orders, two Orders of Suvorov, second degree, Orders of Kutuzov, first and second degrees, the Order of the Patriotic War, first degree, the Red Star Order and many medals.

We shall always have a bright memory of Aleksandr Ignatyevich Kazartsev, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, in our hearts.

A.I. Koldunov, S.K. Kurkotkin, I.N. Shkadov, A.I. Sorokin,
V.N. Dutov, S.A. Bobylev, Ye.S. Yurasov, I.M. Maltsev,
B.V. Bochkov, Yu.T. Chesnokov, N.D. Grebennikov, A.G.
Smirnov, Yu.V. Votintsev, N.I. Moskvitelev, A.I. Khyupenen,
V.N. Abramov, M.F. Bobkov and Ye.A. Sizov

11499

CSO: 1801/258

ARMED FORCES

MEDICAL OFFICER RECEIVES AWARD

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY SOVETSKOY SOTSIALISTICHESKOY RESPUBLIKI in Russian No 25 (1391) 20 Jun 85 p 658

/Ukase No 882 of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on conferring the honorary title "Honored Doctor of the RSFSR" to medical personnel of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Polyclinic

/Text For services in public health and successes achieved in preventive medicine, the honorary title of "Honored Doctor of the RSFSR" is conferred upon Col Medical Corps Anatoliy Dmitrievich Bulygin, Department Chief and upon Valentina Petrovna Shchegolkova, Department Director.

Chairman RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
V. Orlov

Secretary RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
Kh. Neshkov

Moscow 12 June 1985

12869
CSO: 1801/260

ARMED FORCES

JPRS-UMA-85-052
6 September 1985

LIEUTENANT RECEIVES POSTHUMOUS RED STAR

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH
RESPUBLIK in Russian No 23 (2305) 5 Jun 85 p 359

/Ukase No 412 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Awarding of
the Order of the Red Star to Sr Lt Sh. A. Agishev/

/Text/ For bravery and valor displayed in the performance of his
military duty, Sr. Lt Shamil Akhnafovich Agishev is awarded the Order
of the Red Star (posthumously)

First Deputy Chairman USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium

V. Kuznetsov

Secretary USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
T. Menteshashvili

Moscow, Kremlin 30 May 1985

12869

CSO: 1801/260

GROUND FORCES

LT GEN MOISEYEV ON WEAKNESS OF OFFICERS' TECHNICAL MASTERY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 1 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen M. Moiseyev of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District:
"The Regiments Need Experts"]

[Text] We have many tasks facing us which we have to accomplish during the summer training cycle. The course to strengthen the training process further and enhance the quality of studies, training exercises and the effectiveness of competition requires new efforts both to improve the training material-technical base and to strengthen discipline, order and good organization in all areas. Among the problems troubling the planners of combat and political training and the organizers of educational programs is also, of course, the issue of how to raise further the professional expertise of our officers.

This issue, as is known, is not new. Life, however, continues to convince us that all our affairs are dependent to a considerable degree on how we deal with this issue. This is especially very evident when our people turn up in situations very similar to actual combat.

I recall during an exercise when the situation became so complicated that Guards Capt N. Sidorov's motorized rifle battalion, along with its attached assets, was forced to engage in combat immediately from its march formation. According to the intelligence data, superiority was on the side of the motor riflemen. The battalion commander, however, refrained from the temptation to attack the "Enemy" head-on the whole time he was making his decision. He left only a portion of his troops and assets under the command of Guards Sr Lt M. Kuzmin to attack from the front. The battalion's main forces, however, attacked the "Enemy" in the flank and in the rear after they had completed a maneuver.

As later events showed, Guards Capt Sidorov acted correctly. During the battle, it was revealed that the "enemy" had hoped for just such a frontal attack from the motor riflemen and had employed his anti-tank assets, mine-fields, engineer obstacles, etc. for just an attack.

Getting into the details of combat training, I will only say that the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission by the motor riflemen was largely the result of the high professional expertise of Guards Capt Sidorov

and the other officers of the battalion. During the exercise, they showed their ability to employ their know-how creatively in a specific situation and all demonstrated excellent organizational qualities, resoluteness and hard skills in commanding and controlling various forces and assets. Particularly, I am talking here about those professional qualities without which a commander is simply inconceivable.

There is still another extremely noteworthy detail: The overwhelming majority of the officers who proved themselves during the evaluation able to achieve success in a struggle with a strong, shrewd and aggressively active enemy, is made up by first and second class specialists and experts. There is nothing surprising in this, it is exactly the way it is supposed to be. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that this fact deserves some attention.

The point here is that people in many places still do not deal with the issues associated with the enhancement of officer qualifications thoroughly and in close interconnection with tactical fire training. There are also many places where people proceed from the point that a highly qualified specialist should not only, let us say, be an excellent marksman or vehicle driver, he should also confidently master the procedures of modern battle, know how to employ effectively equipment and weapons, and methodically and competently train his subordinates. Some commanders and leaders see only a technical side in their areas of expertise and forget that class qualifications of expertise in their officers is an extremely extensive and all-encompassing concept.

I remember a tactical exercise involving Maj D. Naglovskiy's motorized rifle battalion. The motor riflemen performed sufficiently confidently on terrain not too terribly difficult. Soon, however, they were required to negotiate impenetrable areas over natural and artificial obstacles and repair equipment under conditions approximating those of combat. Here, the confusion began. Maj Naglovskiy was not sufficiently precise in the command and control of his subordinates, he assigned missions to them without considering the nature of the terrain and the level of their special training. Overall, the battalion commander was not able to employ totally the combat capabilities of his equipment and weapons. The initiative was lost to the "enemy."

In training, as in combat of course, no one is insured against failure. In the given incident, however, the officer was insufficiently competent in the areas associated with the organization of the utilization and repair of equipment in a combat situation. On the other hand, judging by the records of the battalion commander and many of his subordinate officers, these people are highly qualified specialists. Is this not an example of formalism in the effort to increase expertise according to class qualification?

Unfortunately, such examples are not unique. Experience shows that we still have many officers, especially junior ones, who have poorly mastered the equipment organic to their units. It is also disturbing that the technical horizons of some of them are not only failing to expand, they are actually diminishing. It is also a key point here that, contrary to some who feel otherwise, it is not the fault of our military schools that our officers are

technically poorly trained. The overwhelming majority of graduates of military training establishments, including command schools, has been sufficiently exposed to material and technical subjects. This, however, is not enough for one to become an expert in his area. Hard skills in the utilization and combat employment of equipment are required. These skills do not come by themselves. Continuous efforts are necessary to improve one's technical know-how. It is up to the more experienced of our comrades to help our junior officers with this.

The effort to enhance the classification of our officers, for instance, in the regiment where Guards Capt Sidorov serves, is regarded as one of the most important elements in the complex of measures to improve their tactical fire training and methodological level.

Here, we have a situation where the officer cannot be granted the qualification of a high class specialist unless he is capable of, let us say, organizing reconnaissance and coordination between various forces and assets, adapting to the terrain, effectively utilizing the capabilities of equipment and weapons and thoroughly supporting combat operations. As experience shows, such an approach to this issue is totally effective. It trains people to evaluate their technical know-how with the severe test of combat.

The experiences of a certain tank regiment are also shown in a similar light. Here, the issues of enhancing the officers' qualifications and expertise are constantly at the center of attention on the part of the commander, his staff, the party committee and the Komsomol committee. This work is precisely planned and coordinated. Every officer knows which level of excellence he is supposed to reach in this or that phase of training. He also knows that at any moment the regimental staff can test how well he can perform what he already knows. Such tests take place regularly. All of this enhances planned discipline, provides an incentive for people to search out new, more effective ways to improve their military-technical know-how and skills. It is totally logical, for example, that many regimental officers, including the juniors ones as well, actively participate in rational and creative work.

As is known, independent study is the basic form of improving officers' expertise. They rely precisely on this in the regiment I am talking about. This, however, does not mean at all that the officers here stew in their own juices. Their study is under constant supervision. They are given individual assignments. Those needing help can receive the counsel of an experienced specialist at any time.

A great deal is done so that the technical horizons of the officers, particularly the anti-tank and other specialists in the regiment, correspond to modern requirements. I include here guards majors V. Vorobyev and V. Salnikov, Guards Capt A. Kalashkin, and others. They participate energetically in the preparation and conduct of instructor-methodological and hands-on lessons and group exercises employing the unit's organic equipment. They also participate actively in propagandizing the know-how of the better specialists and help officers prepare for skill qualification tests.

Other units, of course, have much to learn in the plan to improve the officers' know-how. Naturally, we see one of our own tasks now in doing everything to disseminate what is valuable as we gain it here. At the same time, however, we have to keep in mind that the end results in competition and the soldiers' contribution to all the people's struggle for a worthy reception of the CPSU's 27th congress will depend largely on how quickly we are able to eradicate present inadequacies and mobilize all reserves to service combat training.

The task of enhancing the skill qualification and expertise of our personnel, primarily the officers, and expanding their military and technical horizons makes particular sense today. We all know how importantly the party regards scientific-technical progress. As the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed, the acceleration of this progress is regarded as the key strategic lever to speed up the national economy and better utilize accumulated potential. The party's requirements, manifested in connection with the above to all cadres, apply totally to military officers. To keep step with modern requirements means to work incessantly on oneself and to improve professional expertise. It is here that we find combat skill qualification and classification.

As experience shows, socialist competition can play an important role in the enhancement of officer activity to improve his scientific-technical training. There is still too much formalism here, however. We also have to think about increasing the prestige of skill classification. One of the best paths we can take in our search for a solution to this problem can be seen in the improvement of the system providing incentives to the best specialists and an increase in requirements on those who do not fulfill their assumed obligations and are failing to grow professionally. I think that we do not utilize all the possibilities even in the plan to organize competition between officers according to their specialties. For now, they are conducted only from time to time.

In a word, the enhancement of our officers' combat qualifications and expertise is one of our foremost tasks. It cannot be otherwise. Ultimately, the goals of expertise set by the commanders themselves are the best guideposts for their subordinates.

12247
CSO: 1801/245

GROUND FORCES

AUTOMATED TRAINING FACILITY UNDERUSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 85 p 2

/Article by Col A. Yurkin, correspondent for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "But Is It Productive?" More Effective Utilization of Modern Training Aids/

/Text/ They are proud of this training center in the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District. The idea for creating the center came from artillerymen and had the broadest and most active support. Col A. Klybkov, Lt Col Yu. Ermakov, and Maj V. Shumilov and many other enthusiasts were among those who created the center. Plans for the building, designed for the most up-to-date electronic systems, were developed by officers and cadets at the Leningrad Higher Engineer Construction Establishment imeni Army Gen A. N. Komarovskiy. They also supervised the implementation of the project. The structure, cleverly decorated and with a municipal quarter, sprang up quickly on the training ground. A computer, display terminals and other equipment of the newest type were installed at the center.

The purpose of this training center is as follows: train artillery subunit commanders not only in operating this automated command and control equipment, with which the troops are already equipped, but prepare them to receive also the latest-generation computer which will enter the subunits tomorrow.

Lt Col V. Komin was appointed center chief. In terms of other duties he performs, this is his primary responsibility. His immediate assistants were Sr Lt D. Amustin, who had been educated as an electronics engineer at the institute, and a technician, Warrant Office I. Sokolov. Of those who were, if it can be put this way, the authors of the new training facility, only Maj V. Shulimov was left.

After visiting the center, one can see a great deal. You can touch equipment here which can considerably facilitate the workload of the commander in battle planning, fire control, and speeding up their calculations.

How is the training center used in practice? What contribution is it making in raising the officers' professional skills?

Unfortunately, the output from this interesting, multi-promising training facility is still low. The modern, expensive computer is virtually not running. It is standing idle.

I recently observed a curious picture at this very range. A fire control officer, a battery commander, was preparing data using a hand-held calculator. Suffice to say, the capabilities of this pocket calculator cannot be compared with the computer installed at the center. And all this is progress. But the divisional commander, verifying the battalion commander's calculations, was using an artillery ruler.

"This simple commander's instrument," he explained to me, "is battle-tested. And I believe it is far from obsolete. But this," scornfully nodding at the hand-held calculator, "is a tribute to fashion."

Judgements such as these can be encountered around the most modern training centers. I, of course, do not believe that the traditional ruler must be quickly carted off to a museum. But, consciously avoiding the new and sceptically treating the high-speed electronics only because it has not been personally mastered means dooming oneself to inevitable obsolescence.

When I shared my observations with Lt Col Victor Aleksandrovich Komin, chief of the training center, instead of a reply, he took that pocket calculator and ruler and persuasively argued: even an electronic calculating device at this level provides great advantages in time and accuracy.

"Still not all officers, including artillerymen, have acquired a taste for command and control automation or for using high-speed computers," Lt Col Komin recounted. Battery commanders, chiefs of staff and divisional commanders display the greatest activeness in this area. And here the youngest of officers, yesterday's graduates from military institutions are, in many cases, not displaying a keen interest for the new or a desire to master it as soon as possible. This kind of inertia must be decisively combatted.

Why is this new training center used only sparingly in daily training? I discussed this with Lt Col Komin and Sr Lt Amusin and Warrant Officer Sokolov, his assistants. They shared their opinions with me and those of a man who works at the training ground, Lt Col Dementevskiy.

"In addition to the high-speed computer," Lt Col Dementevskiy said in particular "many other things are still needed: exercise programming, formulated training procedures, sufficiently experienced and skilled exercise supervisors. There is much needed."

Yes, serious efforts and subject-oriented work are necessary to master the newest technology. Sr Lt Amusin, who had received specialist training as an electronics engineer prior to his service and has skills in operating automated command and control systems, himself admitted: programming, linked to solving training problems, does not come simply. What kind of reorganization is needed in training cadets at command establishments to ensure that they will strive to master modern calculating equipment, and regard the use of calculators, already allowed in primary education, as their own great achievements?

It is strange, but among the enthusiasts who relish the development of unit training centers and the creation of new training centers, and including rationalizers and inventors, there are few Lieutenants and Sr Lieutenants. And as part of creative groups, they would pass through the big school and would become the receivers of knowledge from those who set the tone in technical creativity. Because the search in the area of perfecting training aids involves a narrow circle of enthusiasts, we are suffering large losses.

At one time, a new training simulator for training tankers appeared at one of the training centers in the Red Banner Siberian Military District. Using the simulator, the trainees acquired skills in negotiating obstacles and driving the vehicle over difficult routes. Use of the simulator made it possible to achieve good training results with a noticeable saving of fuel and equipment resources. The innovation attracted the attention of many. They inquired about the designs and drawings. A simulator such as this one soon appeared at the "Vystrel" Higher Office Courses. Once a baseline has been adopted as a model in local varieties, it helps tankers perfect their skills.

What happened to the simulator in the Siberian Military District where its first version appeared? On one occasion, a prestigious committee requested to see it in action. A warrant officer assigned the responsibility of taking care of it, could not get it started--no matter how hard he tried. In justifying himself, he threw up his hands and said: I am a driver-mechanic, not an electrical engineer. Suffice to say that in the regiment where the simulator was sent it is used extremely rarely. The resources expended for manufacturing equipment and the great creative work of the innovators were not justified.

I recount this case to reemphasize the conclusion: it does not take much to construct a successful simulator center, but its proper utilization must be organized and individuals trained for this. If everything hinges on some enthusiasts, then when they leave the unit frequently the effort is abandoned and the simulator, other training equipment, left essentially without someone to run it, ceases to serve the trainee due to occasional significant downtimes and improper maintenance.

And the reverse is true. If there are individuals in a unit truly inspired to see that the training aids not only meet the requirements of time, but are used at maximum intensity in order that none of the simulators stand idle, the quality and efficiency of the training process will be high. An X-tank regiment in the Leningrad Military District over the course of several years was not successful in achieving consistently high scores in live fire training for tank commanders and gunnery. The regiment was frequently criticized for this in lectures and meetings held at various levels. It is not known how long all this would have continued were it not for Maj B. Donovan coming to the regiment to look into the matter. Energetic and well-trained in the technology, the officer managed to quickly smooth out the precision operation of the center's electronic simulator. The intensity of the training process and mainly, quality of drills and training sessions were markedly higher. All companies in the regiment received high scores in live fire training during their final exercises. Furthermore, active use of the simulator center made it possible for the tankers to save a great deal of fuel, lubricants, and other materials.

Those are the facts. They automatically bring to mind the thought: what else needs to be done? Indeed, with the growth of military affairs, the requirements on training aids will steadily grow. Enthusiasm alone here, apparently, will not get you very far. Perhaps, the time has come for building district-level or zonal simulator training centers and their centralized management. These centers would become organizational mode's for units and formations and would help in achieving a turnaround in ideas and moods in personnel the need for which was mentioned at a CPSU CC meeting on problems of scientific and technical progress. There are still many problems in the use of troop training aids, especially simulators which make it possible to perfect skills with minimal economic expenditures. The search for their solution cannot be delayed. The introduction of the most modern technical resources into the training process is a vital matter for everyone who organizes it and supervises them.

12869

CSO: 1801/260

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON U.S. LIGHT HELICOPTER DEVELOPMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 5 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Yu. Boyiko: "Light Helicopters"]

[Text] As is known, light helicopters are being extensively utilized for the accomplishment of missions in the interests of the ground forces. Please tell us about the future models of such aircraft and the tendencies which are now being followed in the development of this type of equipment. - Capt I. Polakov, Sr Lt V. Nikitenko

Military leaders in a number of capitalist countries, particularly the United States, regard helicopters as one of the most effective assets for executing various combat and ancillary missions (the destruction of tank forces, fire support for ground forces, the conduct of electronic warfare and aerial reconnaissance, the landing of assault teams, the evacuation of wounded, etc.). The helicopters in the U.S. arsenal - AN-1G (Huey-Cobra), AN-1S (Cobra-Tow), UH60A (Black Hawk), OH-58, OH-6 - have approximately the same tactical-technical characteristics: two-man crews, a maximum lift-capacity of 4,500 kilograms, a cruising speed of 230 kilometers per hour and an actual ceiling of 3,700 to 4,000 meters. Beginning last year, the U.S. arsenal began receiving a new and, as foreign military experts report, greatly improved over present U.S. helicopters of the same class, AN-64A (Apache). Its maximum lift-capacity is 8,000 kilograms; it has a cruising speed of 290 kilometers per hour and an actual ceiling of 6,250 meters. As is the case with the other U.S. helicopters, the Apache has a two-man crew.

They are sparing no pains in their advertisements: journal issue after issue, both those for specialists, as well as those for the general public, show colorful snapshots of the flying machines. They describe the combat qualifications and capacities of the light helicopters because this guarantees the various firms orders and solid financing. However, foreign military publications have recently taken more and more to printing the stories of specialists who criticize these new flying machines.

As such, one of the issues of the journal ROTOR AND WING INTERNATIONAL reported on a scheduled meeting of the U.S. Association of Army Aviation where the doubt was raised whether the light helicopters in the U.S. arsenal correspond

to modern requirements. According to data published in the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 56 shortcomings were revealed in a test conducted by the appropriate agencies to evaluate the accomplishments of flight missions by Army Aviation. The results showed that any given collection of the aircraft has no chance to survive in a future war. For this reason, the journal reports later that work on the LHX Program, which is targeted at creating a qualitatively new generation of light military helicopters, has been stepped up recently in the United States. A target cost for the development has also been revealed: 3.4 million dollars for the multi-purpose helicopter and 5.6 million dollars for a more complicated combat copy (in 1984 dollars). The overall sum, however, which U.S. leaders believe the LHX Program will cost is 40 billion dollars.

U.S. leaders plan to replace in U.S. ground forces by 2010 no fewer than 5,000 helicopters of obsolete construction with a single class of aircraft which will be produced through the LHX Program. Currently, there are 22 types of light helicopters in the U.S. arsenal. In addition to the first 5,000 aircraft, they plan to produce approximately 2,000 aircraft for the Marine Corps and 1,000 more for the Air Force.

These figures, as we can see, are large. Foreign commentators assume that the corporation which receives the right to develop this program will become the leader of the U.S. helicopter building industry. It is no accident that such authorities in helicopter building as Bell, Boeing Vertol, Hughes and Sikorsky have joined the competition.

The LHX Program envisions the building of two basic versions of these light helicopters: one for general purpose (multi-purpose) and another special reconnaissance-combat version (SCAT). It is envisioned that the first aircraft will be equipped for the transport of crews belonging to air defense, missile and anti-tank weapons, the conduct of electronic-countermeasure service. They will also be used as command and communications vehicles. The basic functions to be planned for with the LHX-SCAT helicopters will be reconnaissance, both along the front and in the enemy's rear, participation in anti-helicopter and anti-tank defense, as well as in direct fire support of friendly ground forces and the suppression of the enemy's air defense operations.

As the journal INTERAVIA reports, the construction of the helicopter should allow for a rapid reequipping of these aircraft for the execution of this or that reconnaissance or combat mission. It is stressed that one of the basic requirements being placed on the helicopters being developed is the capability of being flown by a single pilot. In the opinion of foreign experts, this will lighten the load of the aircraft considerably (up to 270 kilograms) and reduce the expenses to train specialists. Various devices will assist the pilot in flying the aircraft during the execution of flight missions. One issue of the journal SPECIAL ELECTRONICS reported on the development of a system of helicopter control through speech and a system of unspoken warning signals.

The journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY is informing its readers that the firm of Boeing Vertol has created a model of a single-seater helicopter cockpit which the firm purposes to use as the basis for future models. The cockpit is outfitted with a large panoramic display consisting of four cathode-ray tubes. The pilot flies the helicopter by using a moving map which represents the locations of the helicopter and friendly troops, as well as where threatening objects and obstacles are.

The firm of Sikorsky has proposed another lay-out for the cockpit. The firm has opted for maximum simplification in flying the aircraft and has reduced the number of indicator lights monitored by the parameters. The people at Sikorsky are looking for the best place to locate control buttons, levers, pedals, etc. They have proposed, for example, to install a single lever to control the helicopter's flight: a forward or backward movement takes care of pitch, right or left deals with rolling and turning it in relation to the helicopter's shaft will control yaw. If upward or downward pressure is applied to this lever, the overall rotation speed of the propellers will change.

Various points of view are held with regard to the speed characteristics of the LHX. Some specialists believe that these helicopters should not exceed the speeds of present-day helicopters. Others are of the opinion that the helicopters' speed should be somewhat higher, in the order of 400 to 500 kilometers per hour. Still others are fighting for speeds even higher: 550-600 kilometers per hour.

The president of Sikorsky stated in a press article that the results of research conducted by the firm indicate that speed should not become one of the determining factors, inasmuch as increasing the speed will take place at the expense of making other aspects of the helicopter perform poorly.

The journal FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL reports that the ultimate configuration of the cockpit, onboard equipment, weapons, type of engine and carrier blades will be determined only after the completion of all research projects envisioned by the program. The objectives of the program, planned over a three-year period, is to determine the lay-out of the cockpit, set the levels of control system reliability and the best combination of weapons, and substantiate speed and maneuver requirements.

Work is being done on developing a digital optical control system to fly the helicopter. It is proposed to replace the helicopter's electronic signals on actuators with optical signals which will be transmitted along an optical cable of fibre. The basic merits of such a system, according to foreign military specialists, are the non-susceptibility to electro-magnetic disturbances, simplicity in damage repair, a sharp reduction in the number of components and even higher speeds in signal transmission.

There is still one additional tendency we should mention. We are talking here about building the helicopter's fuselage out of composite materials, something, according to experts, that would reduce the weight of the aircraft by 22 to 25 percent and production costs by 17 percent. People assume that such a fuselage will be capable of withstanding the shock of a crash landing traveling vertically at 12.5 meters per second.

After completion of the preliminary projects in all areas and the final selection of the design and characteristics of the future helicopter, the issue of the production of the first 5,000 helicopters will become the order of the day.

This, as the foreign press reports, will require 10-15 years. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is searching for ways to speed up the LHX Program.

12247

CSO: 1801/245

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

LIMITED USE OF COMPUTER IN PVO TRACKING

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 85p 2

[Article by Lt Col M. Zechikhin: "The Answer Is in the Computer"]

[Text] The air "enemy" was literally testing the strength of the launch detachment's nerves. Targets moved into the launch zone, but they would suddenly turn away after having performed a complex maneuver. The radar markers, weakly blinking, lost their clarity and disappeared off the screens of the radar sets.

The "enemy" was obviously probing the strength of the anti-aircraft defense. Soon, reports began to arrive on new targets. The tension increased. Would the aircraft intersect the invisible line towards which they have been moving more than once? Understanding the "enemy's" intention in this situation virtually meant victory in this battle.

The director of the exercise, Lt Col M. Kuznechikov, heard a report from an officer working at an automated operation position: "Judging by their course and speed, the targets will be in the impact zone in exactly one minute."

The confident tone of the subordinate's report irritated the lieutenant colonel somewhat.

"Are you a clairvoyant, or something?"

An answer came through the receiver: "The computer is helping..."

Lt Col Kuznechikov nevertheless decided to check out the situation himself. While he was verifying the data, however, the targets entered the fire zone. At the same time, the "enemy" switched on his jamming assets. A ripple of light covered the screens. Processing the target information was done, but with a great deal of difficulty and errors. The score of the team at the command post (CP) was reduced.

At the exercise's critique, Lt Col Kuznechikov made a devastating remark:

"I did not want to act because of a computer's prompting..."

The evaluator objected: "One must act in accordance with his decision, but the 'advice' from a computer should also be considered."

What then prevented the adequately trained officer from effectively using a computer's data in the exercise?

Today, the volume of incoming target information has grown even greater during the preparation and conduct of battle with an air "enemy." At the same time, the time to process this information has diminished considerably. It is completely understandable that the old methods make it even more difficult to collect and analyze data and to direct the battle flexibly and precisely. As a result of this, battle directors will unavoidably lag behind a dynamic and rapidly changing situation; it will also hold up the progress of combat operations. This was exactly what happened in the exercise described above. And the main reason, I think, can be found in the fact that Lt Col Kuznechikov was not totally prepared psychologically to use a computer; he had a poor understanding of its capabilities. Obviously, and to a certain extent, the inertia in the officer's thinking was also at fault. All of this reflected negatively on the ability of the team at the CP to work effectively.

The quickly changing nature of modern anti-aircraft combat requires that the commander constantly checks the decisions he makes and instantly reacts to the "enemy's" maneuvers with actions which most completely correspond to the logic of developing events. Here, it is impossible to get by without the aid of automated control systems (ACS). They expand the commander's opportunities, permit a better concentration of friendly operations, model the most complex situation and create favorable conditions for the demonstration of initiative and creativity. All of these things are obvious concepts. Nevertheless, there are still some problems here and there in the interaction between man and machine.

I remember such an incident. An exercise was going on at a CP where Maj Rodionov was in charge of the team on duty. The senior commander created a complex air situation with the aid of a simulator: Every "enemy" air attack differed sharply in its scheme and execution from the previous one. The soldiers toiled with sweat on their faces as they strove to accomplish the difficult missions operationally. They, however, were always being pressed for time. Against all of this, the non-use of the CP's computer became even more glaring. When a pause arrived, I became interested and asked: Why was this so? Maj Rodionov shrugged his shoulders: "We use it only in extreme situations..."

An analysis of the combat training of the CP's team revealed that the soldiers here rarely worked with the computer's data and a complex electronic calculating machine often stood by idle. True, the soldiers used it at first. However, it once provided erroneous data in the heat of a combat training exercise. One of the officers admitted in annoyance that even working with the computer was a troublesome operation. It turned out that the false data originated not because of the "capriciousness" of the computer, but because of a careless approach in dealing with it, including the introduction in it of imprecise basic parameters.

All of this shows that working with a computer requires a great deal of responsibility and comprehensive special training. However, individual officers approach modern electronic equipment, as they say, with a "hammer." Or they prefer not to deal with it at all. Why is this the case?

Utilizing computers in daily command activity unavoidably results in the application of advanced command and control principles in combat training and exercises and requires that all officers in the chain of command master further game theory, the mathematical modelling of combat operations and programming. And, of course, it is difficult for individual specialists to move, as they say, from the beaten track to an untraveled road. The difficulties are also connected to changes with familiar forms of documentation, information processing procedures and the steps in making a decision when using a computer. As a rule, this encourages the majority of officers to analyze the causes and nature of real or perceived changes in their activity and to forecast the possible ways of making their decision, something which ultimately and unavoidably leads to the development of the correct attitude in dealing with an ACS. A great deal here also depends on how consistently, persistently and expeditiously the commander, his staff and the political organization attempt to spread into practice modern methods of working with an ACS and how strictly they evaluate the special training of their officers.

In the unit where officer A. Vyrvich serves, for example, they came to the conclusion a long time ago that no single exercise or class should be conducted without the use of an ACS. It goes without saying that some officers do not immediately enjoy such work, they have yet to accommodate a close contact with complex electronic equipment. To change this, commanders, political workers and the party organization have to show persistence in inculcating in their specialists a keen feeling with regard to a new and correct attitude towards the ACS. This was initiated through hands-on classes where it was clearly and understandably demonstrated how the use of computer equipment in combat efforts expands the opportunities of the commander and makes his work more productive.

One class, which made a deep impression on the officers and became a uniquely pivotal point in changing their attitude towards computers, was the one conducted by officer A. Anankiniy. As a specialist with "exquisite" professional skills, he carefully thought out every action and every operation and theoretically and practically substantiated their expediency and necessity. With a number of training simulators, he created a situation which was tense and complicated in its plan and originality because of the tactical methods of aerial combat employed by the "enemy." Even a superficial familiarization with the situation caused one to conclude that the solution to the problem would be difficult to execute. This further stimulated interest in the duel. The entire course of the duel was broken down into fragments, in each of which two separate elements of a commander's decision are calculated: The decision made with the aid of a computer and the one made without it. The results were immediately compared. By the end of the class, the data provided by the computer was so various and convincing that it became clear that the outcome of the battle would have been different without the computer's use.

The training of a commander in the unit also serves the interests of extensively mastering the computer. During this training, classes are constantly conducted on and quizzes given to test the knowledge of computer equipment, its parts and components. Now, the entire chain of command has thoroughly mastered the work at an automated operational position.

Now, this military collective does not have a single officer who does not comprehend what frame of mind is required to master the computer in order to use it most effectively. This is something which corresponds to the important designation associated with this equipment. We are talking here primarily about the skillful utilization of the possibilities of electronics and the efficient solution of problems which the commander runs into during his combat activity. Officer Vyrvich himself devotes a great deal of time to his efforts to improve the officers' skills in modelling anti-aircraft combat and learn how to use an ACS in his combat activity, thus receiving the maximum amount of data when he is making a decision. This was proved in a trip to the range where the soldiers received high scores.

...I recently had the good fortune to be present at an exercise on team arrangement. The exercise director was Maj N. Sapronov. The exercise moved towards a situation similar to the one Lt Col Kuznetsov had to deal with. The command to begin the CP exercise was received. Soon, targets appeared on the radar station's display screens. The usual steps were followed: "Azimuth..., speed..."

It turned out that nothing forecasted the complication of the situation. Maj Sapronov, however, decided to utilize the computer's data operationally.

"Enemy" aircraft tore towards the defended site from three sides. Electronic countermeasure assets began working energetically. The situation changed precipitously. Calculated seconds were devoted to making the decisions. Here, it became clear that the aircraft would enter the fire zone almost simultaneously from three sides. It was not easy for the CP team to determine the order in which to shoot down the targets in this situation. The skillful use, however, of the computer helped solve the problem.

The collection and processing of information, the making of a combat decision, and much, much more in the combat training activity of a commander requires a considerable expenditure of time and maximum precision. In all of this, it is difficult to overestimate the role of computers. Their further comprehensive mastering is the order of the day.

12247

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NAVAL FORCES

PRAISE FOR PRECISION IN UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 85 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Pasakin: "A Meeting At Sea"]

[Text] In their approach to the ocean tanker Ivan Bubnov the crew set up a slate on the rotating bridge of the cruiser. Someone then marked with chalk: 156.7 degrees. The ship had yet to be so required to maintain such a course in its approach, i.e., right down to a tenth of a degree. This time, however, the situation was unique: the cruiser had to take on fuel, water and other cargos from the tanker and this required exquisite accuracy in all the calculations and actions of the crews.

At this important time, it was Warrant Officer F. Medenko who was at the cruiser's wheel. He did not know who was at the wheel of the tanker, but it seemed that each of them was reading the other's thoughts at a distance. The cruiser almost rolled over when the rudder on the tanker shifted slightly. The two ships were separated by only a few dozen meters.

We used to encounter the Ivan Bubnov everywhere in the Mediterranean Sea, even in its most isolated spots. Hardly having fueled one ship, the tanker would rush off to replenish another. Sometimes, it would sail together with an "escort" made up of several ships taking on fuel simultaneously. As the helicopter pilots would relate, an aerial view of such a "coupling" reminds one of a floating city of steel with a complicated communications system. If one ignores the foam left behind in the wake of the ships, one gets the impression that the refueling ships and the tanker had stopped moving. But this is not the case: They are immobile only relative to each other. They are moving together, as a whole, in perfect synchronization, without moving ahead or lagging behind. It is in this precision that we see the greatest demonstration of the crews' maritime skills.

Once there was the incident when they sent the tanker in a hurry to the destroyer Otchayanni which was heading towards a combat training exercise area. Initially, the refueling went along as usual. Later, however, it became extremely difficult to navigate on the rough seas. The destroyer was forced to maneuver and periodically change its speed. All of this was repeated in the exact same manner by the tanker. Afterwards, the experts called this operation unique. It occurred suddenly for both crews, but the sailors, nevertheless, managed brilliantly.

...There is the crack of the pneumatic line and a caproic marline falls across the deck as if it were a thin serpent. From onboard the tanker, a bearded man smiles: "Boatswain Petr Guslakov here. Watch how we take care of this!" The heaving line is the first binding link between the cruiser and the tanker. After a few more precise actions are performed, the road of beams is ready.

I watch how the hose comes to life and fills up with a spreading elasticity. There are many tanks on the cruiser and it is necessary to fill them up in such a manner so as to avoid the slightest roll by the cruiser. Closely following all of this is the support battalion commander. Capt Lt C. Chervoniy. He ensures that the oncoming fuel corresponds to the levels decided upon the evening before. Everything is running smoothly. Overall, the fuel being pumped is regulated by an automatic valve. In an emergency, however, Chervoniy's subordinates are ready to cut the flow of the fuel with the "Dedovskiy" method, i.e., with the aid of a brass line. The method is quite simple, but it does have its precise requirements. A special group of people has been trained for this in the support battalion.

While I was at the power engineering and support post, a missile cruiser drew near on our starboard side which was unoccupied. The same problems now repeat themselves on this side. Commands and the cracking of the lines can be heard and our coupling grows larger. I notice that the tanker "has grown up a bit." When we met her, she was set in the water at her waterline. Now, she was noticeably higher.

The arrival of the missile cruiser made it still more difficult to hold the charted course and speed. The watch officer, Capt Lt A. Moskalev, almost uninterruptedly set the last figure on the slate board in front of the wheel, the one which specifies degrees in tenths. The speed of the rotation of the propellers is also controlled with an accuracy to a single revolution.

And what is going on on the tanker? It turns out that preparations are going full steam ahead to take on a third ship which will stand astern of the tanker. Thus, I was lucky to be a witness to a complicated operation at sea and watch the setting up of a floating city. Afterwards, having set up radio communications with the tanker's captain, Aleksandr Yemelyanovich Danilenko, I expressed to him my admiration for what I had seen. I heard his reply: "The usual." Of course, there was no false modesty in this. The naval tanker Ivan Bubnov, sailing under the flag of the auxiliary fleet, has covered many thousand kilometers in service life and has serviced thousands of ships. At all latitudes, Soviet military sailors regard it as a reliable and good friend.

After we had replenished the tanks with fuel and had moved off, I went below, burning my hands on the ladder's handrails, to the boiler room. In the peephole of the furnace one could see how the blinding flame was burning and sweeping over the burners. The cruiser was again ready for distant voyages. Until we meet again, Ivan Bubnov. This was certainly not our last meeting.

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NAVAL FORCES

BRIEFS

PORT CALL - ROSTOCK--A detachment of Soviet military ships, including the missile cruiser "Grozniy" and the patrol ship "Neukrotiniy" will return an official friendly visit to the port of Rostock in the German Democratic Republic from 7 through 10 June 1985. The detachment will be under the command of the commander of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Admiral K.V. Makarov. [text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 85 p 3] 12247

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DOSA AF

DEFENSE SOCIETY PRESIDUM ON PREPARING FOR 27TH CPSU CONGRESS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Jun 85 p 1

/Article: "Extend a Proper Greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress"

/Text/ At a regular meeting of the USSR DOSAAF CC tasks in organizing DOSAAF in fulfilling the resolutions of the April (1985) CPSU CC Plenum and a proper greeting to the 27th Party Congress are determined and other issues in the activities of the defense society discussed.

For guidance and constant utilization by all committees and organizations, production enterprises of the defense society, the Preisdium adopted the resolutions of the April (1985) CPSU CC Plenum. They are a battle program of practical activities for mobilizing the multimillion members of the defense society for a proper greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress, a full and qualitative fulfillment of 1985 plan assignments and the current Five-Year Plan on the whole.

The decrees indicated the necessity, in accordance with the requirements of the April CPSU CC Plenum, statutes and proceedings set forth in the conference documents in the CPSU CC on issues of accelerating scientific and technical progress, to adjust future annual plans and take additional specific measures for the further improving of mass defense work, perfect the monitoring and verification of executive orders, and strengthen labor, plan and performance discipline.

At regular plena, meetings of committee presidiums and in general meetings in primary training, and sporting organizations and production collectives, it was proposed to discuss the tasks in preparation for a proper greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress.

It was recommended to DOSAAF committees and organizations to clearly and persuasively reveal the leading role of the communist party and to show its unwavering concern for the welfare of the people and for strengthening the country's economic and defensive might, as well as to explain the complexity and contradiction of international society and, in a well-reasoned manner, expose American imperialism's aggressive essence.

For DOSAAF CC in the union republics and DOSAAF kraykoms and obkoms must consistently and persistently carry out tasks connected with further increasing the quality of training of specialists for the USSR Armed Forces, especially in practical skills, concentrate on improving the training and educational process and strengthening the training and material bases and utilize more efficiently the capabilities of the All-Union shows-competitions in the rayon and municipal organizations, schools and aero clubs, which has been extended until 1 February 1986.

The Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF CC took note of the low results in training youths for army and navy service found in the Krasnodar and Primorskiy Kray, Amur, Astrakhan, Volgograd, Murmansk, Pern, Ryazan, Smolensk, and Yaroslav Oblast committees and called on them to remove the existing deficiencies and ensure fulfillment of plan assignments for the 1985-86 training year in all areas of training specialists for the USSR Armed Forces.

Committees, supervisors of training organizations and DOSAAF sport and technical clubs must reliably continue to raise the quality of personnel training in the mass technical professions which have military applications and the result-oriented attitude of the leadership by this important sector of the activities of the defense society, and take effective measures to strengthen the results already achieved in personnel training for the national economy and fulfill plan assignments set for 1985.

Taking into consideration future growth in the Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern economies, it was proposed that the DOSAAF committees and organizations of the Primorskiy Kray and Kamchatka, Amur, and Chitin Oblasts formulate and implement additional steps for strengthening the material and technical base and expand the scope of personnel training for mass technical professions.

The Presidium required from committees and sport federations further work improvements in terms of broadened involvement in continuous work with sports with technical and military applications played by workers, youth of conscription and preconscription ages, and perfecting the training of amateur and professional sportsmen, viewing this work as an important element in the activities of the defense society in training reserves for the USSR Armed Forces.

We must in every way possible introduce into the DOSAAF training and primary organizations--especially in the general educational schools, professional-technical schools, tekhnikums and VUZ's, in collective farms and state farms and also in areas where youth live, sport rifle shooting, tournaments with military applications, go-carting, automobile, radio controlled motorcycle racing, modelling and other permissible sports, combining physical and technical training.

In accordance with the CPSU CC decree "On Measures to Improve the Utilization of Club Institutions and Sport Facilities," we must ensure further perfecting of work in the sport and technical clubs and sport facilities and their effective utilization, as well as create sport and technical clubs, the most elementary sport facilities in all rayons and cities, major primary training organizations.

DOSAAF committees and organizations must improve fundamentally the use of transport resources and prevent instances of mismanagement of motor vehicle resources and fuel and lubricant materials, ensure the efficient organization of the park service and safe vehicle operations, preventing transport accidents, as well as wage daily an uncompromising struggle with drunkenness and reckless driving--the primary causes of traffic accidents.

To DOSAAF CC at union republic, kray, and oblast level DOSAAF committees, it is directed: continue broadening the material and technical base utilizing existing reserves and capabilities, respond to modern levels of mass defense work and ensure its high quality, take resolute measures to ensure full utilization of capital investment allocated for the current year and the prompt introduction of start-up facilities for 1985, building and establishing aviation organizations.

DOSAAF committees and supervisors of production enterprises must continue work to improve organization of production, restructure planning, forms and methods of management, reduce the red tape, increase the intensity of plan assignments and strengthen the economy. In all ways possible, they must support the initiatives of leading collectives and work during the 27th CPSU Congress on conserving raw materials, materials, and energy resources.

The Presidium stressed that in working with personnel, the party line on increasing the demandingness on the part of supervisors of society committees and organizations and on increasing responsibility for the area they are charged with must be steadily implemented. This is based on the fact that the spirit of an innovative creative approach to one's work, and the ability to notice in a timely fashion and support valuable undertakings is necessary for supervisors of committees, training and sport organizations and DOSAAF enterprises. Do not permit and stop the promotion to supervisory position those individuals who are unfit to supervise defense organizations. Resolutely relieve those supervisors from their responsibilities who abuse spirits and by their behavior bring disgrace to the defense society.

It was proposed to DOSAAF committees and organizations during socialist competitions using the slogan "We shall mark the 27th Party Congress with high results in mass defense work," and direct political and labor members' activeness of the society to qualitatively solving our present tasks and totally fulfilling the socialist obligations accepted.

As already reported, the Presidium adopted the decree on conducting proceedings and elections in DOSAAF organizations. Meetings (or conferences) will be held in primary training organizations in October-November 1985, and rayon, municipal, and okrug conference in November-December 1985; oblast and kray DOSAAF conferences will be held in December and January 1986.

The Presidium emphasized the situation concerning exemplary DOSAAF training organizations. Training results in defense society organizations of personnel in mass technical professions for the national economy and tasks for fulfilling the plan for 1986 and results of financial and economical activities of the society and production and economical activities of DOSAAF enterprises for 1984 and steps for further perfecting work are reviewed.

The job of DOSAAF organizations in fulfilling decrees on measures for the further development of sport rifle shooting was discussed.

Decrees were adopted on these matters.

Procedure for conducting the DOSAAF lottery for 1986-1990 was determined.

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DOSA AF

DOSA AF CC ON CONDUCT OF REPORTING, ELECTORAL MEETINGS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 23 Jun 85 p 1

[Unattributed article: "At the USSR DOSAAF CC: The Conduct of Reporting and Electoral Meetings at DOSAAF Organizations"]

[Text] In accordance with the USSR DOSAAF Charter and in connection with the expiration of the authority of the committees and the auditing committees of the primary, rayon, city, okrug, oblast and kray organizations of DOSAAF the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF CC has decreed:

1. That reporting and electoral meetings (conferences) be held in the primary DOSAAF organizations in October-November 1985; rayon, city and okrug DOSAAF conferences be held in November-December 1985; oblast and kray DOSAAF conferences be held in December 1985-January 1986.

That the standards of representation to the conferences will be established by the appropriate DOSAAF committees.

2. That the DOSAAF CCs of the union republics ensure that the kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon committees of the Society the conduct of reports and elections on a high organizational and ideological-political level and direct them to a further heightening of the responsibility, initiative and activity of DOSAAF members of the execution of socialist obligations and plan assignments of the current year as well as the five-year plan as a whole, and to a worthy meeting of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Will, in the preparation and execution of the reporting and electoral campaign in a businesslike and principled atmosphere with a self-critical approach to the evaluation of the activity leading organs, analyze and review the work done for putting into practice the requirements of the 26th Party Congress, the following plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the decisions of the 9th All-Union Congress and plenums of the DOSAAF Central Committee and also previous reporting and electoral meetings and conferences.

3. That the DOSAAF Committees will develop, report to local party organs, and ratify preparatory plans for reports and elections and schedules for their execution.

Will, in connection with the reports and elections of the leading organs, recruit for organizational and mass political work a broad range of permanent

staff members and activists of the Society and instruct them in a timely fashion.

Will use to the utmost the upcoming reports and elections to strengthen all leading organs with personnel that have shown their worth in practical work.

Will, in the course of the reporting and electoral campaign, energetically take steps for the realization of decisions taken at meetings and conferences and the critical observations and suggestions expressed by DOSAAF members, and will well prepare and organize training for newly elected representatives and members of committees and auditing commissions.

4. That the auditing commissions (inspectors) will, in the preparation period for reports and elections, check the financial-management activity of committees (organizations) and thoroughly reflect its condition in reports at appropriate meetings and conferences.

5. For a broader popularization of the patriotic activity of the Society, the DOSAAF Committees will, in the course of the reporting and electoral campaign, use the capabilities of the press, radio, television, various forms of visual agitation and oral propaganda and military-patriotic, sporting and other mass measures.

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DOSA AF

DEFENSE SOCIETIES' CONFERENCE OPENS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Jun 85 p 1

/Article: "For Strengthening Friendship"/

/Text/ An international conference of leaders of the fraternal defense and sport societies and organizations in the socialist countries convened in Moscow yesterday.

The following delegations are participating in the conference: Organization for Promotion of Defense (OPD) attached to the People's Republic of Bulgaria headed by Lt Gen Georgi Kostov, chairman of the OPD Central Council, Vietnamese People's Organization for Defense Education (VPODE), headed by Army Gen Khoang Van Tkhaem, chairman of the VPODE permanent committee, Hungarian Defense Alliance (HDA) headed by Maj Gen Laioshen Kishshem, general secretary HDA, the 'Sport and Technology' society (SAT) of the German Democratic Republic, headed by chairman of the SAT Central Board, vice Admiral Gunter Kychebauch, Committee for Physical Education and Sport (CPES) of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, headed by CPES Deputy Chairman, Pak Men Cher, Society for Military-Patriotic Education (SMPE) of the Republic of Cuba, headed by the chairman of the SMPE National Council, Col Arnoldo Tamaio Mendes, Society for Promotion of Defense (SPD) of the Mongolian People's Republic, headed by Maj Gen Zhugdergemdiyn Gurragch, Chairman of the SPD Central Council, League for the Defense of the Country (LDC) of the Polish People's Republic, headed by chairman of the LDC Main Board Division General, Zygmund Khyshch, National Council of Physical Education and Sport (NCPES) of the Rumanian Socialist Republic, headed by NCPES Secretary Nikolae Dragason, USSR DOSAAF headed by Admiral of the Fleet G. M. Egorov Chairman USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, and Alliance for Promotion of the Army, (APA) Czechoslovak Socialist Republic headed by Lt Gen Vatslav Gorachek, Chairman of the ACA Central Committee.

V. I. Drugov, First Deputy Department Chief of the CPSU Central Committee, was present for the convening of the conference.

Yesterday, delegations participating in the international conference of leaders of fraternal defense and sport societies and organizations visited the mausoleum of V. IL. Lenin and placed wreaths there.

Conference participants next visited Alexandrov Garden where, by the Kremlin Wall, the Eternal Flame of the people's monument to the sons who gave their lives for freedom of the Motherland burns. At the graveside of the Unknown Soldier, delegates placed wreaths and honored the memory of those who had fallen for freedom and independence of the socialist Fatherland by observing a moment of silence.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

'FREQUENT SHORTCOMINGS' OF YOUNG HELICOPTER NAVIGATORS CITED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Usoltsev, Red Banner Volga Military District: "By Rote: On Certain Problems of Navigator Training for Cadets at the Air School"]

[Text] Lieutenant A. Smirnov, helicopter navigator, pleasantly surprised the squadron commander. The recent flight school graduate had thoroughly made the calculations and laid out the route on the flight map, competently filled out the navigator's flight log and the other necessary paper work and confidently listed characteristic ground reference points along the prescribed route.

To be on the safe side, the squadron commander asked the crew commander:

"And how did Smirnov fly the route"?

"Our classical 'triangle'? No criticism." Captain N. Pervov answered.

After that the squadron commander unhesitatingly indicated his permission for the performance of a mission on the flight sheet and in the work books of the helicopter specialists. He was certain it would be successful. Lieutenant Smirnov did not cope with the air navigator's duties, however. On one section of the route, a strong side wind carried the rotary-wing aircraft off the prescribed path. The air navigator did not detect this immediately, and when he did he was unable to precisely determine the helicopter's position. Nor did the lieutenant use the radio air navigation equipment. The crew was able to make the necessary correction only after reaching a prominent linear reference point.

Temporary loss of orientation in flight is an annoying situation, of course. And the report sent from the unit to the school on its graduate after he had served as an officer a year contained the conclusion: "Poorly trained in matters of helicopter navigation."

Here are some lines from a letter from Lieutenant A. Bormotov, a 1983 graduate, to his former instructors at the Syzran Higher Military Air School for Pilots imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR: "Not everything is going smoothly in the service. I have to work a great deal on my own to fill in gaps which developed

in my knowledge during my cadet years due to the separation of the theoretical training from the practical. It is regretful that certain important aspects of helicopter navigation, as an example, were not properly reinforced on cadet flights in a training squadron and have therefore already been forgotten. And one cannot manage without them."

Unfortunately, such reports on the inadequate navigational preparation of young airmen are not a rarity. To state unequivocally that the young aviators acquire little knowledge in this discipline essential to the air fighter during their training years would also be incorrect, however. I am a graduate of the Syzran School and I know this very well. I had to attend classes conducted by instructors in the helicopter navigation department after graduating from school. Former 1st-class military navigators with extensive practical experience and a high level of methodological skill, they explain complex training questions intelligibly and know how to interest the cadets. In addition, the lecture hall here is equipped with everything needed.

Just what is wrong then?

The theoretical knowledge acquired in the helicopter navigation department are reinforced, as we know, during flight practice in training squadrons. I have visited a training subunit twice. The first time I was there, the second-year students had just begun performing flights on the route. I know from my own experience the excitement felt by a cadet preparing to fly far from his own airfield for the first time. Its familiar outlines will no longer be visible, as they are on a flight to the zone or a circular flight. The individual will not be permitted to "get lost," of course: the route is monitored by radar. One cannot help feeling ashamed of an error, however. It was therefore difficult to find a cadet at the starting point who was not occupied with the work. Some of the young aviators were going over the ground reference points and studying the flight area and methods of regaining visual orientation, while others were practicing determining lateral deviations and various navigational operations.

It was the middle of summer. It had been a completely different situation in the fall, when the practical flight training of the future air fighters in the training subunit was coming to an end. A certain indifference and complacency could be seen in the actions of individual cadets when preparing for route flights. When I mentioned this to the cadets, this was my answer:

"Why repeat the same thing a dozen times? We already know the training routes like the palm of our hand."

I should explain something here. The cadet flights in the training subunit are ordinarily performed on two routes with three or four turning points on each. The flight training course calls for each cadet to make several route flights of different kinds. They perform these independently. Then there is an almost equal number of flights flown as pilot-navigator on a crew with a fellow student. And while the young airmen work with a flight map

and navigator's equipment in the first exercises, they handle the navigational calculations differently on subsequent flights, when they have thoroughly studied the ground reference points and the characteristic features of each route. They know that when the helicopter has drifted to a certain reference point, they must make an adjustment of plus 10 degrees, let us say, in order to arrive at the turning point.

And so, repetition is not always the key to learning. The cadets obtain a certain amount of experience in piloting but not helicopter navigation skills. From the navigator's standpoint, some of the route flights serve no purpose. And the helicopter pilot, like no one else in the aviation, must possess solid skills not just as a pilot, but also as a navigator, since the use of radio air navigation equipment is made difficult and is sometimes impossible when flying in mountains, far from airfields with radio equipment and ordinarily at low or minimal altitudes. Furthermore, there is no help from ground. These are the difficulties for which the cadets should be prepared.

There are also deficiencies of another kind. Flights on "routine" routes which are not altered for a long time (the instructors jokingly say that they are flying on last year's remnants) relax the young airmen, who still do not have the necessary professional knowledge or experience, as a result of which they begin to do less to improve themselves. They develop a feeling of self-confidence. They can handle anything, they think. And this is manifested not just on the flights but also with respect to the theoretical training.

After visiting helicopter navigation classes for second-year cadets who had not yet flown and a squadron for third-year cadets with flight experience, I became convinced of the following. The former had a greater interest in the discipline, and there was a more serious atmosphere in the lecture hall than in the case of their senior comrades. Not all of the cadets were making only a half-hearted effort, of course. But many of them were.

"After flying the very same routes, the cadets in the squadron developed the opinion that errors in helicopter navigation could be corrected "by sight," explained Colonel G. Gabrashitov, senior instructor in the helicopter navigation department.

During their very first months as officers, the former cadets understand what an inexcusable error they have made by not properly perfecting their navigation training during their practical flight work, of course, and begin to make up this omission on their own. In time, many of them acquire experience and become skilled air navigators. The process of professional development is not always painless, however. Furthermore, these difficulties and complications could be avoided by organizing the helicopter navigation training in a well conceived manner in the training subunits.

Take the routes, as an example. The flight areas for the cadets are not large. Ordinarily, it is not possible to lay out more than two routes because of flight safety considerations. "In order to provide better

navigational training for the cadets and to diversify the missions, our subunit used to alter the flight course on a route by 180°," Lieutenant Colonel V. Tregubov, former squadron navigator and now an instructor, told me. "Flying on a reverse course, the future military pilot finds it awkward working with the map (the flight begins at the terminal point), which forces him to prepare more carefully for a mission."

Major General of Aviation V. Aleksentsev, first deputy commander of Air Forces of the Volga Military District and Honored Military Pilot of the USSR, who is a past chief of the Syzran School and has flown several thousand hours on various types of helicopters, believes that the routes could be changed several times during the cadet flights. This is a lot of trouble, to be sure; it requires time and is frequently hard on the nerves. There is rigid time limitation on the flight training plan for the cadets. The subunit commander therefore takes the line of least resistance.

The veteran helicopter pilot believes that more efficient work on the part of the instructor during the performance of route flights is one reserve for increasing the return from the practical flight training of the cadets.

Colonel N. Sadov, military navigator 1st class, pointed out yet another facet of the problem during the discussion. According to him, the flight navigators also experience certain difficulties in training the young flyers. The instructors have their own training groups, after all. Where is such an officer to find the time to conduct additional classes with all of the flight personnel, when the cadets in his own group demand special and constant attention? The classes in helicopter navigation are therefore sometimes "abbreviated," as they say. And the professional training of the future helicopter pilots suffers as a result.

The squadron navigator, on the other hand, is simply physically incapable of working with the cadets at the take-off point every day. He is a member of the flight supervision group, performs unit duty and other details. And consultations and drills during the cadet flights can and should do a lot to help improve the navigational training of the helicopter pilots. The flight navigators have something to share with their subordinates, something to teach them. Furthermore, a serious critique of errors committed by the cadets is very effective when it is performed in detail immediately after the flight. The experienced flight navigators can offer useful advice, which will promote more rapid professional development on the part of the lieutenants. This would require giving the flight navigators a smaller load of purely instructional work.

In short, the training of military helicopter pilots in navigation is a difficult job, one requiring a creative approach. The training process must be constantly improved in the subunit, and the theoretical and practical training must be brought into conformity. For now, however, this is still just an appeal.

The squadron's flight replacement is beginning, and I hear the cadets saying once again:

"What route are you flying"?

"The well-known 'triangle'...."

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MILITARY HISTORY

ROLE OF RIVERINE FLOTILLA IN WESTERN OFFENSIVES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 85 (signed to press 2 Apr 85) pp 41-44

[Article by Rear-Adm (Ret) V. Shelyag, deputy chief of the political section of a brigade of river ships during the war: "Hearts Were On Fire With Valor"]

Excerpts It was the middle of April 1945 at the Kustrin bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder River. Near a small community with the long name of Woksholenderlogau, along the banks of an unnamed tributary of the Oder stood motor gunboats carefully camouflaged with branches and camouflage nets. Their gun barrels and the guides for the "Katyushas" located on board were aimed at targets which could not be seen from there but were well known to every battle crew, targets which would have to be suppressed when the order came.

A group of seamen had gathered at a small site among the bushes. They were all listening attentively to a short but stoutly built petty officer 2nd class with the Order of Lenin and the medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union shining on his uniform, who had climbed atop an improvised speaker's platform of shell cases.

It was a meeting of personnel from the 1st Pinsk Motor Gunboat Division of the 2nd Luninets River Ship Brigade of the Dnepr Military Flotilla. The division had been assigned the combat mission of providing fire support for ground units in the offensive against Berlin.

I shall have to digress here and explain how the sailors came to be on the Oder, at the very cutting edge of the Soviet Army's crucial offensive against fascism's lair.

Ships of the Pinsk Military Flotilla which had been on the Dnepr prior to the war had been destroyed in the unequal battles fought in 1941. The sailors who survived fought on the land fronts and later as part of the Volga Military Flotilla. When the Volga became the deep rear, its ships were transferred to the west. The fighting pennants of the new Dnepr Military Flotilla began fluttering in the air in April of 1944. For daring raids into the enemy's rear area, landing operations, the destruction of enemy crossings during the Belorussian Operation and support of the crossing by our attacking troops over the Berezina, the Pripyat and their numerous tributaries,

the first River Ship Brigade was named the Bobruysk, while the second, in which I served as deputy chief of the political section, was named Luninetsk and Red Banner. There were eight Heroes of the Soviet Union among the Dnepr sailors.

When the fighting in Belorussia ended, the flotilla ships were transferred to Poland by rail at the order of the command element. Their subsequent trip along the Western Bug to the Vistula was not an easy one. They had to cross 93 strips of shallows. Blown-up bridges on the Bromberg Canal and the Oder and Warta rivers, destroyed water-engineering works--the seamen overcame all of this as they hurried to keep up with our army's advancing units and to be there where their assistance was needed.

On 7 April, 3 days before the date set by the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, two of the flotilla's brigades were concentrated in the area of Kustrin. The flotillas were ordered to interact with two armies in the front's main strike group, which was to advance on Berlin from the Kustrin bridgehead. The first BRK [river squadron] was attached to General N.E. Berzarin's 5th Assault Army, the 2nd to General V.I. Chuykov's 8th Guards Assault Army.

The artillery ships in both brigades were deployed at battle positions, while the divisions of motor gunboats, gunboats and amphibious batteries were a part of the general artillery fire system with the mission of effecting a breach in the enemy's defense, which was especially strong on the Selow sector. Detachments of air defense boats were a part of the defense system for crossings on the Oder, which were constantly subjected to fierce enemy attacks. The seamen gunners had the opportunity to demonstrate their fighting skill as early as 14 April. They provided fire support for reconnaissance in force by troops located at the bridgehead. They simultaneously zeroed in on the main targets designated for the Dnepr forces in accordance with the plan for artillery preparation prior to the general offensive, which was expected any day.

Not only the artillery targets had to be coordinated prior to the operation, but the missions and forms of political work as well. I went to the political section of the 4th Guards Corps, with whose units we would be directly interacting. I was received by Colonel G. Zolotikh, chief of the corps political section, in the political section dug-out in a dam protecting the Oder from flooding. The soldiers and sergeants were pleased to learn that, in his words, "the Volga had come to the Oder." The veterans who fought at Stalingrad have warm memories of the flotilla seamen, of their heroism in supporting the crossings, evacuating the wounded and hauling in reinforcements for the city's defenders.

The success of combat operations during the first phase of the offensive depended in great part upon observers moved up to the first trenches of the infantry preparing for the offensive, or even slightly further. The main part of the political section personnel's work on the eve of the crucial battle was considered to be that of making the rounds of the brigade's fire adjustment posts, meeting with the men and giving them moral support.

It had already begun to grow dark when I returned from the observers. It was the end of 15 April 1945. I suddenly saw boats on trucks among the large number of various kinds of combat vehicles. Familiar officers--Senior Lieutenant Gavriil Suvorov, deputy chief of the political section of the 1st River Squadron, and Lieutenant Mikhail Kalinin, commander of a hydroplane detachment--came up to me and explained everything. There were many water barriers in the zone of advance of the 5th Assault Army's 9th Rifle Corps, including such a major obstacle as the deep and fairly wide Spree River with its high banks. General I. Roslyy, corps commander, had requested the army's command element to place a detachment of hydroplanes at his disposal. These were high-speed, maneuverable boats armed with machine guns. Vehicles hauling the boats had moved up to Berlin in the battle orders of the corps' advancing units.

On 22 April the troops broke through to the Spree, on the opposite bank of which were located the government establishments of the fascist capital. The command element assigned the sailors the mission of organizing the transfer of two divisions across the water barrier.

Lieutenant Kalinin, detachment commander, and Senior Lieutenant Suvorov, political worker, explained the combat mission to the personnel. An oath was unanimously taken, signed by all of the Red flotilla seamen, petty officers and officers. "To us seamen," the document stated, "has fallen the great good fortune to participate in the storming of Berlin.... We vow to take the battle flag of our Bobruysk Red Banner River Ship Brigade through all obstacles."

At midnight the ships were lowered into the water at three designated sites and began crossing under the cover of artillery fire. Lieutenant M. Kalinin appointed Senior Lieutenant G. Suvorov, political worker, as commander of the right group of boats, Petty Officer 1st Class A. Pashkov, detachment Komsomol organizer, commander of the left group, and assumed command of the central group himself. All of the groups in the crossing performed skillfully and courageously.

Especially heavy fighting broke out on Pashkov's sector. The enemy kept the crossing site under constant fire. On his last trip the commander, wounded in the arm, knocked out an enemy fire point with machine-gun fire. When a boat operator was put out of action, Pashkov, himself wounded in both arms, took over control of the boat.

"Hang on, fellows!" he would say to encourage the landing forces.

When the boat had been moored to the bank and the landing had begun, a shell fragment pierced the valorous commander's chest....

Senior Lieutenant Suvorov, a political worker, successfully directed the operations of the group of boats. Fighting flared up at the bridgehead captured with the sailors' help. Fascist "Ferdinands" broke through to the Spree and opened fire on the crossing. One of our tanks on a ferry towed by a hydroplane was set on fire by a direct hit by a shell. The

tank's ammunition supply could explode any minute and the tankmen and sub-machine gunners on the ferry could be killed. Suvorov approached the burning pontoon on his boat under intense enemy fire and saved the fightingmen. Colonel D. Narutskiy, commander of the 220th Tank Brigade, who was observing the crossing, embraced the valorous political worker when the latter returned to the bank. The tankmen fervently thanked the sailors for rescuing them.

During 3 days of combat work, the Dnepr boat crews took 16,000 soldiers, 600 guns and mortars, 27 tanks and a large quantity of military supplies essential to combat across the Spree. The homeland greatly appreciated the sailors' feat. Nine of the most valorous were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The ground units moved out soon after the offensive began, and the artillery on the ships located at the Oder bridgehead could no longer reach the targets. The brigades were assigned the mission of forcing their way through to Berlin on water routes and providing support for the front's units engaged in intense fighting with the desperately resisting enemy.

The newly formed 3rd Ship Brigade made its way to the Reich capital from the south on the Spree River. The situation was more difficult on the front's northern flank. One needs only to glance at a diagram of the Berlin Operation to see that Soviet forces attacking the city were threatened by a dangerous grouping covering the large water barriers, the Oder and the Hohenzollern Canal. The flotilla's 1st and 2nd brigades were transferred to that salient on the Oder.

A detachment of our brigade's ships (motor gunboats, landing minesweepers, patrol boats and hydroplanes) commanded by Captain 3rd Rank I. Mikhaylov was ordered to fight its way through near Hohenzaaten, an enemy strong point at the confluence of the river and the canal.

On the night of 26 April the detachment fought its way through the system of enemy guns. Near Schwedt the ships took aboard a rifle regiment of the 234th division with reinforcements and landed it on the left bank of the Oder, which was defended by the fascists (it was not a crossing, but a landing operation, since the ships had to take the landing force around 9 kilometers to the landing site).

The success of the mission was due in great part to the party-political work performed on the ships. The communists did good work in the division Komsomol organizations. Prior to the battle the fightingmen wrote out individual and group vows. "As we move out for the final attack on the German fascist lair," one of the documents states, "we vow that we shall fulfill our duty in the battles ahead.... We shall fight the fascists to our last drop of blood, to the death.--Komsomol members Roy, Firyabov, Kulesh, Mitkin and Morozov." And they kept their vow. They fought courageously and selflessly. Komsomol member Firyabov silenced two enemy fire points with accurate machine-gun rounds. Red Navy man Morozov, who had been accepted into the Komsomol on the eve of the battle, replaced Firyabov, wounded by a fragment from an enemy mine, at a machine gun. A mine specialist, he handled the machine gun perfectly and fired at the enemy until the combat mission had been completed.

I have before me the "Support Plan for the Breakthrough Combat Operation." Behind its lines I can see the faces of the combat friends who compiled the plan, rendered it complete with their actions and bound it together with their bloodshed in the fighting. There were Captain Lieutenant P. Fedoseyev, deputy commander of a division of motor gunboats, division party organizer V. Zubritskiy, Komsomol organizer G. Zhuravel and L. Zima, party organizer for a division of minesweepers. Luka Zima conducted himself courageously during the breakthrough. He encouraged the seamen with his inherent, extraordinary optimism and mild Ukrainian jokes. And when a machine-gunner was killed, the political worker took over the machine gun and continued to fight until the ships were out of the engagement zone. Lieutenant Aleksey Loza, commander of a patrol boat detachment, died in that battle.

After crossing the Oder the Soviet forces launched a swift offensive, and the northern bank of the Hohenzollern Canal had soon been cleared of the enemy. The sailors moved rapidly to the west over the canal. Berlin was only a few kilometers away. They encountered blown-up bridges and crossings and damaged locks on the way, however. The sailors made an all-out effort and forced their way through all the barriers.

The Red Banner waved over the Reichstag on 1 May, and the Berlin Garrison surrendered on 2 May.

The Dnepr sailors fulfilled their military duty and assisted the ground forces in the offensive against fascist Germany's capital on several sectors of the front and in the city itself. Purposeful and substantive party-political work played an important role.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ADM SOROKIN ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF 'GREAT VICTORY'

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 5, May 85 pp 34-47

[Admiral A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Spiritual Factor of Victory--On the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory"]

[Text] Forty years have passed since the last salvos of the Great Patriotic War died away. The fighting, unprecedented in its scope, ferocity and social consequences, ended victoriously against Hitler's fascism, which pursued the aim of destroying the first socialist state, exterminating the Soviet peoples and establishing hegemony over the world.

Inflicting a crippling defeat on the enemy, the most reactionary force of international imperialism, our people and their army, led by Lenin's party, not only defended their freedom and defended the cause of October but also made a decisive contribution to Victory over Nazi Germany and its allies, to the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery and to saving world civilization. And in this lies their great service to mankind.

This is why progressive peace-loving forces of the entire planet justly see in the celebration of the 40th anniversary of Victory over fascist Germany the evidence of deep respect for the unprecedented achievement of the Soviet soldier, our people and Lenin's party. "The attained victory," it was pointed out in an address at the scientific and practical conference devoted to the ideological work of the party in the light of the decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "is a living victory, our history and our contemporaneity. Each new generation on entering life turns to its roots, since civic and political maturity are inseparable from the history of the country and from its heroic pages."¹

The historical world importance of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War is disclosed in all its fullness from the height of past decades.

The destruction of German fascism and Japanese militarism exercised a most profound influence on the entire course of world development. Favorable conditions were created for the struggle of workers for their social and national liberation. The positions of the forces of peace and progress were

strengthened and the influence of communist and workers parties grew. The world socialist system arose and is successfully developed. The disintegration of the shameful system of colonialism was accelerated, ending subsequently with its collapse.

Among the factors ensuring our Great Victory, a most important role was played by the spiritual factor. This factor specifically ensured growth and transformation of economic, social and political, scientific-technical and strictly military resources of the Land of the Soviets into that practical force which utterly destroyed Hitler's war machine and all its material and moral foundations.

Communist ideology constituted the core of the spiritual strength of the Soviet people in the war. In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," it is emphasized that victory in this war "confirmed the powerful vital power of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Deep ideological conviction, unlimited faith in the rightness of the great Leninist cause served as an inexhaustible source of spiritual strength for the Soviet people and their moral and political solidarity."²

Consistently expressing and reflecting the basic interests of the working class and all working people and at the same time constituting the scientific theory and methodology of revolutionary action tested by experience, Marxist-Leninist theory has provided an objectively accurate picture of the conditions and character of the war we have mentioned and its course and outcome and served as a reliable guide for the practical work of the party, the state and all the Soviet people in crushing the German fascist invaders.

Our ideology as the nucleus of social consciousness provided an aim for and cemented the thoughts and moods, feelings and will of the Soviet people and also increased their moral and fighting, material and spiritual capabilities.

• • •

The prepared-in-advance treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was met by our people and their Armed Forces in a state of high moral preparedness for the defense of the socialist Fatherland. And the more difficult the situation and the more fierce the fighting, the more clearly was displayed the greatness of spirit of the Soviet people, educated by the party of communists and the socialist way of life.

"Those people will never be defeated whom workers and peasants in their majority recognize, feel and see as defending their own, Soviet power--the power of workers, as defending that cause whose victory to them and their children would provide the possibility of enjoying all the benefits of culture and everything created by human labor."³ This most important social and moral principle, disclosed by V.I. Lenin, was manifested with special force from the first days of the Great Patriotic War.

The moral readiness of the Soviet people to defend the gains of Great October to a victorious end did not come of itself. It was the natural result of the

revolutionary changes of social existence, systematic implementation of the party's policy, understanding the real military threat to socialism and the theoretical validity of its defense as well as the purposeful ideological and political work among the masses and the well-organized military and patriotic education in the country.

Doing everything possible to hold off the war, to gain time, the party and the Soviet government undeviatingly adhered to Lenin's precept to keep the powder dry while they determinedly prepared the people and the army for a fight to the death with any possible aggressor. This preparation encompassed all sides of the country's defense capability and the fighting power of the Red Army and Navy.

A profound influence on the solution of defense tasks was exerted by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the ideas and theses disclosing the origin, nature and political content of wars of the epoch of imperialism, the nature and purpose of armies and the relation of war to economics, politics, ideology and scientific and technical progress.

The natural methodological foundation of the work of the party and the Soviet people in strengthening the material and spiritual foundations of our defense capability was Lenin's thesis of defense of the socialist Fatherland developed in party documents. On this basis, in accordance with the decisions of All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and its Central Committee, Soviet military science was developed and military and patriotic education of the Soviet people and the fighting and political training of the personnel of the army and the navy were conducted.

As to how effective the ideological and mass political work was in preparing the Soviet people for the defense of socialism in the prewar years, the actions and behavior of Soviet people at the front and in the rear during the time of the war speak louder than any words.

By unleashing a war against the USSR, the fascists hoped to spiritually break and to enslave the Soviet people, to shoot, to send to gas chambers and to burn in the crematoria of concentration camps all defiant people. They pursued the aim of complete extermination of the communist world view.

For the purpose of "destroying the world view," there was made ready not only the gigantic war machine of the Wehrmacht but also a tremendous apparatus of "total propaganda" aimed at sowing mistrust of the Communist Party and the Soviet government among the Soviet people and creating discord and enmity between workers and peasants, strife among the peoples of the USSR and frightening the Soviet people with the might of the fascist army, thus weakening their will to resist. The war between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany was not only a clash of political, economic and social systems and of armies directly contradictory of each other in their purpose but also of a most fierce struggle of two irreconcilable ideologies.

* * *

The struggle against fascist Germany in its attack on the USSR required not only the fullest possible use of the spiritual strength of the Soviet people but also its building up with reference to the concrete situation. Ideological and political educational work of the party at the front and in the rear was a most important constituent of its work in organizing the defeat of the aggressor. It was conducted under the assiduous leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). During the years of the Great Patriotic War, about 40 questions of ideological work were examined at the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee and more than 50 such questions at the Secretariat.⁴

The ideological work conducted by the Communist Party was aimed at the creative development of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism while taking into consideration the character and special features of the given concrete war and at the introduction of their ideas into the consciousness of the Soviet people, the fighting men of the army and navy and their transformation into deep-rooted convictions as a guide to action for unremitting struggle with hostile fascist ideology.

During the years of the war, the ideological activities of the Communist Party were primarily aimed at exposing the unjust, predatory and rapacious character of the war of fascist Germany against the USSR and other countries, conducted on the basis of a scientific analysis of the social nature of fascism as the most reactionary and aggressive manifestation of imperialism.

The essential elements of the political aims of the war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union were revealed by our party in a directive of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of 29 June 1941. The aim of the treacherous attack of Hitler on our country, it was pointed out in this document, was "destruction of the Soviet system, seizure of Soviet lands, enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, plundering of our country, seizure of our grain and petroleum and restoration of the power of landowners and capitalists."⁵

In disclosing the reactionary, unjust character of the war unleashed by the Nazis against the USSR, the Communist Party at the same time emphasized that this war affected not only the most basic and vital interests of the Soviet people but also that the destinies of other peoples and states were being decided in it. Trying to exterminate and enslave the peoples of our country, the Hitlerites counted on freeing themselves for a struggle against England and then America in order to realize their fantastic idea of world hegemony of German fascism. "The aim of fascist aggression, regardless of how it might have been clouded over by the Hitlerites," M.I. Kalinin pointed out, "can be seen on a clear day as the desire for hegemony of the entire world."⁶

Fulfilling the unconditional Leninist requirement of "knowing the enemy,"⁷ the Communist Party disclosed the class origins and provided an extensive description of the ideology of fascism, constituting the theoretical and political basis of the military doctrine of the German imperialist circles. This ideology emerged to a significant degree as the reaction of monopolist capitalism to the growth of the workers and communist movement in a number of countries of Western Europe. The social and political nucleus of the ideology

of Hitler's fascism was anticommunism in its most undisguised, class-exposed form permeated with the spirit of racism and geopolitical postulates.

On the basis of analysis of the aims of Hitlerite Germany's war and the social nature of fascism, the party disclosed the extremely reactionary, miasanthropic character of this war and showed that the fascist invaders were ruthless, cruel and implacable enemies of the Soviet people and all progressive mankind.

A tremendous influence on the growth of the spiritual strength of the people and defenders of the socialist Motherland was exerted by the all-round validation by our party of the just, liberating and progressive character of the war on the part of the Soviet Union. The truly Marxist solution of this question was an important contribution to Lenin's theory on just and unjust wars. The scientific determination of the nature of the Fatherland War of the Soviet People as an extension of the policy of socialist revolution under new conditions, a policy in defense of the gains of October, was reflected in party decisions and speeches of heads of the Party and the Soviet government and of scientists.⁸ The party substantiated the aims of the Soviet Union in the war foisted on it: no conquest of foreign territories and no subjugation of foreign peoples, but liquidation of the mortal danger hanging over our Motherland and liberation of the peoples of Europe who had come under the yoke of Hitlerite Germany.

In providing a comprehensive evaluation of the aims of the Patriotic War of the Soviet people, the Communist Party proceeded from the well-known Leninist position that realization by the masses of the just aims and causes of the war was of tremendous importance in the attainment of moral superiority over the aggressor and would assure victory.⁹ Touching upon the aims of the war, the people's commissar of defense in a 1 May 1942 order noted: "We are conducting a patriotic, liberating and just war. We have no aims to seize foreign countries or to vanquish foreign peoples. Our aim is clear and noble. We want to liberate our Soviet soil from the German fascist scoundrels."¹⁰

On the basis of and in close contact with the problem of the character of the war, the question of defense of the socialist Fatherland as a sacred duty of every citizen of the country, that is, a duty that was extremely noble and most elevated, exceptional in importance and strict in regard to fulfillment was examined.

An important place in the theoretical work of the Communist Party was occupied by understanding the special features of the unleashed war and first of all disclosure of the irreconcilable class character of the armed conflict of the USSR with Hitler's fascism and its absence of compromise.

The party's conclusion to the effect that the war of the USSR against Fascist Germany in terms of the content of the political aims and composition of the participants and in terms of forms and methods of armed struggle was truly a people's, international war was of fundamental importance.

A clear expression of the all-people's character of the Great Patriotic War was the all-round development of a mass, organized partisan movement, combat

operations of units of the people's militia [opolcheniye], underground struggle on territories occupied by the enemy, collection of money for the defense fund, the donor movement and the like.

The Communist Party deeply substantiated the idea that in this war the question was being decided not only of preservation of the USSR as the first socialist state in history and the vanguard of the struggle of the working masses against oppression and exploitation, but also the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery and saving of world civilization. This is why representatives of many countries and peoples fought on the side of our multinational state. As we know, with the help of the USSR, there were formed and equipped Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Romanian and French units and formations with a total number of more than 555,000 persons.

The Communist Party was able to disclose a number of new tendencies which found their manifestation in the years of the war: growth of the role of international proletarian solidarity; the rise and formation of military cooperation with armies of the liberated countries; transformation of international defense of socialism into a most important element of the struggle for preservation of world civilization.

In the theoretical work of the party in the period of the war, a major place was occupied by analysis of the military and technical features of armed confrontation with the enemy. There were noted among them: a sharply growing level of mechanization and motorization of troops, mass use in it of new technical resources, the hitherto unprecedented scope of military activities, growing maneuverability, vast destruction and losses and so on.

A significant influence on bolstering the spiritual strength of the army and the people was exerted by the Communist Party's disclosure of the historical doom of fascism. Special emphasis was placed on showing the precariousness of those foundations on which fascist Germany was sustained. Objective contradictions were disclosed of the contradictions of Hitler's bloc and the transitory character of the superiority of the Wehrmacht resulting from the suddenness of the attack on our country.

The study of the sources of our victory and revelation of the reserves of growth of the military might of the socialist state and ways and means of creating all the necessary preconditions of victory in the Great Patriotic War served as an independent direction of research. The bedrock of the aggressor's defeat was considered by the Soviet state and its Armed Forces to be the party's leadership.

Creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory, the Communist Party under the circumstances of the war advanced a new constructive approach to solving the problem of postwar arrangement of peace and the prevention of war and threat to peace in the future. The objective was substantiated not only of winning this war but also making impossible the occurrence of new aggression and a new war. The Communist Party saw the solution of the problem of preventing a new war by way of systematic introduction into international relations of the principles of peaceful coexistence, development of activeness of the people's masses and the further establishment in their consciousness of a moral and ethical

appraisal of fascism as an unjust social system inimical to man. These conclusions, which found their reflection in the decisions of the Crimean and Potsdam conferences, served as the basis of the international work of the party and the Soviet state in ensuring peace and security. Thus for the first time in history, we were concerned with--and on a completely practical level at that--not simply with postponement of a new world war but of elimination of a military threat as such, of excluding war from the life of society and of universal and complete disarmament.

* * *

During the years of the war, ideological work was broadly and actively conducted on the basis both of development of Marxist-Leninist theory and of introducing it into the consciousness of the masses. At the same time, the party was undeviatingly guided by the well-known Lenin's thesis that the state "is only strong when the masses know everything, are able to judge everything and undertake everything consciously."¹²

The war required the reorganization and improvement of ideological educational work in accordance with the requirements and conditions of the situation.

From the beginning and in the course of the war, the Soviet Information Buro and the Council of Military-Political Propaganda under the Main Political Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army were formed, and the institution of political fighters was introduced. All the resources of ideological influence were directed by the Communist Party at elucidating to the fighting men of the army and the fleet and to the workers of the home front the gist of the crisis that was going on in the life of the country. Even the first declaration of the Soviet government referred to the fact that peaceful construction was interrupted, that a mortal danger threatened the country and that all energies and resources were required to be aimed at repulsing the enemy.

A decisive struggle was declared against a mood of euphoria and unconcern manifested in assumptions of an easy victory and the inevitability of mass revolutionary appearances of the working class in the aggressor's rear. In connection with the sudden attack of the enemy and the critically difficult situation, the problem of ensuring psychological stability of the personnel of units and ships during mass impact of the enemy's weapons and equipment became most acute.

Special attention was paid to inculcating in USSR citizens Soviet patriotism on the basis of propaganda of the advantages of socialism over capitalism, the achievements of our people in the development of the economy, science and culture and the solution of the national question. This contributed to strengthening in the people and the army faith in victory over the aggressor, increased their spiritual strength and served as a vivifying source of mass heroism.

An inseparable part of inculcation of love for the socialist Motherland was the propaganda of the party's heroic history and the fighting and revolutionary traditions of our people formed in the course of struggle for

national independence and for liberation from the oppression of capitalists and landowners, imperialist interventionists and White Guards as well as in the period of socialist construction. In unity with education there was formed in Soviet people a sacred hatred toward the fascist aggressors. Monstrous plans were disclosed, publicity was given to the evil deeds of the invaders in the regions occupied by them and their taunting of Red Army men, commanders and political workers taken prisoner. The inculcation of hatred toward the aggressor, however, did not have for its aim vengeance on all the German people. The party constantly explained that our aim in the war was to destroy German militarism and nazism and not the German people.

Unflagging attention was given in ideological educational work to strengthening the friendship of the peoples of our country--one of the chief sources of the invincibility of the socialist state. This promoted the mobilization of the fighting men of the army and the navy and of workers of the home front of all the nations and nationalities for selfless defense of the multinational Soviet Motherland.

In the rear and at the front, explanations of Lenin's ideas on the unity of the army and the people were broadly conducted. The importance of this unity was shown for the attainment of victory over the enemy. The principles of USSR foreign policy, thought and the importance of the mission of liberation of the Red Army were broadly explained with all the resources of ideological influence.

Special importance was attached to the moral, political and psychological conditioning of the fighting men of the army and the navy. The main attention here was given to inculcation of fortitude, courage, fidelity to military duty, readiness for self-sacrifice and strengthening of iron discipline. These general tasks were constantly concretized by the party's Central Committee, depending on the situation existing at the Soviet-German front at different periods of the war.

In the first and most difficult period of the war, basic stress was placed on development of fortitude and self-control, on overcoming elements of psychological instability (for example, fear of aircraft, fear of tanks) and on developing the ability to fight when surrounded and to defeat a numerically superior enemy. Much attention was paid to debunking the myth of the invincibility of Hitler's army. In the second period of the war, the first-priority task of agitation and propaganda was the inculcation in fighting men of the desire for an offensive, a high level of combat activity and the wish to liberate Soviet soil as quickly as possible from the invaders. In the concluding period of the war, when the Red Army directly assumed the realization of its liberating mission, problems became particularly acute of international education of fighting men, intensification of propaganda of the ideas of fraternal aid to all peoples fighting against the fascist tyranny. The Soviet fighting man entered the territory of foreign countries only for the purpose of total defeat of the cursed enemy of mankind--German fascism. The liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe required of the fighting men of the Red Army new heroic efforts and many sacrifices. About 100 operating formations with a total number of almost 7 million persons took

part from July 1944 to the end of the war in the liberation of the European countries.¹³

From the very start of the struggle against German fascist aggression, mass political work on the home front was subordinated to the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" The chief factor in agitation and propaganda was mobilization of the efforts of the Soviet people to achieve a basic turning point in the war, to exceed Hitler's Germany in production of weapons and war materiel and to provide the Red Army with everything needed. In the concluding stage of the war, personnel of the ideological front directed the efforts of workers of the home front at increasing the economic power of the country and at restoring the national economy and culture in the liberated regions.

With the war drawing closer to a victorious conclusion, the leading edge of the party's ideological work became increasingly questions of educational work among the population of the regions liberated from the German fascist invaders, especially in the republics and oblast, which had become part of the fraternal family of peoples of the Soviet Union not long before the Great Patriotic War.

In close unity with the changed content of ideological work, its organization, forms and methods were reorganized. The correlation of propaganda, agitation and organizational functions of ideological educational work was mobile and flexible. At the same time these functions acted as one integrated whole.

In the interest of growth of the spiritual strength of the army and the people, the party's Central Committee carried out a reorganization of the party, soviet and military press. Taking into consideration the numerical growth of the Armed Forces, the ranks of which had been joined by about 20 million persons in the years of the war, a redistribution occurred of the number of copies of central papers for the benefit of the front, and the network of military periodical publications was bolstered.

On the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the most experienced and qualified party journalists were sent to the front, and the necessary material base was provided for the publication of military newspapers. PRAVDA alone sent about 40 of its own personnel to the front. In the organization of all the work of journalists in the war, an important part was played by the decrees of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of 9 August 1941 "On the Work of Special Correspondents at the Front" and of 13 August 1942 "On the Work of Special Correspondents of Central Newspapers and TASS at the Front" as well as the decree issued 24 May 1943 "On Reorganization of the Structure of Party and Komsomol Organizations in the Red Army and Intensification of the Role of Front, Army and Division Newspapers."¹⁴

Since the start of the war, the circulation of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA--the organ of the People's Commissariat of Defense--had been significantly increased. Single-issue circulation of military newspapers in the Soviet Army at the end of the war amounted to about 3.5 million copies.¹⁵ In the operating army, one copy of the Red-Army newspaper went to one or two fighting

men; 50 newspapers were published for fighting men of non-Russian nationalities in their native language. Among the fighting men another printed product was widely disseminated among fighting men. The main political directorates of the Red Army and the Navy during 1941-1945 issued more than 3,300 titles of printed editions with printing in excess of 2 billion copies, not counting the publications of front and army political organs.¹⁶

Under the conditions of the war, radio broadcasting was of special value in ideological educational work. This, as expressed by V.I. Lenin, was a "newspaper without paper where distance played no part."¹⁷ It carried news from Moscow to such places which, because of the difficulties of the combat situation, did not always receive central or even front newspapers. All-union radio broadcasting on the instruction of the party's Central Committee significantly expanded information broadcasts and increased the number of releases of the "Latest News." Broadcasts of "Listen, Front!", "Letters to the Front," and "Letters from the Front," which contributed to strengthening the tie between the front and the rear, also were widespread.

During the years of the war, the scale of cultural and educational work grew. A major service to the education of the people and the army belongs to the work of Soviet literature and art. "The Science of Hatred" and "They Fought for the Motherland" by M. Sholokhov, "Vasilii Terkin" by A. Tvardovskiy, "Days and Nights" by K. Simonov, "The Russian Character" by A. Tolstoy and "The Front" by A. Korneychuk, articles by I. Ehrenburg and other literary and publicistic works played a notable role in formation of the character of the defenders of the Motherland. During the years of the war, the country's creative collectives produced more than 430,000 shows and concerts in the active army. The Soviet cinema made its contribution to victory. Of 103 feature films put out in the years of the war, more than 60 dealt with war themes.

In ideological work of the Communist Party, a major place was occupied by the struggle against hostile fascist ideology. This struggle included resistance to the penetration of nazi ideology into the consciousness of Soviet people and fighting men of the army and navy as well propaganda to the troops and population of the enemy.

From the first days of the war, the Communist Party carried out a decisive reorganization of all contrapropaganda work for the purpose of paralyzing the undermining activity of the enemy's propaganda. As early as in the directive of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of 29 June 1941, reference was made to the necessity of organizing a merciless struggle against any disorganizers of the home front, deserters, panic mongers and rumor spreaders. The decree of the party's Central Committee "On Organization of Struggle in the Rear of the German Forces", adopted 18 July 1941, was of major importance to organizing a rebuff to the ideological influences of fascism. A big role in organization of counterpropaganda was assigned to the Soviet Information Bureau and also to the Council of Military and Political Propaganda attached to the Main Political Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army. As of July 1941 there were formed departments attached to the Main Political Directorate

of the Red Army and the political directorates of the fronts and sections for organization of mass political work among the population of occupied territories and political guidance of the partisan movement. Beginning with the first half of 1944, sections for work among the local population were introduced on the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) in the political directorates of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.¹⁹

Leaflets were regularly scattered on the territory occupied by the fascists with the heading "News from the Soviet Motherland" and others. From August 1941 to the spring of 1944, Voyenzdat put out about 700 titles of such leaflet-bulletins with a total circulation of more than 500 million copies.²⁰ Beginning with the second half of 1941, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement became actively involved in the work of issuing leaflets for the enemy's rear. Solely from December 1942 through March 1943 the political department of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement released over Soviet territory seized by the enemy more than 6 million leaflets and brochures.²¹

Throughout the entire war, special propaganda was waged on a wide scale for the enemy's troops and population, which carried the truth on the Land of the Soviets and on the advantages and invincibility of the Soviet order, the growing might of the Soviet Army and its successes at the fronts. Well-coordinated operation of all the organs and special propaganda media combined with brilliant victories won by our army near Moscow, in the battle for Stalingrad, at the Kursk arc and so on exerted a broad impact on the forces and population of the enemy, giving rise to pessimism and collapse of the moral spirit of Hitler's forces.

The war made necessary raising the level of party supervision of ideological work and increasing supervisory party influence on all its aspects. Since the start of the Great Patriotic War, the ideological sector of party work at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) was headed by candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the party's Central Committee A.S. Shcherbakov. In the organization and conduct of this work, an active part was taken by such prominent party and state figures as A.A. Zhdanov, M.I. Kalinin, D.Z. Manuil'skiy, Ye.M. Yaroslavskiy and many others. The party apparatus, in charge of ideological questions, was constantly being strengthened. In the Administration of Propaganda And Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), new departments were formed in the years of the war: propaganda groups, literature, cinematography, radio broadcasting and radio installation and arts.²²

The Central Committee devoted a great deal of attention to ideological educational work in the Soviet rear. In the decree "On the State of Agitation and Propaganda Work in Penza Oblast" (July 1942), the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) demanded that heads of party organs engage more and more concretely in agitation and propaganda and closely tie them to problems that workers were solving.

Beginning with the fall of 1942, interrepublic, interoblast and other conferences were held on questions of agitation and propaganda. At them, results of accomplished work were thoroughly studied and ways were outlined for improving the ideological and political education of workers under the conditions of the war. The Central Committee employed on a broad scale reports of party organs on questions of their ideological work. Thus in the course of only one year (March 1943-March 1944), reports were heard at the Central Committee of more than 30 secretaries of kraykoms and obkoms on propagandae. The Administration of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee familiarized itself in the first three years of the war with the organization of ideological educational work in 82 oblasts and krays, which made it possible to generalize experience, to determine defects and to adopt measures for improving all agitation and propaganda work.²³

The decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) on organization of political reports of party and soviet personnel for the rural population (July 1943) was of major importance. Realizing its demands, more than 60,000 party and state managers presented reports and lectures in rural localities by July 1944. During the years of the war, a total of 3 million reports and lectures were presented in the rear.²⁴

The party's Central Committee concentrated its attention on raising the level and effectiveness of ideological educational work among the fighting men of the army and the navy. In this regard, a very important role was played by measures adopted by the Central Committee for strengthening the army's and navy's party organizations, sending a considerable number of communists from regional to military party organizations and constant concern for replenishment of party ranks. During the years of the war the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) sent into the Armed Forces 13,850 supervisory party personnel.²⁵

A most important measure was the decision on reorganizing political-propaganda organs into political directorates and political departments of the Red Army and Navy. This reorganization contributed to bolstering the responsibility of political organs for the arrangement of political work, including agitation and propaganda work, and for its closer connection to the solution of combat missions. By the end of 1944, the Red Army had more than 2,000 political organs²⁶ and by 1 June 1945--more than 3,500.²⁷

For the purpose of raising the level of ideological educational work in the army and the navy, the party's Central Committee constantly strengthened ideological organs. In the first years of the war, the best trained and most experienced ideological cadres were sent to work at the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Workers and Peasants Red Army. Groups of T/O and non-T/O agitators were created attached to the Main Political Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and the political organs of fronts, armies and divisions. The position of agitator was introduced in regiments and on ships. All this contributed to raising the quality of agitation and propaganda work.

The Lenin Komsomol was a reliable help to the party in ideological and political education of fighting men. Operating in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the Komsomol Central Committee adopted in June 1941 a decree "On Measures Relating to Military Work in the Komsomol." It set for komsomol organizations the task of bringing up komsomol members in the spirit of fidelity to the socialist Motherland and of being able to dedicatedly fight the hated enemy and serve as a model in battle.

The Communist Party throughout the entire war devoted tremendous attention to the training of ideological cadres. At the start of the fascist aggression, the High Military Pedagogic Institute switched to a 6-month period of study, and a general faculty was created in place of the three faculties. The institute trained exclusively propagandists for regiments and departments of political propaganda (subsequently political departments) of units. The Military Political School of Propagandists initially went over to a 6-month and subsequently to a 3-month period of training. For the training and retraining of military journalists and cultural and educational personnel, special courses were created. These measures in combination with the call for personal and general mobilization, in the course of which a significant portion of the political staff of the reserve was used for filling positions of personnel of the ideological front, made it possible to provide political organs with highly skilled cadres of agitators and propagandists and personnel of military organs of the press and of cultural and educational institutions.

In training of ideological personnel, an important role was played by the publication and dissemination of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. During 1941-1945, there were published more than 500 editions of works of the classical writers of Marxism and Leninism with a total printing of 17 million copies.²⁸ On the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the publication was organized of V.I. Lenin's works on military questions. A two-volume edition was published of his selected works and also "Military Correspondence of 1917-1920." Study of V.I. Lenin's works helped workers of the ideological front to develop creative thinking and to improve the forms and methods of political and military education of personnel under combat conditions.

Theoretical works of Soviet social-scientists--philosophers, economics and historians were of major value in the training of ideological cadres. Soviet historians prepared and published works glorifying the heroic past of our Motherland, promoting bolstering of the patriotism of our people and army. Prominent scientists-historians--A.M. Mankratova, I.I. Mints, M.V. Nechkina, Ye.V. Tarle--gave lectures before propagandists and agitators of the Red Army.

The party directed major attention to the training of ideological cadres and improvement of forms and methods of work with them. In formations, units and on ships, seminars and conferences were conducted with ideological personnel, usually coordinated with tasks and times of training of regular operations and with pauses in combat operations. Conferences of ideological personnel were held on the scale of the front and army where questions were discussed relating to the practice of ideological educational work and lectures and reports were read on the military and political situation. The All-Army

Conference of Agitators for Exchange of Work Experience Under Combat Conditions, held in April 1943, was very valuable. The participants of the conferences heard a substantive speech by M.I. Kalinin which was then widely used in agitation and propaganda work among the troops.

Thus, ideological work reorganized so as to take account of the work, constant party supervision of it, and the fighting, mobilizing character of ideological influence on the consciousness and feelings of the fighting men of the army and navy and workers of the rear ensured undoubted moral superiority of the Soviet people over the enemy at all stages of the war, which in the end was most important in achieving our Great Victory.

The most striking manifestation of the moral and political superiority of the Soviet people and their army and the embodiment of the spiritual strength of the Soviet individual was mass heroism at the front and in the rear. For exceptional fortitude and valor, 11,603 Soviet fighting men were conferred the title Hero of the Soviet Union and more than 7 million were awarded USSR orders and medals. The whole world came to know the immortal feats of the heroes of the Defense of Brest Fortress and Minsk, Odessa and Sevastopol, Leningrad and Kiev, Stalingrad, Tula, Novorossiysk and Kerch and the participants of the defeat of the German fascist troops at Moscow. When the situation called for it, Soviet fighting men like Private Aleksandr Matrosov and Captain Nikolay Gastello sacrificed themselves for the sake of victory over the enemy.

Fortitude, courage and military valor were displayed by Soviet troops in battles in the North Caucasus, at Kursk and Belgorod, in the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic region and beyond the Arctic Circle and in the very large-scale offensive operations in the concluding stage of the war, especially at Berlin. Soldiers of the land of socialism also displayed remarkable qualities in the course of accomplishment of the great liberating mission of the Red Army.

The Great Patriotic War confirmed the prophetic words of F. Engels that members of communist society would fight for their fatherland with zeal, fortitude and bravery which the mechanical training of capitalist armies would not be able to withstand.²⁹

Unparalleled selflessness and mass heroism were displayed by workers of the rear, women and adolescents, replacing those who had gone to the front. A total of 198 persons were conferred in the years of the war the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and more than 16 million were awarded orders and medals.

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The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War demonstrated to the whole world the invincible vital strength of the new developing social and economic formation, the social-political and ideological unity of Soviet society and the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the multinational Soviet state. At the same time, the Great Victory was a demonstration of the indestructibility of the moral spirit of the Soviet people and the triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The strength of our ideology elevated in the eyes of the workers of the entire world the moral and political nature of socialism. World War II clearly proved that the ideology of fascism and its doctrines of racism, chauvinism and anticommunism and the idea of world dominance could not become and did not become the basis of a firm moral spirit for the armies and the population of the states of the aggressive block. Outrages, violence and brigandage carried out by the aggressors in occupied countries in the end acted on them in a disintegrating way and evoked wrath and hatred toward them from the subjugated peoples. The reactionary postulates of fascism and militarism and the desire of aggressors for the establishment of world hegemony were alien to the interests of workers and of all progressive forces of the planet.

At the same time, historical experience has shown what a tremendous danger the ideology of militant anticommunism and antisovietism, neonazism and revanchism holds for the world. It even today is being widely used for the preparation of a new world war by the most aggressive militarist and chauvinist forces of international reaction, headed by the ruling circles of the United States. In this regard, the results and lessons of the Great Patriotic War call all progressive mankind to increasing vigilance, to a decisive struggle against the aggressive aspirations of international imperialism and to a struggle for peace and international security.

As was emphasized at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we henceforward will not spare our efforts for the USSR Armed Forces to have everything necessary for the reliable defense of our Fatherland and its allies so that no one could catch us unawares. 30

On the threshold of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory over fascism a meeting was held in Warsaw of top party and state figures of Warsaw-Pact countries. Its participants examined the question of extending the period of operation of the Pact on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid concluded in Warsaw 14 May 1955. In a triumphal setting, the leaders of the delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed a protocol on extending the pact for 20 years with subsequent prolongation for another 10 years. The meeting in Warsaw was a memorable landmark on the road of further strengthening the unity and solidarity of states of the socialist community, an invincible force in the struggle for the peaceful future of the planet.

The June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee determined the basic tasks of strategic character of the party's ideological work in the light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. At this and subsequent plenums of the Central Committee, in the materials of the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference (December 1984) and in the speeches of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, a deep analysis was provided of the state of ideological, political and educational work and ways were determined of reorganizing many of its sectors and spheres will taking into account the redirection of the party's and the people's attention to the solution of qualitatively new historic missions.

Ideological work is also increasingly assuming the foreground in the training of the Soviet Armed Forces for rebuffing any aggressor. The growing ideological conviction of Soviet fighting men, whole-hearted devotion to their own people and close rallying around the party and the Soviet government are constantly being displayed in fulfillment by personnel of their sacred duty to the Motherland, in improving military skills and in socialist competition under the slogan "for the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and for the 27th CPSU Congress--our selfless military labor!"

"Soviet patriotism," it was emphasized in an address at the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference held in Moscow in December 1984, "was and continues to be one of the greatest spiritual gains of October, the result of purposeful ideological educational work by the party and of all socialist life. And we must with special care and party attention preserve and expand its heritage, otherwise there would not be the sacred feeling of love for the Fatherland or fidelity to international duty."³¹ The party believes that teaching of history to be an important tool in the inculcation of civic mindedness, Soviet patriotism and internationalism.

In fulfilling the requirements of the party and the directives of the Extraordinary March and April (1985) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, military councils, commanders, political organs, party and komsomol organizations of the army and navy are ably using the chronicles of the Great Patriotic War and other heroic pages of the history of our Motherland for forming in Soviet fighting men high moral, political and fighting qualities and for ensuring their active display in the defense of the great gains of socialism.

The many-sided experience of the war and the experience of maintaining constant spiritual superiority over the aggressor constitute our priceless heritage. In the army and in the navy, they are studied, explained, used and developed, taking into account the difficult and dangerous military and political situation and the existence on the planet of colossal stocks of weapons of mass destruction and aiming at the most perfect means and method of armed struggle while keeping in mind the present level of preparedness and the special features of different groups of personnel.

This work among the troops and in the fleets in which an active part is taken by front-line soldiers and veterans of the Armed Forces made wise by combat experience and by persons working in literature and art yields remarkable fruit.

Today's defenders of the Motherland have not undergone the severe tests that fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are faithful to the heroic traditions of our army and our people.

The indestructible moral spirit of the Soviet people and the fighting men of the army and navy transform all the component parts of our defense and combat potential into a mighty monolith, serving as a guarantee of the constructive labor of the Soviet people and a guarantee of universal peace on earth.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovershenstvovaniye razvitogo sotsializma i ideologicheskaya rabota partii v svete resheniy iyun'skogo (1983 g.) Plenuma TsK KPSS. Materialy Vsesoyuznoy nauchno-practicheskoy konferentsii. Moskva, 10-11 dekabrya 1984 g." [Improvement of Developed Socialism and Ideological Work of the Party in the Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Materials of the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference. Moscow, 10-11 December 1984]. Moscow, 1985, p 44.
2. PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.
3. Lenin, V.I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 315.
4. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1. Moscow, 1970, p 405.
5. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee]. Vol 6. 8th ed. Moscow, 1971, p 17.
6. IZVESTIYA, 27 September 1941.
7. Lenin, V.I., op cit, Vol 18, p 336.
8. See, for example: Stalin, I.V., "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuz" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union]. 1st-5th ed., Moscow, 1942-1953; Kalinin, M.I., "Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda protiv nemetskikh zakhvatchikov" [The Patriotic War of the Soviet People Against the German Invaders]. Moscow, 1942; Yaroslavskiy, Ye.M., "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda protiv gitlerovskoy Germanii" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People Against Hitler's Germany]. Moscow, 1941; Fedoseyev, P.N., "Voyna protiv gitlerovskoy Germanii--osvoboditel'naya, spravedlivaya voyna" [The War Against Hitler's Germany--a Liberating War, a Just War]. Moscow, 1942; Mints, I.I., "Voyna Otechestvennaya--voyna spravedlivaya" [The Patriotic War--a Just War]. Frunze, 1942.
9. See Lenin, V.I., op cit, Vol 41, p 121.
10. PRAVDA, 1 May 1942.
11. See Grechko, A.A., "Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva" [The Armed Forces of the Soviet State]. Moscow, 1974, p 388.
12. Lenin, V.I., op cit, Vol 35, p 21.
13. See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 12. Moscow, 1982, p 36.
14. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz", op cit, Vol 5, Book 1, p 674; VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 5, 1984, p 98.

15. See "Partiya i armiya" [The Party and the Army]. 2nd ed., enlarged. Moscow, 1980, p 198.
16. See Seleznev, I.A., "Voyna i ideologicheskaya bor'ba" [War and Ideological Struggle]. Moscow, 1974, p 68.
17. Lenin, V.I., op cit, Vol 51, p 130.
18. See "KPSS i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil 1917-1964" [The CPSU and Building of the Soviet Armed Forces 1917-1964]. Moscow, 1965, p 324.
19. See VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 5, 1983, p 87.
20. See "Istoriya velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945], Vol 6. Moscow, 1965, 279-280.
21. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Vol 5, Book 1, p 486.
22. See ibidem, p 405.
23. See ibidem, p 406.
24. See ibidem, p 416.
25. See Petrov, Yu.P., "Stroitel'stvo politorganov, partiynykh i komsomol'skikh organizatsiy armii i flota (1918-1968)" [Building of Political Organs, Party and Komsomol Organizations of the Army and the Navy (1918-1968)]. Moscow, 1968, p 278.
26. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza", op cit, Vol 5, Book 1, p 316.
27. See VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 5, 1983, p 87.
28. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, op cit, Vol 5, Book 1, p 409.
29. See Marx, K. and Engels, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 2, p 539.
30. See "On the Convocation of the Forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks Connected with its Preparation and Holding. Address of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev."--PRAVDA, 24 April 1985.
31. Gorbachev, M.S., "Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda" [Living Work of the People]. Moscow, 1986, p 45.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ARMY GEN LELYUSHENKO ON 'LIBERATION' OF PRAGUE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Apr 85 (signed to press 2 Apr 85) pp 36-40

[Article by Army Gen D. Lelyushenko, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: "To the Assistance of Rebellious Prague"]

[Text] The Soviet Armed Forces entered Czechoslovakia's territory as early as September 1944. By the end of April 1945, after 7 months of fierce fighting, they had liberated almost all of Slovakia and large industrial centers--the cities of Moravska Ostrava and Brno. By the beginning of May 1945, however, the German fascist forces occupied even more of Czechoslovakia's territory: more than 300 kilometers from east to west and north to south, as well as the city of Prague, the nation's capital. The grouping of Hitlerite forces was also considerable--more than a million men.

In order to route the enemy and liberate Czechoslovakia as rapidly as possible, it was necessary to plan and carry out the offensive operation especially thoroughly. This mainly required time, and time is precisely what was limited. Separate talks between the Hitlerite command element and ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain were being conducted behind the Soviet Union's back. The people's liberation struggle was at a high degree of fervor in Czechoslovakia, and the party movement was expanding. Through its organ, the newspaper RUDE PRAVO, the Communist Party headed by Klement Gottwald, called upon the workers for an armed struggle against the occupiers and traitors among the national bourgeoisie. Despite counteraction by the reactionaries, following instructions from an emigre bourgeois government in London with the objective of seizing power in the nation, the communists succeeded in forming the Czech National Council and bringing about armed uprisings in a number of cities, including Prague. The partisans and rebel groups were considerably weaker than the enemy, however, and not as well armed. They needed immediate assistance.

In view of the developing complex situation, the Soviet command element decided to effect an immediate regrouping of forces in order to shatter the German fascist forces and totally liberate Czechoslovakia and Prague, its capital. Three fronts were designated to carry out the operation: the 1st Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, the 2nd Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy, and the 4th Ukrainian Front commanded by Army General A.I. Yeremenko.

The command element of the 1st Ukrainian Front planned to achieve the assigned objective by carrying out the main strike from the area of Riesa with the forces of three combined-arms armies (General V. Gordov's 3rd Guards Army, General P. Pukhov's 13th Army and General A. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army) and two tank armies (General P. Rybalko's 3rd Guards Army and the 4th Guards Army, which I was commanding at the time).

The 4th Guards Tank Army was to attack along the western banks of the Elbe and Vltava in the 13th Army zone and, interacting with adjacent armies, to take Prague on the 6th day of the operation. The beginning of the offensive by the 1st and the 2nd Ukrainian Fronts was set for 7 May 1945.

In accordance with a directive from the front commander, forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army were concentrated in the designated area and its corps were assigned the following missions: the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps was to execute a march of more than 200 kilometers, reach the forming-up site southwest of Riesa and, interacting with adjacent forces, develop the offensive toward Prague; the 10th Guards Volunteer Tank Corps was to move up to the (Kazabr-Reppe) line, which was also around 200 kilometers away, and to conduct the offensive against Prague jointly with units of the 13th Army. The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps was to proceed in the army's 2nd echelon.

The missions ahead of the Soviet fightingmen were difficult ones. In order to accomplish them successfully and rapidly, we officers and generals would not only have to demonstrate skill and find the most effective ways to route the enemy, but also to inspire the men to carry out the last large operation, to perform boldly and decisively. We had to overcome the excessive complacency which had developed in the personnel of certain units of our 1st Ukrainian Front since taking Berlin, to explain to the soldiers the importance of the Red Army's liberation mission and the need to destroy the last stronghold of the hated enemy. I recall how persistently the political organs and political workers at all levels performed this work together with the commanders. Guards Colonel Nikolay Grigoryevich Kladovoy, chief of the political section of our Guard Tank Army, together with officers M. Ivanenko, I. Yelagin, D. Kochetkov and L. Lozov, his deputies and immediate assistants, and the political workers of the units and subunits, relying upon the party and the Komsomol aktiv, let every soldier, sergeant and officer know about the directive from the front military council and explained the nature of the liberation mission and the need to respect the country's national, everyday and religious traditions and rites. At the same time, we always indicated the need to increase vigilance, to destroy Hitlerite agents in Czechoslovakia and to combat those who had betrayed the Czechoslovak people and gone over to the side of fascism. The aggressive zeal of the personnel increased even more after the commanders and political workers of the formations and units informed the fightingmen of the uprising by the workers in Prague and of the fact that they saw their liberation only in the Red Army.

...On the night of 4 May forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army began the march toward Prague. While en route, we received a report that rebelling Prague was asking for assistance, since the Hitlerites had brought additional forces into the city and planned to drown the uprising in blood. The army was ordered to speed up its advance. The columns traveled day and night and by the morning of the 6th had reached a line from which the attack could be launched. It was decided to conduct reconnaissance in force, using the forward detachments.

The situation had been ascertained by approximately 0800. The forward detachments (the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade from Guards Colonel M. Fomichev's 10th Corps and the 35th Mechanized Brigade from Guards Colonel P. Turnin's 6th Corps) supported the breakthrough of the enemy's defense with fire from tanks and guns and captured a division chief of staff with a map. It was learned from the interrogation of the prisoner that we were opposed by only one enemy regiment and that a second regiment of the enemy division was occupying a defense in the zone of advance of our neighbor to the left, Army General P. Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army.

I reported this information to Marshal Konev, front commander, and requested permission to commit the army's main forces to the battle. Ivan Stepanovich said that he would join me immediately in order to ascertain the situation on the spot. He arrived at our command post approximately 40 minutes later. During that time our forward detachments had advanced 30 kilometers into the depth of the enemy's defense. The front commander rapidly assessed the situation and had himself put into contact by telephone with General Rybalko, whom he ordered to switch immediately to an offensive without any sort of artillery or air preparation. We were permitted to commit the main forces to the battle. Rifle units of General N. Pukhov's 13th Army entered the offensive directly after the tanks. Air support was provided by General V. Ryazanov's ground-attack aircraft and A. Pokryshkin's fighters.

The offensive developed rapidly. This does not mean that it was easy, however, that the Hitlerites did not offer stiff resistance to us. In the area of the Ore Mountains, for example, the enemy blocked and mined passes and placed antitank guns in ambush. Had we entered into battle with those covering forces, the pace of the advance would undoubtedly have dropped considerably and the enemy would have put far more tanks out of action. We therefore decided to bypass the mined passes and the defended obstructions. Military astuteness came to our aid, as it did so many times during the war. The tankmen turned over every other link in the tracks to give them better traction on the rocky slopes of the mountains and crossed over where the enemy did not expect them....

Liberating the city of Teplice-Sanov on the opposite slopes of the Ore Mountains, we continued our advance toward Prague. We suddenly heard the following message over the radio: "Attention! attention! This is Czech Prague. A large number of German tanks and aircraft are attacking our city. We appeal to the heroic Red Army for support. Send tanks and aircraft to help us. Do not let our Prague be lost."

Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists informed every officer, sergeant and soldier of the appeal from the Czech patriots. It intensified the aggressive spirit of our troops even more. Operating in the difficult mountain terrain, Guardsmen in the 16th Mechanized Brigade of G. Shcherbak's 6th Guards Mechanized Corps burst into the city of Most on the morning of 8 May. The city was highly important with respect to military industry: it had a large plant for the production of synthetic gasoline. The brigade destroyed more than 20 enemy guns, routed the fascist garrison and liberated the city.

Hundreds and thousands of men, women and adolescents came out to greet the Soviet soldiers. They were Russians, Czechs, Poles, Frenchmen, Danes and people of other nationalities whom the Hitlerites had driven from their native parts to perform hard labor. Emaciated and dressed in prison garments, they rushed to our troops, hugged and kissed them, gave them flowers and yelled with tears in their eyes: "Long live our liberators!", "Long live the Russians!" and "Long live freedom!".

On the night of 7 May the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, commanded by Guards Colonel V. Buslayev, burst into the small town of Zatec (60 kilometers northwest of Prague). Guards Lieutenant Colonel O. Grebennikov, commander of a tank regiment, detected a long column of enemy motor vehicles in the semi-darkness and attacked it from the march. Other brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps soon approached and completed the defeat of the enemy. It turned out to be the staff of Field Marshal Scherner's Army Group Center, which was rushing from Jaromerz (110 kilometers northeast of Prague) to Plzen in the American zone of operations, in order to direct the forces from there. Scherner's staff ceased to exist literally in a matter of a few minutes as a result of strikes from tanks in the subunits of Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Derevyanko and Guards Lieutenant S. Bednenko.

Although on 9 May the Fuhrer's successor and new fascist leader Doenitz fulfilling the terms of Hitlerite Germany's Act of Unconditional Surrender, which had been signed a day before, issued the order for "all branches of the armed forces, all theaters of military operations, all armed organizations and individuals to halt combat operations against the former enemies at 0000 on 9 May," the enemy had no intention of laying down its weapons. It would become known after the war that fascist Germany's newly emerged ruler issued an order that same day, 9 May, which called for prolonging the struggle against Soviet forces as long as possible, because only then would the numerous units of the German fascist army be able to gain time to force their way through to the west.

Even this venture of the now nonexistent Hitlerite command was a total failure, however. The fascist forces were totally defeated, and those which remained were taken prisoner. This is how subsequent events developed during those days in May of 1945.

At approximately 0230 on 9 May the army headquarters received a radio message from Guards Colonel M. Fomichev, commander of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade,

which was operating as the army's forward detachment. He reported that Guards Captain F. Koroteyev's battalion had burst into Prague and engaged the enemy.

The main forces of the 10th Guards Tank Corps and the 5th and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, and our army's 70th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel N. Korniyushkin soon entered the city. They were followed by units of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, which included the Czech Corps of Ludwig Svoboda. The enemy's Reich SS Tank Division, the Wiking Motorized Division, the 21st Tank Division, the 20th Police Regiment, two security battalions and other units had been totally defeated by 0400 on 9 May. More than 4,000 Hitlerite soldiers and officers were captured.

When I tell about the battles fought to liberate Prague I cannot help recalling the heroic crew of a tank commanded by Guards Lieutenant I. Goncharenko. His tank was the first to burst into the enemy-held city. The crew and an assault landing force of submachine gunners boldly engaged 11 fascist combat vehicles. And they emerged the victors from that duel. It would probably be better to let renowned tankmen P. Batyrev, N. Kovrigin, A. Filippov and I. Shklovskiy, whom I met in 1965, tell the story themselves, however. This is their account.

"There it was, Prague! We entered the city between 0200 and 0300. The vehicles proceeded along unfamiliar streets. There was a barricade across one of them. The rejoicing rebels jumped onto the armor, hugging and kissing us. There was a lump in our throats.

"We had still not encountered the enemy. We moved ahead. A Czech guide who had been on our platoon commander's vehicle until that time moved over to our tank. We did not recognize the name of that courageous individual at the time. Only now have we learned that it was Frantisek Soucek, prisoner in a fascist concentration camp liberated by our tank army. He proved to be a very valuable man. We had no plans or maps of Prague, and Comrade Soucek helped us get our bearings in the city.

"With the aid of that reliable guide, we moved down a steep incline toward the Vltava in order to capture the bridges and prevent the retreating Hitlerites from destroying them. Near Manesow Bridge camouflaged self-propelled enemy guns began firing at us. Sergeant Batyrev, a gun detachment commander, returned the fire. A duel of fire began. Two enemy vehicles burst into flame, but an enemy shell fell into the turret of our tank. Ivan Grigoryevich Goncharenko, our valorous commander, was killed. We decided to fight to the end, however. Batyrev continued firing and put another self-propelled gun out of action. Senior Sergeant Shklovskiy, the mechanic-driver, and Frantisek Soucek, who was on board the vehicle, were wounded by another enemy shell. In a third hit, Sergeant Filippov, the radio operator, was seriously wounded by fragments from an enemy shell. A fourth shell then struck the tank's armor, and the cannon was jammed. Sergeant Kovrigin, the loader, was also shell-shocked. The crew decided to abandon the damaged vehicle.

"This is how our last day of fighting ended. The enemy did not succeed in blowing up the bridge, however. Our single combat with the enemy's self-propelled guns had barely ended when Senior Lieutenant V. Polegenkiy's tank company arrived at the site of the fighting. The tankmen routed the Hitlerites, crossed the bridge to the other bank of the Vltava and swept toward the center of the city."

Today, a Soviet tank stands on a pedestal in Soviet Tankmen's Square in Prague as a mark of the Czechoslovak people's respect for our soldiers. A decision by the Prague Municipality awarding the title of honored citizens of the Czechoslovak capital to I. Shklovskiy, A. Filippov, P. Batyrev and N. Kovrigin was announced in a formal setting in the capital of Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1965. Somewhat later this title was conferred upon M. Fomichev, commander of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade, and me.

It remains only to be said that on 11 May 1945 near the city of Chemnitz (now called Karl-Marx-Stadt), General Ye. Fominykh's 25th Tank Corps, which was made operationally subordinate to us, completely defeated the traitor Vlasov's band and captured him and his staff.

On 9 May 1945 Moscow, the capital of our homeland, proclaimed the liberation of Prague by the Red Army with a thunderous artillery salute. The soldiers who distinguished themselves most were awarded the great title Hero of the Soviet Union. They include Lieutenant General Ye. Belov, commander of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, Guards Lieutenant Colonel N. Korniyushkin, commander of the 70th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Derevyanko, commander of a tank company, and Guards Lieutenant S. Bednenko, commander of a tank platoon. Guards Colonel M. Fomichev, commander of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union twice. A number of formations and units were awarded the honorary Prague title, including reconnaissance battalions of the 10th Guards Tank Corps and the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. The author of this article was later awarded the title Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The medal "For the Liberation of Prague" was established on 9 June 1945 by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to commemorate the glorious victory.

The war did not end for the 4th Guards Tank Army with the liberation of Czechoslovakia's capital. As ordered by command, we took up positions to the east and southeast of Prague and cut off retreat routes to the west for the defeated German fascist forces.

The encirclement of the main forces of the German fascist Army Group Center was completed on 10 May. Almost all of the enemy grouping operating in Czechoslovakia was encircled. Only individual units of Army Group Austria on the flank of the grouping succeeded in escaping into the zone of operations of the American forces. Losing all hope of breaking out to the west, the encircled German fascist forces laid down their weapons.

The date 9 May 1945, on which the peoples of the world celebrate the Victory over German fascism, is also a national holiday for the Czechoslovak people: Liberation Day and Birthday of the New Czechoslovakia.

"Our people," states one greeting from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "will always recall that memorable day with infinite love for and gratitude to the great Soviet Union, to the glorious Soviet fightingmen who sprinkled the soil of our homeland with their blood in a fierce battle to save mankind and liberate our peoples. They will remember this day with infinite love and gratitude for the invincible liberating Soviet Army."

The last salvos of the Great Patriotic War died away 40 years ago. Forty years ago the Soviet Union demonstrated in the most convincing manner that there are no forces in the world capable of destroying socialism, of bringing to their knees a people loyal to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, devoted to the socialist homeland and rallied round the Lenin party. Unfortunately, however, some people in the west have shown that they have a short memory. Pursuing their mercenary objectives, imperialism's aggressive circles are once again making preparations for a new world war.

We remember the lessons of the war, however, and we know how to respond to the threat of war--with enhanced vigilance and combat capability on the part of the Armed Forces. As stated at the special March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee it is particularly important in the complex international situation to maintain our homeland's defense capability at a level which makes it well understood by potential aggressors that an encroachment upon the security of the Soviet Nation or its allies, upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a devastating retaliatory strike. Fightingmen of the army and navy, which are continuing the traditions of the heroic front-line fighters in a fitting manner, are always on guard, always prepared to repel any aggressor.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

JAPANESE, S. KOREAN, U.S. MILITARY COOPERATION CRITICIZED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by A. Golts under the rubric "Military-Political Commentary": "Why the Pentagon Is Filling its 'Quiver'"]

[Text] The Japanese newspaper NIHON KEIZAI recently reported that dictator Chun Doo Hwan has expressed his willingness to receive a Japanese squadron at one of the South Korean ports at any time. The newspaper stated that this will likely be Pusan or Chinhae. Tokyo has also agreed to receive South Korean military ships.

The newspaper YOMIURI has reported that there will soon be joint maneuvers by Japan's air forces and American F-16 fighter-bombers, nuclear weapons carriers, which are based in South Korea. Furthermore, these exercises will be conducted in direct proximity to the Korean coast.

The exchange of visits by Japanese and South Korean naval forces, the forthcoming military air maneuvers and other demonstrations of military activeness in the Far East are all current steps on the path to establishing an aggressive Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military bloc in East Asia.

This is not the first year American leaders have been busy with plans for putting together such a militaristic triangle. From their standpoint, all of the prerequisites exist. Washington has long had bilateral "security agreements" with Tokyo and Seoul, under which large bodies of American troops are stationed in South Korea and Japan, and many dozens of U.S. military bases are located there. It is therefore just a matter of concluding a direct military agreement between Japan and South Korea. Both the Japanese leadership and the South Korean ruler have indicated a willingness to do so. And only the fear that the signing of such an agreement will evoke an outpouring of indignation on the part of the popular masses is restraining Tokyo and Seoul from taking this step.

Washington unceasingly asserts that forging a military bloc in Asia is only a "response" to an alleged "Soviet military threat." Addressing the Japanese Parliament a year and a half ago, President Reagan even cited a proverb which says that "while it is easy to break one arrow, three arrows together cannot be broken.

It is not at all as a defense against the mythical "threat" that the Pentagon is collecting "arrows" in its "quiver," however. The recently ended American-South Korean military exercises in South Korea are proof of this. The NEW YORK TIMES has reported that special purpose units from the 7th Infantry Division, designated for interventionist actions abroad, took part in them. The emergency movement of American troops to a nation across the ocean, the conduct of punitive operations and the organization of sabotage in the "enemy's" rear area were practiced during the maneuvers. The Pentagon plans to involve also the armed forces of South Korea and Japan in the execution of such operations on the Asian Continent.

The latest moves by ruling circles of the USA, Japan and South Korea, which indicate that the creation of the aggressive bloc is entering the final phase, is causing alarm and indignation in many states of Asia. The Pyongyang newspaper RODONG SINMOON stresses the fact that this policy is drastically exacerbating the situation in the Far East and runs counter to the aspirations of all peoples advocating detente and peace in the region. And one has to agree with this opinion.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

'W. GERMAN LIES' ON SUPPOSED PACT AGGRESSOR UNIT DENOUNCED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Maj V. Nikanorov: "Somewhere in a 'Restricted Area...']

[Text] The first mission is to blow up an important bridge on the Hamburg-Munchen Autobahn. The second is to strike and cut off a railway line in the Ruhr district.... It seems that this is the plan under which servicemen of the Warsaw Pact states are operating as they prepare to conduct operations in the FRG and neighboring nations! The DPA [German Press Agency], which made this astounding "discovery," reported the following: "Somewhere in a highly restricted area in Russia one can find a scene which no one would expect to see in reality: soldiers in the uniform of the Bundeswehr. All orders are issued in flawless German. The servicemen orient themselves with the latest maps of the FRG...." This is followed by statements with increasingly dramatic effect which allege that the Warsaw Pact is planning acts of subversion and terrorism against highly important military facilities in the interior of the NATO nations and against high-ranking political figures of those nations.

How should this fabrication be assessed? As another attempt to catch a non-existent black cat in a dark room? Western propaganda has engaged in such attempts more than once. Here we have the latest fabricated "sensation." The DPA is right about one thing: no one expects the scene it has described, because it is in fact not a reality. It exists only in the sick minds of those who dictated these malicious fabrications to the agency.

We should mention in passing that the slanderers do not limit their flight of fantasy to the narrow bounds of "a secret training ground in the interior of Russia." They try to convince their fellow citizens that "treacherous agents" of the socialist powers are intensively infiltrating the territory of the FRG, disguised as tourists, athletes or drivers of transiting trucks. And when this involves a truck from the Soviet Union, one of the two people sitting in the cab may be a chauffeur, but the other is "an officer of the Soviet secret service" for certain. And if a bus carrying tourists from a socialist nation suddenly stops by the side of a West German highway, these people--and the DPA informants "are certain of this"--are treacherous Red spies or even worse, saboteurs determining where to conceal a couple or more bombs. In short, if the DPA is to be believed, spies and saboteurs are besieging the FRG on all sides.

Why was this vile lie needed? Who benefits from frightening citizens of the FRG with accounts of "parachutists, frogmen and tankmen" who, according to the DPA "information," possess "not only personal weapons with silencers, but are also in part equipped with chemical and biological weapons"? The explanation is quite simple. Certain circles in the West, who are vitally interested in expanding the arms race, are attempting to neutralize protests by broad popular masses incensed by the unrestrained rush toward the nuclear abyss. The proponents of armament assume that the frightened inhabitant will view the deployment of American first-strike nuclear missiles in his native country with less fear and will submissively resign himself to the need to tighten his belt, because this will make it possible to allocate more marks for acquiring the "new generation" of weapons. This is precisely the purpose of the fairly tattered scarecrow of the "Soviet military threat," which they are attempting to give a fresher appearance.

Speaking in Italy recently at a conference of Atlantists, General B. Rogers, Supreme Commander of Joint NATO Forces in Europe, repeated the usual bunch of fabrications about alleged intentions of the Soviet Union "to control, frighten and blackmail" nations of the West. "The main problem facing NATO today," Rogers said in conclusion, "is to convince our population that this threat exists."

It is indeed not an easy task. How does one convince people of the existence of something which does not exist? And so they have to invent fantastic exercises at a mythical training ground somewhere in a highly restricted area....

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BRIEFS

PORT VISIT AT MAPUTO--The large ASW ship Strogii, accompanied by a tanker, will make a five-day official friendly visit to the Port of Maputo in accordance with an agreement of June 22, 1985. Soviet sailors will take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the declaration of independence of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 85 p 3] 12821

VISIT OF KOREAN JOURNALISTS--A delegation of Korean military journalists, headed by Sr Col Kim Dok Khen, chief editor of the central organ of the KNDR Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, the "Chosum Inmingun," visited the "Krasnaya Zvezda" newspaper editorial offices from June 19 to 27. The guests familiarized themselves with the work experience of the "Krasnaya Zvezda" editorial board collective in their preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress. They visited units in the Moscow and Kiev Military Districts where they were briefed on the training and living conditions of Soviet soldiers. The delegation visited sites of revolutionary and combat glory in Moscow and Kiev. The Korean military journalists were received by the Deputy to the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, Lt Gen D. A. Volkogonov. The delegation departed Moscow on June 27. /Text/ /Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 85 p 3/ 12869

CSO: 1801/260

AFGHANISTAN

TIME BOMBS DISCOVERED, DEFUSED IN MOSQUE

LD062145 Moscow TASS in English 2119 GMT 6 Aug 85

[Text] Kabul, August 6, TASS--TASS correspondent Vladimir Volkodav reporting.

Counter-revolutionaries were prevented from staging a fresh crime in Afghanistan. On August 2 bandits planted three powerful time bombs in a big mosque in the city of Herat. They were to go off at the time when the Mosque was crowded with worshippers--Moslems coming to offer their Friday prayers. Two of the defused bombs bear the mark "Made in U.S.A." and the third one was manufactured in Italy.

In their hatred for revolutionary Afghanistan imperialist forces resort to mass terror against the civilian population. Guided and armed by Western secret services, bandits who are pictured in the West as "defenders of the faith" spare neither Islamic shrines nor Moslem religious figures. For example, a band routed last spring had tried to blow up the famed mosque in the city of Mazar-e Sharif, known to the whole world as one of the most beautiful architectural monuments.

Not so long ago bandits threw a grenade at a group of students attending a religious school at one of the mosques in Herat. The mullah of the central mosque in the city of Andkhvy was murdered in front the worshippers because "he failed to curse those who allowed their children to attend school." Several clergymen were killed by bandits for refusing to cooperate with counter-revolutionary bands, and a group of clergymen died in the blast of a mine planted at the mosque of the Kabul Polytechnical Institute. Over the years since the April revolution counter-revolutionaries killed more than 200 patriotically minded Moslem clergymen, tens of mosques were desecrated and destroyed.

CSO: 1812/316

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

ORUZGAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES 'ROUTED'--Kabul, August 4, TASS--One more counter-revolutionary gang, sent inside Afghanistan from abroad, has been routed in Oruzgan Province, BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY reported. Scores of bandits were killed, many were taken prisoner. During the operation, Afghan security forces uncovered weapons and munitions depots and fuel stocks, seized great quantities of foreign-made weapons, including anti-tank mines, rockets and grenade-launchers, and seditious anti-Afghan publications. Realizing the futility of fighting against people's power, more and more members of counter-revolutionary units lay down arms. A gang of 86 people have recently surrendered to the authorities in Bagdhis Province. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0842 GMT 4 Aug 85 LD]

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September 17, 1985